Spiking School Dist. No. 71, DeKalb County v. Purported 'Enlarged School Dist. R-11, DeKalb County, Mo.'

• Decision Date: 14 January 1952
• Docket Number: No. 42019,R-I,DE,42019
• Citation: 362 Mo. 848,245 S.W.2d 13
• Parties: SPIKING SCHOOL DIST. NO. 71, DE KALB COUNTY et al. v. PURPORTED 'ENLARGED SCHOOL DISTRICTKALB COUNTY, MISSOURI,' et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 13

245 S.W.2d 13

362 Mo. 848

SPIKING SCHOOL DIST. NO. 71, DE KALB COUNTY et al. v. PURPORTED 'ENLARGED SCHOOL DISTRICT R-II, DE KALB COUNTY,

MISSOURI,' et al.

No. 42019.

Supreme Court of Missouri, en Banc.

Jan. 14, 1952.

Essie Ward, King City, Fred Koling, Albany, E. L. Redman, Albany, for appellants.

Harold Miller, Maysville, for respondents.

DALTON, Judge.

Action for a declaratory judgment to test the validity of the consolidation of certain school districts under RSMo 1949, Secs. 165.657, 165.707, V.A.M.S. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and assigned as grounds for dismissal that the petition failed to state facts upon which relief could be granted and stated no proper grounds for relief by a declaratory judgment action. The motions were sustained and plaintiffs' petition was dismissed. Plaintiffs have appealed.

This case was first heard in Division Two of this Court where an opinion was prepared but failed to get a carrying vote. The case was transferred to the Court en Banc where it was argued and reassigned. It was later reargued and reassigned. Since the opinion in Division Two properly states the facts, we will adopt the same with some modification and without quotation marks. We will also adopt without quotation marks portions of other opinions prepared in this cause.

The plaintiffs are six former common school districts of Polk Township, DeKalb County, Missouri, their boards of directors and officers, a town school district together with its directors and several individual resident taxpayers, allegedly representing a class of persons within the respective districts. Plaintiffs seek to question the legality of the formation of the new consolidated school district, Enlarged School District R-II, DeKalb County, Missouri, the validity of the election of its directors and their authority to act as such. The defendants are the other former common school districts and their officers and directors who did not join in this action as plaintiffs, the new consolidated district and its officers, the judges of the County Court of DeKalb County, a township trustee, the DeKalb County Treasurer, the County Board of Education of DeKalb County, the Superintendent of Schools of DeKalb County, the Attorney General of the State of Missouri and certain named persons allegedly representing a class of persons, to wit, residents, taxpayers and partrons within the respective districts.

The plaintiffs alleged that the six plaintiff common school districts, by appropriate and proper proceedings, had been annexed to the plaintiff town district, King City School District No. 87, in October, November and December, 1949; that County Boards of Education were purportedly formed, under the statute, supra, in Andrew and DeKalb Counties in May 1949; that the 'purported County Board of Education of DeKalb County, Missouri, did attempt to form and organize an enlarged school district to be composed of' the six plaintiff common school districts and other districts and 'purported to call and hold a special election' on October 21, 1949; that by the purported special election held October 21, 1949, the plaintiff school disricts and the defendant common school districts, four of which are in Andrew County, were purportedly consolidated into 'Enlarged School District R-II, DeKalb County, Missouri'; that a purported special election was held for the purpose of electing a Board of Directors and directors were declared elected and said directors purported to organize as such board of directors of said reorganized district; and that said directors have purported to act as such.

Plaintiffs further alleged that said 'Enlarged School District R-II of DeKalb County' was illegal, nonexistent, ineffective and void; and that it had 'no legal political status', because by geographical location and convenience, the six plaintiff common school districts naturally belonged to and were a part of the King City School District No. 87 rather than the new enlarged district; and that the incorporation of the six plaintiff common school districts into the new district deprived plaintiffs of certain fundamental rights and their children of the best education in available schools. In this connection it is alleged that the county boards of education had agreed with the plaintiffs and promised them a choice of districts but arbitrarily proceeded in disregard of the understanding and the best interests of the plaintiffs and their school children. It is alleged that the County Board of Education of DeKalb County, attempting to call the special election, failed to comply with the provisions of the statute and particularly failed to give due and proper notice; and that the election was not 'duly and regularly called by the County Board of Education of DeKalb County, Missouri.' It is charged that directors of the new district were chosen without proper notice and that patrons in the plaintiff district were not given the right to a voice in the selection of the directors. It is also alleged that the enlargement of the district invades the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and that the statute (Laws Mo. 1947, Vol. II, p. 370) is unconstitutional in eight particulars. It is alleged that the plaintiffs have certain outstanding obligations and contracts and that they are entitled to certain tax money which the county officials propose to appropriate to the use of the new district. It is alleged that certain named defendants, purporting to be the Board of Directors of said purported 'Enlarged School District R-II, DeKalb County, Missouri,' have without any legal authority or right whatsoever, since the 19th day of November, 1949, usurped, held, used, exercised and held themselves out to be school directors of said purported 'Enlarged School District No. R-II, DeKalb County, Missouri,' purported to be a reorganized school district reorganized under Senate Bill 307, Laws of Missouri, 1947, Vol. 2, page 370, V.A.M.S. Sec. 165.657 et seq., that said defendants unlawfully and illegally claim that said reorganized district, includes within its boundaries the six plaintiff common school districts, 'alleged herein to be now a part of King City School District No. 87, Gentry County, Missouri'; and that said defendants claim the money and properties of said common school districts and are 'unlawfully and illegally attempting to supervise, exercise dominion, jurisdiction and control thereof and of their school functions.' It is alleged, as to the consolidations, that the Attorney General 'has deferred the question of bringing of actions concerning their alleged validity and the bringing of quo warranto proceedings to the judgment and discretion of the several prosecuting attorneys of the several counties, and has declined to bring quo warranto proceedings in this instance,' and it is alleged that the Prosecuting Attorney of DeKalb County refused to lend his office to this proceeding and in fact is respondents' counsel here, as he was in the trial court. Declaratory relief appropriate to each allegation is prayed.

This court has jurisdiction of this appeal as J. E. Taylor, Attorney General of Missouri, a state officer, as such, is a party defendant in the cause. Art. V, Sec. 3 Constitution of Missouri, 1945, V.A.M.S.

Appellants first assign error on the dismissal of their petition and contend that 'the court erred in holding that a declaratory judgment action does not lie and is not available to plaintiffs in this proceeding.' It does not appear from this record on what ground the trial court acted, but several grounds were stated in the motions to dismiss. If the court properly dismissed the petition, it is of course immaterial on what ground the court acted or assigned as grounds therefor. Holland Banking Co. v. Republic Nat. Bank, 328 Mo. 577, 41 S.W.2d 815, 820; Huttig v. Brennan, 328 Mo. 471, 41 S.W.2d 1054, 1062.

Appellants argue that the petition alleges the reorganized district 'was illegally formed and its directors were purporting to hold office without authority of law'; that 'the action of the court in dismissing plaintiffs' petition wholly deprives plaintiffs of any and all remedy for the wrongs and grievances set out in their petition'; that the remedy provided by quo warranto is not available to plaintiff, as the prosecuting attorney of the county is of counsel for defendants and plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law; that this action 'seeks to declare common school districts to be now a part of King City School district * * * seeks for a declaration of ownership of properties and money * * * seeks to put to rest conflicting claims of political status and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity'; and that the petition 'adequately states a cause of action for declaratory judgment relief.' In their supplemental brief, appellants concede that 'all of the points in the instant case are closely related to the question of legality of the purported R-II district' and, accordingly, they direct their arguments to that question and insist that 'the purported Enlarged School District R-II is not legally organized and its purported board of directors is not legally elected.' Appellants say: 'The gist of all the complaints is that the County Board of Education did not follow the statutes, did not stay with the statutory authority wherein it was created and the power vested, violated the terms of the statute and exceeded their statutory authority in the purported reorganization of the district.'

Respondents insist that the six plaintiff common school districts are not proper parties to bring this action; that it is against public policy to permit the use of a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of school organization proceedings, or to allow a remedy to any party for such purpose, except to the state by quo warranto; that no justiciable controversy exists even if a declaratory judgment action is a proper remedy; and that, in...