Spiller v. Sherrill, 15390

• Decision Date: 31 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 15390,15390
• Citation: 518 S.W.2d 268
• Parties: Norma SPILLER, Relator, v. Charles SHERRILL, District Judge, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 268

518 S.W.2d 268

Norma SPILLER, Relator, v. Charles SHERRILL, District Judge, et al., Respondents.

No. 15390.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas San Antonio.

Dec. 31, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1975.

Cox, Smith, Smith, Hale & Guenther, Inc., San Antonio, Smith, Davis, Rose, Finley & Hofmann, San Angelo, for relator.

Lee & Lee, Mason, for respondents.

KLINGEMAN, Justice.

This is an original proceeding for a writ of prohibition. ¹ On October 31, 1974, this Court granted a motion for leave to file a petition by Norma Spiller, relator, for a writ of prohibition against Hon. Charles Sherrill, District Judge, and Hugh M. Spiller, respondents, and on such date we entered an order and judgment conditionally granting the writ of prohibition sought by relator. Such proceedings were filed in this Court to protect relator in her continued exclusive use and occupancy of a tract of 999.4 acres of land which is described in and is the subject of an Order Dissolving Interlocutory Trust and Lease dated March 11, 1974.

The herein proceedings arose out of a divorce proceeding styled 'In the Matter of the Marriage of Norma Spiller, Petitioner, and Hugh M. Spiller, Respondent,' in Cause No. 2363, in the 216th Judicial District Court of Kimble County, Texas, on which an appeal has been perfected and is pending in this Court. In such divorce proceedings, Luretha S. Damon was also defendant.

It appears from the record before us that on the 17th day of February, 1972, the trial court entered an order and judgment entitled 'Decree of Divorce and Agreed Interlocutory Order.' This judgment is quite lengthy, covering many things, including the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and respondent, partition and division of various properties, and other matters. With regard to the 999.4 acre tract here involved, a trust is imposed thereon with M. C. Blackburn as trustee. The order further provides that upon removal of respondent Hugh M. Spiller's livestock from such tract, said premises shall thereafter be operated by Norma Spiller, who shall be entitled to the exclusive use and possession thereof pending the entry of a judgment in the proceeding which disposes of all issues and which becomes final, with an allowance to Norma Spiller, at her option, of an additional 120 days exclusive use of such premises from the date any such judgment does become final in order for Norma Spiller to orderly market such livestock that may be necessary; and that during such period of exclusive occupancy, Norma Spiller shall pay Hugh M. Spiller the sum of $250.00 per month. This order is not only signed by the presiding judge but is approved and agreed to in writing by Norma Spiller and her attorney and by Hugh M. Spiller and his attorney and contains acknowledgments of Norma Spiller and Hugh M. Spiller.

On March 11, 1974, the trial court entered an order designated, 'Order Dissolving Interlocutory Trust and Lease,' in which order the trial court finds the 999.4 acre tract to be the separate property of Hugh M. Spiller; the trust is dissolved; and Norma Spiller is ordered and directed to remove all livestock from said tract and deliver possession of said land and premises to respondent not later than 12:00 noon on April 15, 1974.

On March 12, 1974, the trial court entered its decree entitled 'Final Judgment' which, among other things, makes extensive findings as to the status of various properties; decrees that relator take nothing by her suit against Luretha Damon, and take nothing by her action for damages against respondent; makes an extensive partition and division of properties, and further provides that all relief not specifically granted to either party is specifically denied. This judgment contains a notice of appeal by both petitioner and respondents to this Court.

Relator thereafter filed a motion to set aside the Final Judgment and Order Dissolving Interlocutory Trust and Lease, and to grant a new trial in which it complains of many things. ² Such motion was overruled by the trial court, to which judgment, ruling and order the petitioner excepted and gave notice of appeal to this Court. The petitioner, thereafter, timely filed an appeal bond and subsequently filed a supersedeas bond in the amount set by the Court .

Respondent subsequently filed a motion to require delivery of the 999.4 acre tract by relator to respondent and asked that the court enter its order directing the sheriff or other proper officer to eject the petitioner from such lands and place respondent in actual physical possession of same. The court, by letter to the various attorneys, stated that he felt that he had no other alternative except to grant respondents' motion. Petitioner, thereafter, filed in this Court a motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition, which was granted as hereinbefore set forth.

In support of her petition for writ of prohibition, relator asserts three points. (1) Relator is entitled to the continued exclusive use and occupancy of the 999.4 acres of land in question pursuant to the written agreement made between relator and respondent and entered as an agreed order of the court under date of February 17, 1972. (2) Relator is entitled to the continued exclusive use of the 999.4 acres of land in question because the Court's Order Dissolving Interlocutory Trust and Lease dated March 11, 1974, has been properly superseded. (3) Relator's continued exclusive use and occupancy of the property in question is the proper subject of protection by this Court ancillary to her appeal and in the furtherance of the protection by this Court of its jurisdiction.

Respondent urges that the order of February 17, 1972, (Decree of Divorce and Agreed Interlocutory Trust and Lease) was not an agreed order within the meaning of the law; that it was an interlocutory order over which the trial court retained control until a final judgment had been entered; that interlocutory orders, except where provided by statute, are not appealable, and, in any event, relator had not properly perfected her appeal; and that relator has failed to show any threat to the jurisdiction of this Court, or that the trial court had acted or for threatening to act in excess of its own jurisdiction.

We will discuss the various contentions urged by relator and respondent.

QUESTION OF OUR JURISDICTION

( a) Our power to issue extraordinary writs is derived from Article 1823, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. (1964). Where the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals has been invoked, that Court has power to issue all writs necessary to enforce and protect its jurisdiction and to preserve the subject-matter of the litigation in order to make its decrees effective. Wieser v. Manning, 471 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.--Waco 1971, no writ); Dawson v. First National Bank of Troup, 417 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1967, no writ); Lee v. Lee, 355 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston 1962, mandamus overruled); Madison v. Martinez, 42 S.W.2d 84 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1931, writ ref'd); Rule 1823, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. (1964). Relator has timely filed a notice of appeal and has timely filed an appeal bond in the divorce proceeding to which this original proceeding is ancillary and such appeal is now pending in this Court.

( b) Respondent contends that the decree and order dated February 17, 1972, was not a final judgment but was interlocutory in nature and that it is not the proper subject of an appeal to this Court. Relator in the original proceeding now before us is not complaining of the order of February 17, 1972, but is complaining of the order of March 11, 1974, which dissolves the agreed order and lease agreement of February 17, 1972. Relator, in the proceeding herein, is asking this Court to protect relator's exclusive use and occupancy of the 999.4 acre tract provided for in the order of February 17, 1972. Moreover, there is now a final judgment in said divorce decree which was entered on March 12, 1974. There is now pending before this Court an appeal from such final judgment. ³ Relator timely gave notice and timely filed her appeal bond in said cause. An examination of the appeal bond shows that relator took an appeal from the final judgment entered in said cause dated March 12, 1974, and the Order Dissolving Interlocutory Trust and Lease dated March 11, 1974.

The question of what is a final judgment has been a recurring problem in this State. An excellent discussion of interlocutory and final judgments is found in North East Independent School District v . Aldridge, supra, wherein the Court said:

'There are a great number of decisions by Courts of Civil Appeals and by the Commissions of Appeals dealing with finality of judgments in various fact situations. It would serve no good purpose to review them here. Analysis of the decisions we have discussed is sufficient to lead us to the statement of a rule for determining, in most instances, whether judgments in which parties and issues made by the pleadings are not disposed of in express language are, nevertheless, final for appeal purposes. When a judgment, not intrinsically interlocutory in character, is rendered and entered in a case regularly set for a conventional trial on the merits, no order for a separate trial of issues having been entered pursuant to ...