Spinney v. Hill

Decision Date13 November 1900
Docket NumberNos. 12,119 - (8).,s. 12,119 - (8).
Citation81 Minn. 316
PartiesGEORGE F. SPINNEY v. JAMES J. HILL.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $25,628.52 damages for breach of a contract of employment. Upon the pleadings and a stipulation as to the facts entered into by the parties, the court, Brill, J., made an order granting a motion for judgment in favor of defendant. From a judgment entered pursuant to the order, and also from an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Reversed.

William G. White, for appellant.

Young & Lightner, for respondent.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COLLINS, J.2

On the pleadings and a stipulation entered into between the parties judgment was ordered in favor of defendant in this action, and this appeal is from an order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

The facts appearing from the pleadings and stipulation are that in January, 1898, defendant was the owner of all of the stock shares of a newspaper corporation, which shares were and are of the par value of $100 each. At that time plaintiff and defendant entered into a verbal agreement, by the terms of which the former was forthwith to be elected president and general manager of said corporation for the full term of three years, and for said period of time was to have full power and authority to manage, transact, and carry on the business of the corporation in the publication of its newspaper. As compensation for his services, plaintiff was to be paid by defendant $200 per week; $100 thereof in cash, payable weekly, and $100 thereof in stock shares of said corporation at the aforesaid par value, also payable weekly. The plaintiff was, as agreed upon, elected president and general manager of the corporation, and at once entered upon the performance of his duties, and continued to perform them, until he was discharged by defendant in March, 1899. He was paid the money compensation as agreed upon, except the sum of $128.52. This balance defendant refused to pay, and he also refused to turn over or transfer to plaintiff any part of the stock shares.

This action was brought upon the contract for the purpose of recovering the alleged damages, namely, the amount of money which he would have earned if he had rendered services for three years, less the sum paid him, and the par value in money of the stock shares to which he would have been entitled.

Counsel for both parties concede that the agreement, wholly resting in parol, and according to its terms not to be performed within one year, was within the provisions of the statute of frauds (G. S. 1894, § 4209), and that an action to enforce it cannot be maintained. They differ as to what remedy is available to plaintiff, who has not been paid in full for his services if the agreed value of such services is to control; counsel for defendant contending that in the present form of action he is not entitled to recover at all. It is further contended by defendant's counsel that the agreement for compensation in stock shares was in fact one for the sale of chattels of the value of more than $50, and therefore void under the provisions of section 4210, no requirement of that section having been complied with, and the court below seems to have been of that opinion.

1. Taking the facts as alleged in the complaint and as stipulated for the purposes of this motion, we regard the plaintiff's right to recover for services actually performed at the rate fixed by the oral agreement, he not being in fault for failure to complete the term of three years, as settled and disposed of by former decisions of this court, and they seem to be in accord with decisions in England and in the states where agreements within the statute are simply declared nonenforceable, not absolutely void. It was held in La Du-King Mnfg. Co. v. La Du, 36 Minn. 473, 31 N. W. 938, when considering a like nonenforceable agreement, that, while such a contract could not be enforced by action, it was not void.

"And, in so far as it had been voluntarily executed, the terms thereof might be referred to and considered in determining the measure of compensation which ought justly to be allowed to the defendant."

And in Kriger v. Leppel, 42 Minn. 6, 43 N. W. 484, it was said that

"An oral agreement for services not to be performed within one year is not wholly void, though no action can be maintained on it. It will control the rights of the parties with respect to what they have done under it."

The same rule has been followed in cases where parties have entered into possession and occupied premises under parol leases for terms exceeding one year, which by G. S. 1894, § 4215, are declared absolutely void. Evans v. Winona L. Co., 30 Minn. 515, 16 N. W. 404; Finch v. Moore, 50 Minn. 116, 52 N. W. 384; Steele v. Anheuser-Busch Br. Assn., 57 Minn. 18, 58 N. W. 685. The doctrine adopted by these decisions is undoubtedly that, while no action can be maintained on an...

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