Spitalieri v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 12 March 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 5:16-cv-87-OC-34PRL
• Parties: EUGENIO SPITALIERI, II, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

EUGENIO SPITALIERI, II, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 5:16-cv-87-OC-34PRL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION

March 12, 2019

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Eugenio Spitalieri, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on February 12, 2016, by filing, with the assistance of counsel, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1) in the United States District Court Northern District of Florida. On February 16, 2016, the Northern District transferred the case to this Court. See Doc. 5. In the Petition, Spitalieri challenges a 2010 state court (Lake County, Florida) judgment of conviction for two counts of manslaughter. Spitalieri raises two grounds for relief. See Petition at 10-31.¹ Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Response to Petition (Resp.; Doc. 12) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On August 1, 2016, Spitalieri filed a brief in reply. See Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Reply; Doc. 16.). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On May 2, 2008, a grand jury charged Spitalieri with two counts of second-degree murder for the deaths of Anthony Shervington (count one) and Winston Gordon (count two). Resp. Ex. A. Spitalieri proceeded to a jury trial, at the conclusion of which the jury found him guilty of the lesser included offenses of manslaughter as to each count. Resp. Ex. C at 1148. On January 4, 2010, the circuit court sentenced Spitalieri to a term of incarceration of fifteen years in prison followed by a term of probation of fifteen years as to each count. Resp. Ex. B. The circuit court ordered the sentence imposed on count two to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on count one. Id.

On direct appeal, Spitalieri, with the assistance of counsel, filed an initial brief raising the following five arguments: (1) the manslaughter instruction was erroneous; (2) the circuit court erred in not granting his motion to dismiss; (3) the self-defense instruction was erroneous; (4) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a downward departure sentence; and (5) the circuit court erred in assessing jail credit and imposing fines and costs. Resp. Ex. D. The State filed an answer brief. Resp. Ex. E. On July 8, 2011, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA) per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences except that it remanded the case back to the circuit court to correct Spitalieri's jail credit and the imposition of certain fines and court costs. Resp. Ex. G. Spitalieri sought review of the Fifth DCA's opinion with the Florida Supreme Court. Resp. Ex. H. However, on December 28, 2011, the Florida Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction. Resp. Ex. I.

On March 12, 2013, Spitalieri, through counsel, filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp.Ex. J. Spitalieri raised the following two grounds for relief in his Rule 3.850 Motion: newly discovered evidence (ground one) and ineffective assistance counsel for failing to object to an erroneous manslaughter jury instruction (ground two). Id. Following an evidentiary hearing on ground one, the circuit court denied the Rule 3.850 Motion. Resp. Ex. M. On February 2, 2016, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the circuit court's denial of the Rule 3.850 Motion without a written opinion, and issued the Mandate on February 26, 2016. Resp. Ex. Q.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action is timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can "adequately assess [Spitalieri's] claim[s] withoutfurther factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court recently stated:

[T]he federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a "contrary to" clause and an "unreasonable application" clause. The "contrary to" clause allows for relief only "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The "unreasonable application" clause allows for relief only "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous factual determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal courts to grant relief only if the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined § 2254(d)(2)'s "precise relationship" to § 2254(e)(1), which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the state court's factual findings "by clear and convincing evidence." SeeBurt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accordBrumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that "precise relationship" may be, "'a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'"[²] Titlow, 571 U.S. at ---, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2298 (2017). Also, deferential review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1)'s "requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made").

Thus, "AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (201...