Spitler v. Sch. Bd. for City of Norfolk
| Docket Number | CIVIL 2:21cv439 |
| Decision Date | 07 February 2022 |
| Parties | KIMBERLEY WALSH SPITLER, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL BOARD FOR THE CITY OF NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
This matter arises from the School Board for the City of Norfolk's ("Defendant") alleged employment discrimination against Kimberley Spitler ("Plaintiff) that occurred during the 2017-2018 school year, when Plaintiff served as Special Education Teacher at Norview High School ("Norview"). ECF No. 14, Amended Compl. ¶¶ 15-31. Plaintiff now brings the following claims against Defendant for the alleged employment discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"): Count I, Disability Discrimination Failure to Reasonably Accommodate (id. ¶ 188); Count II, Disability Discrimination Through Harassment (id. ¶ 209); and Count III, Disability Discrimination Through Retaliation (id. ¶ 240). Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 15. For the reasons stated herein Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and CONVERTED into a motion for summary judgment in part. ECF No. 15.[1] This Court WITHHOLDS judgment on Counts II and III, as the parties may file additional briefs based on the information obtained during discovery. Plaintiff may also file her own motion for summary judgment if she so chooses.
On July 29, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this employment discrimination action in this Court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees for the alleged employment discrimination she suffered while working at Norview. See ECF No. 1.
On September 23, 2021, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and accompanying memorandum in support. ECF Nos. 6, 7. On October 7, 2021, rather than respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. ECF No. 14. On October 21, 2021, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim ("Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim") and accompanying memorandum in support. ECF Nos. 15, 16. That same day, Defendant also filed a Request for a Hearing on its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 17. On November 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Response Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 18. On November 10, 2021, Defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Response. ECF No. 19. On January 5, 2022, this Court held an adversary hearing. ECF No. 20. The matter is now ripe for adjudication, and the Court will now address Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 15.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The function of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Neitzke v. Williams, 409 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion permits dismissal of a complaint where it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), so as to "give the defendant fair notice of what the .. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The claim must be "plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must construe the factual allegations "in the light most favorable to plaintiff." Schatz v. Rosenberg. 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted); Davis. 896 F.Supp. at 566 ). "Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, '[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.'" Andreana v. Virginia Beach City Pub. Sch.. No. 2:17-CV-574, 2018 WL 2182297, at *5 (E.D. Va. May 9, 2018) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Legal conclusions, which provide the complaint's framework, are not entitled to the assumption of truth if they are not supported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iabal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. If the factual allegations alleged by the plaintiff do not nudge the plaintiffs claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Additionally, "a plaintiff may not introduce new allegations or new facts in an opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss." Hooker v. Disbrow, No. 1:16-CV-1588-GBL-JFA, 2017 WL 1377696, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 13, 2017) . Importantly, however, a district court may consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, "so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic." Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosd., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenshio v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.l (4th Cir. 2006)).
The Fourth Circuit has held that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only in "very limited circumstances." Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir. 1989). However, dismissal is appropriate if it appears that the plaintiff is not "entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged." Harrison v. United States Postal Serv., 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); Davis v. Hudeins, 896 F.Supp. 561, 566 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
The facts recited herein are drawn from Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and the exhibits attached to it, which this Court may consider when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Philips. 572 F.3d at 180. These facts are assumed true only for purposes of deciding the motions to dismiss currently before the Court. They are not to be considered factual findings by this Court. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Defendant employed Plaintiff as a Special Education Teacher at Norview during all times relevant to the Amended Complaint. ECF No. 14 ¶ 15. According to Plaintiff, she is a qualified disabled individual because she has genetic spinal issues, connective tissue problems, and autoimmune disorders. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Despite these health problems, Plaintiff states she could perform her job as a Special Education Teacher with reasonable accommodations that Defendant had provided since 2012. Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 28-32, 41. The reasonable accommodations that Defendant provided, according to Plaintiff, included: limited to no lifting, temperature control of her environment, no excessive walking, use of her wheelchair, and intermittent leave. Id. ¶ 20.
After Plaintiff was involved in a car accident in March of 2016, she was required to undergo spinal surgery, which exacerbated her conditions. Id. ¶¶ 22-25. After this accident, Plaintiff continued to receive the above accommodations from Defendant. Id. ¶ 28. In July 2017, after a change in administrative personal at Norview, Defendant denied her the previously granted accommodations. Id. ¶¶ 35-37, 48-51. Plaintiff claims that Defendant denied her the same accommodations that it granted to Ms. Cumpston, another employee at Norview. Id. ¶ 46. Following the denial of her requests for accommodations, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on September 18, 2017 ("First Charge"). Id. ¶ 68, Ex. G. In the First Charge, Plaintiff claims that Defendant denied her "intermittent FMLA" and "harassed [her] in retaliation for participating in protected activity." Id., Ex. G. Plaintiff requested the intermittent FMLA leave for her "doctor's appointments, days off because of chronic pain, and unplanned appointments," and her doctor "instructed [her] to work 3 hours a day." Id. Despite claiming that she requested different types of accommodations, the First Charge does not reference any other type of requested accommodations beyond the intermittent FMLA leave and the reduced working hours. Id. On April 30, 2021, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Dismissal and Right to Sue. Id. ¶ 12, Ex. A. Plaintiff filed the instant matter on July 29, 2021, which was within ninety (90) days after the receipt of the Notice of Dismissal and Right to Sue. Id. ¶ 13.
In August and September of 2017, Plaintiff submitted multiple requests for FMLA leave to Norview's administration. Id. ¶ 45. In response to Plaintiffs request for leave, Defendant, through its employees, repeatedly asked Plaintiff to provide confidential medical information to obtain the requested leave, as Defendant's employees claimed her paperwork had expired. Id. ¶¶ 48-54. Norview's administration requested that Plaintiff...
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