Spillers v. State
| Citation | 268 Ark. 217,595 S.W.2d 650 |
| Decision Date | 10 March 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
| Parties | Larry Eugene SPILLERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 80-22. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Arkansas |
Duncan & Davis by A. Wayne Davis, Little Rock, for appellant.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by Dennis R. Molock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
A jury found appellant guilty of false imprisonment in the first degree (Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1703 (Repl.1977)) and battery in the first degree (Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1601 (Repl.1977)) and assessed his punishment at 31/2 years and 91/2 years, respectively.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when the prosecuting attorney was allowed to breach a pretrial agreement not to use the appellant's nor his codefendant's cross-implicating statements.
Appellant and his codefendant each made an in custodial statement to the police implicating the other. The attorney for the codefendant filed a motion for severance alleging that his client would suffer undue prejudice if tried with the appellant. At the pretrial hearing, appellant's attorney made an oral motion that any cross-references in the statements should be deleted if the trials were not severed but did not move for severance. From a review of the record, it is apparent that the trial court denied the codefendant's severance motion with the understanding that the prosecuting attorney had agreed "that no effort would be made to introduce the written statements."
During the prosecuting attorney's opening statement, he said: "After staying in jail for a number of days, Mr. Walker (the codefendant) revealed who the other individual in the car was, the individual, the defendant, Eugene Spillers (appellant)." Appellant sought a mistrial asserting this was a breach of the agreement, the statements were not shown as being voluntary, and the statements were fundamentally unfair. In chambers the court denied appellant's motion for a mistrial because no prejudicial error had occurred inasmuch as the statement merely identified one of the occupants of the automobile. The court instructed that there would be The court then observed that the statement by the prosecuting attorney had no probative value whatsoever in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants.
A mistrial is an extreme remedy which should be granted only where the error is so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by a continuation of the trial. Johnson v. State, 254 Ark. 293, 493 S.W.2d 115 (1973). Here we hold that, even though the stipulation may have been breached in the opening statement, which we do not condone, no prejudicial error is demonstrated. The appellant's defense did not relate to his identity. He maintained that the gun fired accidentally wounding the victim. Further, he was identified by four prosecution witnesses. The prosecution's reference to the statement did no more than place the appellant at the scene of the incident. Also, the court instructed the jury that the opening statement or remarks of an attorney should not be considered as evidence.
The prosecuting attorney never sought to introduce the cross-implicating statements into evidence, however, the prosecuting attorney referred to appellant's statement during his cross-examination of the appellant. The reference was made during a series of questions concerning the appellant's destination on the night of the incident. The prosecuting attorney noted several inconsistencies in his prior written statement as to the direction of the automobile and the location of certain roads. The prosecuting attorney was attempting to impeach the appellant's credibility. First, it appears there was no objection to the series of questions concerning the appellant's statement. Further, when the appellant took the stand in his own behalf, he became subject to impeachment like any other witness. Williams v. State, 258 Ark. 207, 523 S.W.2d 377 (1975); and ...
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...court on a case by case basis in the light of all attendant circumstances. It is an exercise of judicial discretion. Spillers v. State, 268 Ark. 217, 595 S.W.2d 650 (1980). A.R.Cr.P. Rule 22.3. We have held that when more than one defendant is being tried for capital murder, the number of p......
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Ruiz v. State, CR
...court on a case by case basis in the light of all attendant circumstances. It is an exercise of judicial discretion. Spillers v. State, 268 Ark. 217, 595 S.W.2d 650 (1980). A.R.Cr.P. Rule 22.3. We have held that when more than one defendant is being tried for capital murder, the number of p......
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McDaniel v. State, CR82-60
...... And we will not disturb that ruling on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Hallman and Martin v. State, 264 Ark. 900, 575 S.W.2d 688 (1979). Although we have uniformly upheld the trial court in cases where severance of defendants is denied, (Spillers v. State, 268 Ark. 217, 595 S.W.2d 650 (1980); Legg v. State, 262 Ark. 583, 559 S.W.2d 22 (1977)), in doing so we have noted that the defenses were not antagonistic. See Hallman and Martin v. State, supra; Ingram v. State, 255 Ark. 6, 498 S.W.2d 862 (1973); see also Washington, Ward and Hampton ......
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