Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital

Decision Date01 November 1947
Citation211 S.W.2d 450,31 Tenn.App. 12
PartiesSPIVEY v. ST. THOMAS HOSPITAL.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court March 5, 1948.

Rehearing Denied by Supreme Court May 3, 1948.

Appeal in Error from Circuit Court, Davidson County; Richard P Dews, Judge.

Action by Odell Minghey Spivey against St. Thomas Hospital for damages for alleged negligence causing death of plaintiff's husband. From the judgment, defendant appeals in error.

Judgment modified, and as modified affirmed.

Roberts & Roberts and Z. T. Osborn, all of Nashville, for plaintiff.

Manier & Crouch and J. Olin White, all of Nashville, for defendant.

FELTS Judge.

Mrs Spivey sued St. Thomas Hospital for alleged negligence causing the death of her husband, Jesse James Spivey. He was suffering with pneumonia and a high temperature. He was brought to the hospital, accepted as a paying patient, and put on a bed near a window on the third floor. A few hours later, while delirious with fever and knowing not what he was doing, he got out this window, fell about 14 feet, struck a concrete porch, and his death ensued next day.

The negligence alleged was that through its interns and nurses--its employees and agents--defendant knew he was delirious and irrational and, if left unattended, would likely get out of bed and harm himself; that with this knowledge it undertook to keep him in bed and give him proper care by its interns and nurses; and that it failed to give him proper care, but left him unattended near this unguarded window, let him in his delirium fall or jump out, and thereby caused his death.

It was further alleged that defendant failed to have enough nurses in attendance, failed to keep someone in the room with him failed to install some device at this window to prevent him from falling through it, failed to use restraints to keep him in bed, or at least did not use them in a proper or sufficient manner, and did not secure the fastenings or other means to prevent him from leaving his bed. Defendant pleaded not guilty.

The case was tried before the judge and a jury. At the close of plaintiff's evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict, which motion was overruled. Defendant did not stand on its motion, but put in evidence by its witnesses to negative negligence and show the death was an unavoidable accident. At the close of all the evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict, which motion was likewise overruled. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff for $20,000. The judge approved the verdict and entered judgment upon it.

Defendant appealed in error and has assigned a number of errors. Its first insistence is that there was no evidence to support a verdict for plaintiff, that its evidence established beyond dispute that it was guilty of no negligence and the event was altogether unforseeable and unavoidable, and that a verdict should have been directed for it at the close of all the evidence.

Learned counsel sharply differ in their views of the evidence. It is not for us, however, to settle such differences. That was for the jury. They rendered a general verdict for plaintiff, and we must take it as settling most of such differences in her favor. We have to decide only whether the circumstances of the case for plaintiff were sufficient, in point of law and reason, to permit the jury to find a verdict for her. Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610, 616; Thayer on Evidence, 208-227, 234-250; Tyrus v. Railroad, 114 Tenn. 579, 594, 86 S.W. 1074, 1077; Brenizer v. N. C. & St. L. Ry., 156 Tenn. 479, 3 S.W.2d 1053, 8 S.W.2d 1099; Osborn v. City of Nashville, 182 Tenn. 197, 201, 204, 185 S.W.2d 510, 512.

And in so deciding, we must look to all the evidence, construe it most favorably to plaintiff, take as true that which tends to support her right, discard all countervailing evidence, and from the rest of it allow all reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict. Wildman Mfg. Co. v. Davenport Hosiery Mills, 147 Tenn. 551, 249 S.W. 984; Osborn v. City of Nashville, supra; Poole v. First Nat. Bank of Smyrna, Tenn.App., 196 S.W.2d 563; Sepaugh v. Methodist Hospital, Tenn.App., 202 S.W.2d 985, 989.

Upon such a view of the evidence, we summarize the circumstances tending to support the case for plaintiff. Defendant is an eleemosynary corporation operating a general hospital in Nashville for the care of the sick. For this purpose it employs a resident physician, several interns, and a large number of nurses and student nurses. It accepts both charity patients and paying patients. Jesse James Spivey was 26 years of age, a veteran of World War II, and had a wife and a three-months-old child.

He and his wife and child lived on a farm near Gainesboro. About February 1, 1946, he became ill with pneumonia. His condition grew worse and at times his termperature was so high that he would be delirious, not know what he was doing, and try to get out of bed. That he might have better care, he was brought in an ambulance to St. Thomas Hospital. His brother, Clayton Spivey, and his brother-in-law, Luther Trisdale, rode in the back part of the ambulance with him. During most of this journey he was irrational.

They arrived at the hospital about 6:00 P.M. February 4. His brother went to defendant's office, arranged for his admission, and paid defendant's charges for a week in advance. He was taken from the ambulance to Room 309, on the third floor, and put on the bed nearest the window. There was another bed in the room but no patient in it.

Some of defendant's employees telephoned Dr. J. D. Lester, a prominent Nashville physician, to whom one of Spivey's local doctors had referred him, and who usually had a large number of patients in the hospital. Dr. Lester said he would see Spivey later that evening along with his other patients there, and he told the resident physician to begin giving Spivey the routine treatment for pneumonia cases. Defendant's interns and nurses did this.

Spivey's temperature when he was admitted was 106, which is 'a very high fever.' Its effect was to make him delirious, not know what he was doing, and try to get out of bed and leave. There was conflict in the evidence as to his condition during his first few hours in the hospital. Defendant's nurses said he was perfectly rational, but his brother and his brother-in-law said he was not, and we must assume the jury accredited the latter. Banks v. Southern Potteries, Inc., Tenn.App., 204 S.W.2d 382.

The window was about two or three feet from his bed. The bottom of it was about the same height as the bed. Its lower sash was movable, unfastened, and unprotected. It is true there was sharp conflict in the evidence as to whether there was a screen outside this window. Defendant's nurses said there was a screen, and those on duty at the time of the accident said the screen was latched. But Clayton Spivey testified quite positively to the contrary. He said he noticed the window that night and looked at it again next day, and there was no screen.

He and Trisdale stayed that night in the room with the patient until about 8:30 or 9:00. During part of this time he was delirious, 'not at himself,' and he tried to get up, sat up in bed, and his brother 'got hold of him and got him to lay back down.' About 8:30 the nurse in charge turned out the hall light, came into Spivey's room, and told his brother and brother-in-law visiting hours were over and they would have to leave. His brother insisted on staying with him, and told the nurse he had tried to get out of bed and 'he would get out of bed and leave if somebody didn't stay in there with him.'

Here again there was conflict in the evidence. The nurse said she told them visiting hours were over, and when they insisted on staying, she told them she would get permission for one to stay, but the other would have to leave. Clayton Spivey, however, testified that she said both would have to go.

Trisdale did go down and wait on the first floor, but Clayton still stayed in the room. About 9:20 or 9:30, he said, the nurse came back and told him under the rule of the hospital he would have to leave. He wanted to stay till Dr. Lester came and talk to the doctor about getting a special nurse. But the nurse said he could stay no longer. He again told her his brother 'would get out of bed if somebody didn't watch him.' She said: 'I will tie him in bed if he tries to get up; I will keep him in bed some way.' Then the brother and brother-in-law left the hospital.

The only evidence as to the rest of the circumstances comes from defendant's witnesses. Dr. Lester came about 10:00 of 10:30. He made a cursory examination, he said, and found Spivey rational, his fever down to 102, and his condition very good. The night supervisor of nurses said the doctor told her that the patient was doing well and would be all right till morning.

This supervisor and the nurses were relieved about 11:00 by another supervisor, Mrs. Short, and two student nurses, Miss Mitchell and Miss Wiggins. Each of these student nurses had charge of a section of the third floor, with about fifteen patients each. In each section there was a nurse's station where the charts of the patients were kept and where there was a signal showing when any patient called for the nurse. Each nurse stayed at her station, keeping the charts and watching for the signals, when not going on her rounds answering calls or checking on patients.

These two nurses alternated in checking on Spivey. They checked on him about every ten minutes while he was being given an intravenous solution of glucose. This was stopped about 12:15, and Miss Mitchell, the student nurse in charge of his section, said she 'fixed him comfortable for the night.' About 1:00 ...

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12 cases
  • Ferguson v. Nationwide Property & Cas.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • December 15, 2006
    ...though the act of the defendant in fact caused the injury, there is no negligence and no liability. See Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1948). "[T]he plaintiff must show that the injury was a reasonably foreseeable probability, not just a remote possibi......
  • Kim v. State
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • October 30, 2020
    ...was reasonably foreseeable as a likely result of defendant's [specific act of negligence]." Spivey v. St. Thomas Hosp. , 31 Tenn. App. 12, 28–29, 211 S.W.2d 450, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).Respectfully, we are not persuaded by the cases cited by the Kims. For one, some of the cited cases inv......
  • Bara v. Clarksville Memorial Health Systems
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • September 12, 2002
    ...are surprises, in the sense that the precise manner of their occurrence cannot be foreseen.' Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn.App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn.Ct.App.1947). Accordingly the particular harm need not have been foreseeable if another `harm of a like general character wa......
  • Phelps v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • August 21, 1970
    ...be, for business, pleasure or otherwise. Judge Felts has covered the question of foreseeability in his opinion in Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn.App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450.' In City of Lawrenceburg v. Dyer, 11 Tenn.App. 493, this Court in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, quoted ......
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