Spinosa's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 17 April 1953
• Citation: 255 P.2d 843,117 Cal.App.2d 364
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re SPINOSA'S ESTATE. SPINOSA et al. v. STATE. Civ. 8094. Sac. 6219.

Page 843

255 P.2d 843

117 Cal.App.2d 364

In re SPINOSA'S ESTATE SPINOSA et al. v. STATE.

Civ. 8094.

Sac. 6219.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

April 17, 1953.

Hearing Denied June 11, 1953.

Sylvester Andriano, Louis Ferrari, San Francisco, for appellants.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., William J. Power, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

SCHOTTKY, Justice.

Appellants filed a petition in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, under sections 1272 and 1272a of the Code of Civil Procedure, to obtain money on deposit with the State Treasurer. Respondent, state of California, opposed said petition and after trial judgment was rendered against petitioners and this appeal is from said judgment.

The facts, as shown by the settled statement on appeal, are substantially as follows:

Vito Madio Spinosa died intestate in Oakland, California, on January 17, 1941. His heirs, the petitioners and appellants, are non-resident aliens, residing in Italy. Letters of administration were issued to the Public Administrator of Alameda County on February 7, 1941. On June 13, 1941, the appellants through their attorney filed the following 'Notice of Appearance' in the probate proceedings: 'To Albert E. Hill, Public Administrator and Administrator of the Estate of Vito Madio Spinosa, * * *: You and Each of you please take notice and notice is hereby given that Francesco Spinosa, Lucia Perelli Spinosa and Antonia Fanelli Spinosa, brother and sisters of Vito Madio Spinoso, and sole heirs-at-law of his estate, hereby appear in the matter of the estate of said decedent and request that special notice be given them of all matters, steps and proceedings taken in the administration of said estate pursuant to section 1202 of the Probate Code of the State of California. Such notice to be sent to Sylvester Andriano, Attorney for said heirs, at 550 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, California.'

On August 15, 1941, the administrator filed a petition for distribution which contained the following: 'Your petitioner is informed and believes and therefore alleges that the following are the persons entitled to share the distribution of this estate: Francesco Spinosa, brother, Lucia Perelli Spinosa, sister, Antonia Fanelli Spinosa, sister.' On January 22, 1942, the probate court filed its decree entitled 'Decree of Settlement of Final Account and Order for Payment of Moneys into State Treasury.' This order recited: 'And it appearing that the affairs of said estate have been finally settled; that no heirs or other claimants thereof or thereto have appeared and established their rights; It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the County Treasurer of the County of Alameda, be and he is hereby directed to forthwith pay into the State Treasury all moneys in his hands belonging to said estate. * * *'

On June 22, 1948 this petition was filed in the Superior Court of Sacramento County to obtain money on deposit with the State Treasurer in the sum of $3,339.21.

The judgment against petitioners was based upon the following conclusions of law: 'That the decree of the probate court finding that no heirs had appeared and established their rights, was an adjudication that Francesco Spinosa, Lucia Perelli Spinosa and Antonia Fanelli Spinosa, were not the heirs of Vito Madio Spinosa and not entitled to share in the estate of Vito Madio Spinosa and that said decree of the probate court is res adjudicata as to the rights of Francesco Spinosa, Lucia Perelli Spinosa and Antonia Fanelli Spinosa to succeed to the estate of Vito Madio Spinosa. That the petition filed herein to recover the estate of Vito Madio Spinosa from the State Treasury was not filed within the time allowed by Probate Code section 1027; * * *.'

Appellants first contend that the order of the probate court did not adjudicate the rights of petitioners, or vest any interest in the funds in the state of California. Appellants refer to the title of the decree which states: 'Order for Payment of Moneys into State Treasury.' It is next argued that the words of the order, 'pay into' do not denote a passage of title to the state. Appellants point out that under section 1147 of the Probate Code, the public administrator is required to deposit all funds with the County Treasurer; that at the end of administration, the County Treasurer, if the money is not distributed to known heirs, is authorized to deposit the same with the state. Appellants cite Estate of Miner, 143 Cal. 194, 76 P. 968, 969, for the proposition that the words 'pay into' do not vest any interest in the state. In that case the decree recited: 'The affairs of the estate of James Miner, deceased, having been finally settled, and there being no heirs or other claimants thereof, it is order that the county treasurer of this city and county forthwith pay into the state treasury all moneys and effects in his hands belonging to said estate.' It was held that: 'After hearing further argument, and a re-examination of the case, we have arrived at the conclusion that the final order of the probate court did not operate to vest the title to the fund, so deposited in the state treasury, in the state, as upon a decree in an action brought to escheat the same.'

Respondent in arguing that the decree of the probate court is res judicata points out that petitioners appeared in the probate proceedings; that the petition for distribution named the petitioners as heirs; and that, however, the court found that no heirs had appeared and established their claim. Respondent concludes that this finding is an adjudication that the petitioners were not entitled to share in the estate. In arguing that the decree of the probate court was a decree of distribution it is stated that the court had before it 'a petition for distribution,' and having found that heirs had not proved their claim, ordered the estate paid to the state.

The general rule as to the doctrine of res adjudicata is well expressed in 30 Am.Jur., secs. 161 and 162, pages 908, 909:

'Briefly stated, the doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. To adopt the language of the English court in announcing the doctrine in an early case, which has been frequently repeated by the courts, the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another court. In speaking of this rule and the distinctions which appear therein, it has been said that this brief but comprehensive summary furnishes a rule for every case that any complication of circumstances can produce. On the other hand, it has been declared that when a case lies hard by the line of cleavage between what is and what is not res judicata, it may be a nice question to determine on which side of the line the case falls.'

'The doctrine of res judicata is a principle of universal jurisprudence, forming a part of the legal systems of all civilized nations. It is not, however, to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice; there are exceptions to it based upon important reasons of policy. There is also support for the rule that judgments relied upon as creating an estoppel are to be construed with strictiness.'

And in Guardianship of Di Carlo, 3 Cal.2d 225, at page 234, 44 P.2d 562, 566, 99 A.L.R. 990, the court said:

'It may be conceded that the proceeding by the guardian has the character of a probate proceeding and is in rem. Smith v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 130 Cal.App. 45, 19 P.2d 1018. But we do not agree that this designation necessarily compels the holding that an intermediate account of a guardian is conclusive against the ward. The Legislature has expressly made it so in the case of executors, administrators, and testamentary trustees. Prob.Code, secs. 931, 1123. The absence of such a declaration in the case of guardians leaves the matter open to the courts to determine the proper rule. There is, no doubt, some force in the analogy of the estate and trustee cases. Nevertheless, they are distinguishable in one important respect, namely, that the ward is a person under legal disability and ordinarily unable to protect himself against overreaching or other improper conduct of the guardian. This distinction is sufficient to justify an exception to the normal application of the principle of res judicata. That principle is not to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice; there are exceptions to it, based upon important reasons of policy, and we think that this case calls for such an exception.'

We are unable to agree with respondent's contention that the 'Decree of Settlement of Final Account and Order for Payment of Moneys into State Treasury,' filed by the Probate Court on January 22, 1942, was res adjudicata upon the question that appellants were not the heirs of Vito Madio Spinosa. The exact language in the order was 'That no heirs or other claimants thereof or thereto have appeared and established their rights.' This language must be considered in the light of, and in connection with, the circumstances as they existed at that time. The administrator had on August 18, 1941, filed a petition for distribution in which he alleged that appellants were the persons entitled to share in the distribution of the estate. This petition was not heard until January 22, 1942. In the meantime, on December 11, 1941, the United States declared war upon Italy, Joint Res. Dec. 11, 1941, c. 565, 55 Stat. 797, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix note preceding section 1. Of this we can take judicial notice. Code Civ.Proc. sec. 1875, subds. 2, 3; 10 Cal.Jur., Evidence, sec. 27, p. 699. Upon...