Spinney v. United States, 6910.
Decision Date | 29 January 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 6910.,6910. |
Citation | 385 F.2d 908 |
Parties | W. Aborn SPINNEY, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Daniel B. Bickford, Boston, Mass., with whom John F. Kehoe and Ely, Bartlett, Brown & Proctor, Boston, Mass., were on the brief, for appellant.
John M. Callahan, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Paul F. Markham, U. S. Atty., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
Certiorari Denied January 29, 1968. See 88 S.Ct. 854.
Defendant, Dr. Spinney, a practicing dentist, appeals his conviction by a jury on a two count indictment charging him with income tax evasion1 for the years 1958 and 1959.2 He admits that he understated his taxable income for the years in question but contends that the government's proof of willfullness was not sufficient to sustain a conviction. He also contends that prior to and during trial his constitutional rights were violated. We shall consider this latter contention first.
For several years prior to indictment the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) investigated defendant's income tax liability for the years in question, interviewed him at home as early as December 1960 and in March 1964 wrote a letter inviting him to appear for a formal interview.3 In response to this letter defendant went to the I.R.S. office in Boston on April 1, 1964, and was interviewed. A stenographic transcript was made, the relevant portions of which are as follows:
Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress the transcript of the interview and the evidence obtained by the I.R.S. as a result of it.4 This motion was denied. United States v. Spinney, 264 F.Supp. 774 (D.Mass.1966). At the trial the transcript of the interview was admitted in evidence. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the admission in evidence of the transcript as well as the fruits of the April 1 interrogation violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically he complains that in neither the letter nor the interview was he given the required warnings enunciated in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966), that he had a right to remain silent at the proposed interview and also that anything he said could be used as evidence against him.
Miranda involved a custodial interrogation. To be sure, the Court said in that case that custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, supra at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (emphasis supplied) Clearly, however, this defendant was not deprived of his freedom of action at all. He was not compelled to appear at the interview or answer questions. He did both voluntarily. In this circuit we have recently held that whatever the limits of Miranda, it does not extend to a factual situation such as is presented here. Morgan v. United States, 377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967). Although in Morgan defendant complained that he was not warned of his right to counsel, our holding in that case is not based on such a narrow factual distinction. Morgan stands for the proposition that where one is legally free, albeit at the risk of unpleasant consequences, to reject the government's invitation to appear and participate in an I.R.S. interview, the requirements enumerated in Miranda do not apply. We think the observations we made at 508 in Morgan apply with equal force here.
Therefore, we find no merit in this contention.5
Nor are we impressed by defendant's claim that there was not sufficient evidence of willfullness to withstand his motion for judgment of acquittal. It is uncontested that there was an understatement of gross receipts. As above stated, it is only the question of willfullness that defendant contests. In support of this contention he cites his cooperation with the I.R.S. investigation to show his lack of intention to defraud. Even if true, this can hardly be considered proof of his innocence. Otherwise, anyone accused of this crime could assure his acquittal by cooperating with the investigating authorities regardless of what the investigation might uncover.
Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284, 290 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917, 71 S.Ct. 350, 95 L.Ed. 662 (1951). The real question here is whether there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer defendant's willfullness. We think that there is. There is evidence that defendant understated his gross receipts on his 1958 tax return by $11,248 and on his 1959 return by $3,173.38.6 His accountant, one Lewis, testified that he obtained the figures on Dr. Spinney's gross receipts for the two years in question from monthly totals furnished by Dr. Spinney himself.7 Lewis further stated that he merely added these monthly totals but did not check their accuracy from the daily sheets. These sheets which were examined by the I.R.S. support the understatements of gross receipts as defendant subsequently admitted. The jury was entitled to consider the unlikelihood of a man who had shown a keen interest in knowing whether his practice was increasing being unaware of his gross income during these years.
In addition, it was shown that defendant substantially overstated his deductions for dentures, dental supplies and other professional expenses.8 There is evidence that he paid these bills himself, that he did this by check and that the only information the accountant had on these expenses was what he obtained from the defendant.9
Defendant's entertainment deductions of $722 taken in 1958 and $825 in 1959, although relatively small, are nevertheless of particular significance on the issue of intent. I.R.S. agent Rosenberg testified that when he asked Dr. Spinney if he could explain and substantiate these deductions, he replied In this connection defendant's accountant testified that in...
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