Spielmann v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 03 December 1940
• Citation: 295 N.W. 1,236 Wis. 240
• Parties: SPIELMANN v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. HAMKINS v. SAME. MILKENT v. SAME.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

236 Wis. 240

295 N.W. 1

SPIELMANN

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

HAMKINS

v.SAME.

MILKENT

v.SAME.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 3, 1940.

Appeals from judgments of the Circuit Court for Dane County; August C. Hoppmann, Judge.

Affirmed.

Action by Emil Spielmann, John Hamkins and John J. Milkent against the Industrial Commission and Nash-Kelvinator, a corporation, to review orders of the industrial Commission denying to the plaintiffs compensation under the Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Act, Ch. 108, Stats. From judgments affirming the orders of the commission, the plaintiffs appeal. The cases were submitted and argued together. The facts are stated in the opinion.Max Raskin, of Milwaukee (Wm. F. Quick, of Milwaukee, of counsel), for appellants.

Stanley Rector, of Madison, Horace J. Mellum, of Kenosha and Lines, Spooner & Quarles, of Milwaukee (Leo Mann, of Milwaukee, of counsel), for respondents.

FOWLER, Justice.

The defendant Nash-Kelvinator Corporation, is engaged in a variety of manufactures, among them the manufacture of Nash automobiles. It owns plants at Milwaukee, Racine and Kenosha. The plaintiff Spielmann was employed in the Milwaukee plant, plaintiffs Hamkins and Milkent in the Kenosha plant. All three plaintiffs lost employment by reason of the shutting down of the plants in which they were respectively engaged. They applied to the Industrial Commission for unemployment compensation under Ch. 108, Wisconsin Stats. The Spielmann case will be first considered.

The act provides for payment to the state by each employer who is subject to the act of a certain percentage of his pay roll. The accumulated payments are credited to an individual fund of the employer who makes them. The state from the individual fund so accumulated pays unemployment compensation to employees of the employer who accumulates the fund who lose their employment and who are eligible to receive unemployment compensation under the terms of the act. The Industrial Commission administers the act. The Commission denied compensation to the plaintiffs because it considered that they were ineligibile under sec.108.04(5) (a) of the Act, which reads: “An employe who has left (or *** lost) his employment with an employer because of a strike or other bona fide labor dispute shall not be eligible for benefits from such *** employer's account for any week in which such strike or other bona fide labor dispute is in active progress in the establishment in which he is or was employed.”

The industrial Commission denied compensation under this statute on the ground that the Milwaukee and Kenosha plants constituted an “establishment” within the meaning of this statute because “of the physical proximity, functional integrality and general unity” of these plants.

It was stipulated at the hearing that the employees of the Kenosha plant “went on strike Monday morning, October 2, 1939, and thereby caused the shutting down of the said Kenosha plant” on the morning of that day, and “the shutting down of said Milwaukee plant” at 10 o'clock A. M. of that day; that said strike was a strike or other bona fide labor dispute which was in active progress to October 20th and the Milwaukee plant resumed operations on October 23d. Upon this stipulation and the finding that the Milwaukee and Kenosha plants constituted an “establishment” the Commission determined that the plaintiff was ineligible to compensation under par. (a) of said section.

The evidentiary facts upon which the Commission found the Milwaukee and Kenosha plants constituted a single “establishment” are without dispute. They were summarized by the Commission as set out in the margin.¹

It appears from this summary that although the two plants were forty miles apart, they were just as much a single establishment for the manufacture of automobiles as they would have been had they been in two buildings adjacent to each other, or in separate parts of the same building. Upon this finding and the stipulation above stated the Commission concluded that the plaintiff “lost his employment because of a bona fide labor dispute” which “remained in active progress in the establishment” during the term of plaintiff's unemployment within the meaning of sec. 108.04(5) (a), Stats.

[1] The appellant urges eight facts that he claims show that the two plants do not constitute a single establishment: (1) “The two are forty miles apart.” This is covered above. (2) “Each has its separate wage and labor contract.” But each craft in a single plant may also have these. (3) “Each has its own seniority and service records.” So has each craft in a single plant. Seniority rights in one craft give an employee no rights in any other craft. (4) “Each has its own labor union to represent it.” So may each craft in a single plant. (5) “Negotiations for working conditions in one are carried on without contact with the other.” So it may be as to each craft, or a separate department in a single plant. (6) “An employee in one plant has no standing in the other.” Also an employee in one craft in a single plant has no standing in any other craft. (7) “Each has its own hiring and firing department.” So may each department in a single plant. (8) “In each the individual employee, his work, tools, hiring and discharge, immediate relationship with his employer is separate and distinct.” So they may be as to different crafts or departments in a single plant. As the same situations may exist as to different crafts or departments in a single plant, none of the things stated, and all of them together seem to us not to control the matter.

[2][3][4] The public policy declaration of the statute is relied on as somehow affecting the question. We do not see anything in the declaration inconsistent with the decision of the Commission. Maybe the statute does not afford the best means of effecting its purpose. Maybe administration of it fails to afford employees in different situations the same rights to compensation. But this does not defeat the statute, or compel or permit departure from or violation of the terms of the statute in awarding compensation. As the law is written, so must it be administered, although its administration in some situations denies compensation for loss of employment resulting from no fault of the employee and the loss is beyond his power to prevent.

Much is made by appellant of giving to the word “establishment” its ordinary meaning. A multitude of meanings of the word is given in the dictionaries. In Webster, one of these meanings is a “permanent commercial organization”; another is “a manufacturing establishment.” Both of these definitions fit the instant situation. The two plants manifestly constitute an establishment for the manufacture of automobiles, else the company has no establishment for their manufacture.

[5] Rules of statutory construction are relied on by both parties. There is no dispute as to what these rules are. No one of them may be relied on to the exclusion of others. The purpose of the statute must be considered and the statute must be construed to effect that purpose, if it is discoverable, if such construction is possible. Manifestly the language of the act itself must be considered. In the instant act we find in sec. 108.01, Stats., that it is “the employer” upon whom the burden is placed to accumulate the fund out of which benefits are to be paid; that it is “industrial and business units” that shall pay the part of the social cost of unemployment imposed on employers; and that it is “the company” that can reasonably be required to accumulate the fund; it is the “employer” that is by provisions of the act encouraged to furnish steady employment. All these declarations of purpose point to the construction of the statute reached by the Commission. It is also to be noted that the fact that an employee is not himself at fault for his loss of employment is not the sole reason for suspension of benefits. Par. (b) of sec. 108.04(5) provides for such suspension in case the loss of employment is caused by “act of God, fire, or other catastrophe, or act of civil or military authority,” directly affecting the place of employment. As well may suspension result from ineligibility to compensation.

[6][7][8] It is suggested that the use of the word “in” instead of “by” in the clause “establishment in which he is or was employed” indicates that the word establishment was used in the sense of a definite place. Perhaps the use of “by” would have more emphasized the fact that the word “establishment” was used in a comprehensive rather than a restricted sense, but we consider that the use of “in” does not preclude the meaning given to par. (a) of the statute by the Commission. Legislatures can not be conclusively presumed to have used such fine discrimination in their use of prepositions. The meaning of the word “establishment” is to be drawn from the whole act rather than from so insignificant a thing as a single preposition. We consider that the conclusion of the Commission must be sustained.

In the cases of Hamkins and Milkent the plaintiffs lost their employment on September 26, 1938. At that time there was no strike at Kenosha. There was, however, labor trouble in the Racine plant on and prior to September 26th that the Commission found constituted a “bona fide labor dispute” in active progress within the meaning of par. (a) of said section. The facts constituting this bona fide labor dispute in active progress were summarized by the Commission as stated in the margin.²

This trouble, referred to in the summary as a blockade, was caused by...