Spinnell v. Doris L. Sassower, P.C.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1992
• Citation: 589 N.Y.S.2d 230,155 Misc.2d 147
• Parties: Andrew J. SPINNELL, Plaintiff, v. DORIS L. SASSOWER, P.C., and Doris L. Sassower, individually, Defendant.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 230

589 N.Y.S.2d 230

155 Misc.2d 147

Andrew J. SPINNELL, Plaintiff, v. DORIS L. SASSOWER, P.C., and Doris L. Sassower, individually, Defendant.

Civil Court of the City of New York,

New York County, Special Term,

Part I.

June 16, 1992.

[155 Misc.2d 148] Michael Schneck, New York City, for plaintiff.

Doris L. Sassower, pro se.

MICHAEL D. STALLMAN, Judge.

This motion to dismiss raises unusual questions relating to the Civil Court's territorial

jurisdiction, the Supreme Court's transfer power and the doctrine of direct estoppel.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, an attorney, sues defendant, ¹ an indefinitely suspended attorney, for $3,147.99 on various theories arising from an alleged independent contractor agreement. Defendant asserts that the Civil Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.

In 1988, plaintiff commenced a prior action against the corporate defendant in Civil Court, New York County on the same claim. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting that all dealings occurred in Westchester County, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Civil Court. After a hearing, the court found that defendant lacked the necessary relationship to New York City. Spinnell v. Doris L. Sassower, P.C., No. 01236/88, n.o.r. (Arber, J., 10/4/88). The court dismissed with leave to sue in a proper jurisdiction.

Approximately six months later, plaintiff commenced this action in Supreme Court, New York County on the same claim. Apparently during routine screening, the Supreme Court transferred it to Civil Court pursuant to CPLR 325(d), presumably since the ad damnum was under $25,000.00. Order (Grossman, J.H.O., 12/18/90).

Ten months later, this case first appeared on the Civil Court Trial I calendar. Defendant served this motion on November 18, 1991; it was repeatedly adjourned in Special Term Part I until submission.

This Court must resolve three issues: First, is the Supreme Court empowered under CPLR 325(d) to transfer to Civil Court an action over which the Civil Court lacks territorial jurisdiction? Can a defendant waive this jurisdictional defect, and was it waived in the case at bar? Finally, what can the Civil Court appropriately do regarding an action mistakenly transferred by the Supreme Court?

I

A. Transfer Power of the Supreme Court Under CPLR 325(d)

CPLR 325(d) authorizes the adoption of court rules that empower a court to transfer a pending action, without the parties' consent, to a lower court that has jurisdiction except for the amount demanded. CPLR 325(d); see N.Y. Const. Art. 6, § 19(k) (enabling provision). After transfer, the lower court can award up to the ad damnum. Rules have been promulgated that authorize the Supreme Court within New York City to transfer such actions to the Civil Court. 22 NYCRR 202.13. CPLR 325(d) authorizes transfer to the lower court only if the lower court has both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction other than monetary jurisdiction; a case may not be transferred solely because the dollar amount sought is within the lower Conversely, the Civil Court will not automatically have, or derivatively acquire, jurisdiction upon transfer simply because the Supreme Court had jurisdiction when the action was commenced there. See Hyman & Gilbert, P.C. v. Greenstein, 138 A.D.2d 678, 526 N.Y.S.2d 492. To argue that the Supreme Court transfer order transfers the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, in addition to the action, not only violates the statute; it is conceptually unsound. It ignores the clear limiting language of CPLR 325(d): "and the lower court would have had jurisdiction but for the amount ... demanded" (emphasis added). Moreover, no court, not even a superior court of general jurisdiction (e.g., the Supreme Court), is empowered to delegate or transfer its jurisdiction to another court.

                court's jurisdictional limit.   See McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries to McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C325:4, p. 565
                

A plain reading of CPLR 325(d) reveals that the Legislature intended that the transferee lower court have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The Legislature did not attach any limiting adjectives to the word "jurisdiction." CPLR 325(d) thus expands only the monetary jurisdiction of the lower court, only for the case so transferred. The words "but for the amount of damages demanded" are the only words of limitation. They thus require that the lower court already have such subject matter and personal jurisdiction as would have permitted the transferred action to have been brought there originally, if the amount in controversy had been below the lower court's monetary ceiling. See Friedman v. Strand, 203 Misc. 170, 115 N.Y.S.2d 266 (pre-CPLR, per Matthew M. Levy, J.).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Civil Court

The Civil Court has subject matter jurisdiction over causes of action for the recovery of money which do not exceed $25,000. See N.Y. Const. Art. 6, § 15; Civil Court Act § 202. The basis of this motion, viz., the statutory requirement that the litigation have a geographical nexus with the City of New York, does not relate to the Civil Court's subject matter jurisdiction. See, N.Y.C. Civil Court Act § 404 and discussion infra. Thus, the Civil Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action; defendant's motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

C. Territorial Jurisdiction of the Civil Court

Civil Court Act Section 404 provides as follows:

(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. The court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-resident of the city of New York, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state and a resident of the city of New York if, in person or through an agent, he:

1. transacts any business within the city of New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the city of New York; or

2. commits a tortious act within the city of New York, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or

3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the city of New York. (Emphasis added).

Civil Court Act Section 404(a) is the local analog of New York's long-arm statute, which asserts the state's personal jurisdiction over New York-related acts of out-of-state individuals and corporations. Cf. CPLR 302. Historically, geographical limits on a court's personal jurisdiction were viewed as a consequence of state sovereignty. See, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565. They were regarded as necessary to prevent a state from exceeding the scope of its sovereignty and infringing upon that of other states. More recently, a territorial nexus between the forum state, the defendant and the litigation has been viewed as a necessary component of due process. Otherwise, a defendant might be haled into court in an inconvenient The territorial jurisdiction of the Civil Court is prescribed for precisely the same reasons. Basic fairness dictates that a defendant should not be forced to defend an action in a local court in a locality with which she has no connection. It is no coincidence that the language of Civil Court Act Section 404, which enumerates the New York City-related acts triggering the Civil Court's territorial jurisdiction, is virtually identical to the equivalent provisions of the long-arm statute, which enumerates the New York State-related acts triggering the State's personal jurisdiction over non-residents. Cf. CPLR 302(a)(1), (2), (4). Civil Court Act Section 404(a) is clearly a provision designed to protect defendants, not one which specifies the types of actions that the court can adjudicate and the remedies that the court can grant. Compare Civil Court Act Art. 4 with Art. 2 and N.Y. Const. Art. 6 § 15. It is therefore appropriately classified as a subset of personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction (see Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 425 N.E.2d 851; Maloney v. Rincon, 153 Misc.2d 162, 581 N.Y.S.2d 120), as recognized by the statute's drafters. A fortiori, the Civil Court is not empowered to exercise the full statewide personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

                and remote forum.   To compel a person to defend an action, when that person lacks such minimum contact with the forum, would be inconsistent with fair play and substantial justice.  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95;  Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528
                

Based on the parties' submissions, which do not pose a triable factual question, plaintiff's claim is not embraced by Civil Court Act Section 404. Plaintiff's claim does not arise from any New York City-related act of defendant. She did not reside, transact business, contract to supply goods or services, commit a tortious act or own or use any real property in the City of New York.

D. Direct Estoppel

Irrespective of the appropriateness of the CPLR 325(d) order, plaintiff is estopped from arguing that this action can be entertained by the Civil Court. Plaintiff previously had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical jurisdictional issue. After a fact-finding hearing held in the prior Civil Court action, Judge Arber decided it adversely to plaintiff. See Spinnell v. Doris Sassower, P.C., supra. The rarely-encountered common law doctrine of direct estoppel precludes him from litigating it anew. Direct estoppel is a species of issue preclusion that prevents a party from relitigating the same issue already determined against that party in a prior lawsuit on the same claim. ² Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 27; Chase, Weinstein-Korn-Miller CPLR Handbook, 2d ed. § 25.01; Siegel, New York Practice, 2d ed. § 443. It is of no significance, in this context, that plaintiff apparently sued only the corporate defendant...