Spindle v. Reid
| Decision Date | 13 May 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 5512.,5512. |
| Citation | 277 A.2d 117 |
| Parties | Evelyn F. SPINDLE and Robert Le Spindle, Jr., Appellants, v. Pearl REID, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Shellie F. Bowers, Washington, D. C., with whom Carlisle E. Pratt, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and KERN and GALLAGHER, Associate Judges.
Robert Lee Spindle, Jr., the operator of an automobile, and his mother Evelyn F. Spindle, the registered owner of the automobile, appeal from a judgment against them for damages suffered by appellee when there was an intersectional collision between an automobile operated by appellee and the one operated by Robert. The appeal questions (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant a recovery by appellee and (2) the right of recovery in any event against Evelyn F. Spindle.
With respect to the first question, there was conflicting testimony, typical of most intersectional collisions, as to the conduct of both drivers, and we are satisfied that the evidence presented questions of fact for the jury as to both negligence and contributory negligence. We find no basis for disturbing the verdict of the jury in this respect.
A more serious question is presented by the claim of Mrs. Spindle that she was not responsible for the negligent driving of her son Robert. The uncontradicted testimony was that at the time of the accident Robert was 19 years of age, married, employed, and not living at his mother's home.1 Some time prior to the accident, the exact time not being shown by the record, Robert, then married and the owner of an automobile, wished to buy a new one. Because the financing bank declined to deal directly with him on account of his minority, title to the new car was taken in his mother's name and she executed the note for the unpaid balance. The downpayment consisted of Robert's old car which was registered in his own name. All payments on the note were made by Robert out of his earnings and he had full control and use of the car. His mother never used the car. It was her understanding that it belonged to her son, that he was paying for it, and that she took title in her name only to accommodate him.
In Smith v. Doyle, 69 App.D.C. 60, 62-63, 98 F.2d 341, 343-344 (1938), where a father was the legal owner of a car that his daughters caused to be bought with their own money for their own purposes, and one of the daughters negligently operated the car, the father was held not liable. The court said:
We know of no case in which, without a statute, a merely formal owner of a car has been held liable in circumstances like these. (Emphasis supplied.)
Prior to that decision but after the factual events of the case there was enacted in this jurisdiction an automobile financial responsibility act, now the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,2 and the question here is whether under the Act and the facts of this case Mrs. Spindle was legally responsible for the results of her son's negligent operation of the car. Answer to this question depends upon whether Mrs. Spindle was the "owner" within the meaning of the Act3 of the car operated by her son.
In Mason v. Automobile Finance Co., 73 App.D.C. 284, 287, 121 F.2d 32, 35 (1941), it was said:
[T]he purpose of the statute was to place the liability upon the person in a position immediately to allow or prevent the use of the vehicle and to do so by giving a lawful and effective consent or prohibition to its operation by others. The object was to control the giving of consent to irresponsible drivers by the one having that power rather than to impose liability upon one having a naked legal title with no immediate right of control.
Following the reasoning of Mason this court in Johnson v. Keyes, D.C.App., 201 A.2d 24, 26 (1964), where a husband had registered a car in his wife's name to avoid his creditors, said:
In the case at bar there was ample evidence for the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Broadwater v. Dorsey
...to obtain financing to purchase an automobile were not suppliers of chattel under Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 390); Spindle v. Reid, 277 A.2d 117 (D.C.1971) (holding that mother who titled automobile in her name in order to help son obtain financing never had control to permit or prohi......
-
Madrid v. Shryock
...and the father loaned him the money. The son, however, exercised exclusive control over the car. Similarly, in Spindle v. Reid, 277 A.2d 117, 118-19 (D.C.1971), it was held that a mother who took title to her emancipated son's automobile in her name and executed a note for the balance due o......
-
Snowder v. District of Columbia, No. 06-CV-959.
...in Ms. Garrick's father's name at the time of notification, State Farm clearly exercised control over the vehicle. See Spindle v. Reid, 277 A.2d 117, 118-19 (D.C.1971) (noting that the "rule in this jurisdiction [is] that registration of legal title in one's name is not conclusive as to own......
-
Lopez v. Langer
...predicates any liability upon the giving of permission, express or implied, to use the automobile. No meaningful In Spindle v. Reid, 277 A.2d 117 (D.C.Ct.App.1971), the court construed a Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act similar to I.C. § 49-1404. In Spindle, the defendant was the tit......