Sponsler v. Sponsler

• Decision Date: 13 February 2020
• Docket Number: A19A2283,A19A2282
• Citation: 353 Ga.App. 627,838 S.E.2d 921
• Parties: SPONSLER v. SPONSLER et al. Sponsler v. Sponsler et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

353 Ga.App. 627

838 S.E.2d 921

SPONSLER

v.SPONSLER et al.

Sponsler

v.Sponsler et al.

A19A2282

A19A2283

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

February 13, 2020

Erika Angelos Heath, for Appellant.

Eric Alvin Ballinger, Canton, Margaret Gettle Washburn, April Sponsler, John Patrick O'Brien, Viraj Prashant Deshmukh, for Appellee.

Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge.

These companion cases present the third and fourth appeals of this case filed by Jeffrey A. Sponsler ("Ex-husband") since the entry of the final decree effectuating his divorce from April Sponsler ("Ex-wife") in June 2009.¹ In the instant appeals, Ex-husband now challenges the trial court’s contempt orders and fee awards entered after remand from the prior appeal in Sponsler v. Sponsler , 301 Ga. 600, 800 S.E.2d 564 (2017) (" Sponsler II "). In Case No. A19A2282, Ex-husband contends that (1) the trial court erred in imposing criminal contempt punishment post-remand, and (2) the trial court’s imposition of criminal contempt punishment created a presumption of vindictiveness. In Case No. A19A2283, Ex-husband further contends that the trial court erred in (3) denying his request for reimbursement of the home equity line of credit ("HELOC") payments that he made after March 1, 2009; (4) awarding the Receiver additional fees under § 9-8-13; and (5) awarding attorney fees to Ex-wife under OCGA § 9-15-14 when it could not be determined how the lump sum award was calculated.

In Case No. A19A2282, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of criminal punishment for Ex-husband’s contempt. In Case No A19A2283, we also affirm the trial court’s award of additional fees to the Receiver under OCGA § 9-8-13. But in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Sponsler II , we reverse the trial court’s denial of Ex-husband’s request for reimbursement of the HELOC payments. Moreover, we vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Ex-wife under OCGA § 9-15-14. In sum, the trial court’s decisions are affirmed in part and reversed in part; this case must be remanded for reconsideration of the Ex-wife’s attorney fees award.

The procedural and appellate history of this case reflects that the parties’ divorce decree was entered on June 16, 2009. In the first appeal, " Sponsler I ," the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions to incorporate the parties’ settlement agreement into the final divorce decree and to deny Ex-husband’s motion for attorney fees. Sponsler v. Sponsler , 287 Ga. 725, 727-728 (1)-(2), 699 S.E.2d 22 (2010). In the second appeal, Sponsler II , the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Ex-husband was in contempt of the divorce decree by failing to timely execute a quitclaim deed for a certain rental property (the "Rental Property") that had been awarded to Ex-wife in the divorce;² however, the Court reversed the trial court’s imposition of the contempt remedy that required Ex-husband to make payments toward the HELOC for the Rental Property after March 1, 2009 because such was in direct contravention of the divorce decree. See Sponsler v. Sponsler , 301 Ga. 600, 602-604 (2) (a), 800 S.E.2d 564 (2017). The Court remanded the case for reconsideration of the trial court’s award of attorney fees in the amount of $20,000.00 to Ex-wife pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14 because it could not be determined whether any part of that award flowed from the litigation of contempt remedies that had been reversed in that appeal. Id. at 605 (3), 800 S.E.2d 564.

In May 2018, after remand, Ex-husband filed a motion for revision of the Receiver’s fees and a renewed motion for contempt based upon Ex-wife’s failure to pay the HELOC for the Rental Property. Subsequently, in June 2018, the Rental Property was foreclosed by the bank because the HELOC payments were not made.

Thereafter, the Receiver filed a motion for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-8-13 for amounts incurred defending against Ex-husband’s challenges to the Receiver’s fee award. Ex-husband objected to the Receiver’s motion.

On December 4, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on the remanded issues, the Receiver’s motion for additional fees, and Ex-husband’s renewed contempt motion. At the hearing, Ex-husband sought reimbursement for the HELOC payments he had made pursuant to the trial court’s order that was reversed by Sponsler II . Following the hearing, the trial court entered a contempt order requiring Ex-husband to serve ten days of incarceration due to his delayed execution of the quitclaim deed and an additional ten days of incarceration due to his delayed execution of the QDRO. In its final order, the trial court denied Ex-husband’s renewed contempt motion, concluding that Ex-wife’s inability to pay the HELOC was caused by Ex-husband’s failure to promptly execute the quitclaim deed and QDRO after the divorce and that Ex-husband "[did] not come to the [c]ourt with clean hands." The trial court also denied Ex-husband’s request for reimbursement of his HELOC payments.

The trial court further found that Ex-husband’s post-remand actions and challenges had caused the Receiver to incur additional fees and expenses. Ex-husband was thus ordered to pay the Receiver an additional amount of $8,000 in fees and expenses pursuant to OCGA § 9-8-13.³

Finally, the trial court determined that the Sponsler II decision did not undermine its award of OCGA § 9-15-14 attorney fees to Ex-wife, and it increased her fee award to $30,000 for expenses incurred due to Ex-husband’s "contumacious conduct and meritless litigiousness."

Ex-husband filed the instant appeals to challenge the trial court’s post-remand orders and awards.⁴

Case No. A19A2282

1. Ex-husband first argues that the trial court erred when it imposed criminal contempt punishment in lieu of re-calculating the civil contempt remedies after remand of the Sponsler II decision. We disagree.

Once an act is considered to constitute contempt of court, the action the court takes to remedy it determines whether the contempt is deemed criminal or civil. The distinction between the two is that criminal contempt imposes unconditional punishment for prior acts of contumacy, whereas civil contempt imposes conditional punishment as a means of coercing future compliance with a prior court order.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Shooter Alley, Inc. v. City of Doraville , 341 Ga. App. 626, 627 (1) (a), 800 S.E.2d 588 (2017).

To remedy Ex-husband’s contempt for delaying his execution of the quitclaim deed and QDRO, the trial court’s first contempt order required Ex-husband to expend $35,000 to bring the Rental Property back into marketable condition and to make payments on the HELOC until the Rental Property was sold. Sponsler II affirmed the trial court’s contempt finding, but reversed the civil contempt remedies that were imposed. Sponsler II , 301 Ga. at 603-604 (2) (a), 800 S.E.2d 564. In its decision, the Supreme Court explained that the trial court was not authorized to hold Ex-husband responsible for repairs, HELOC and taxes for the Rental Property after March 1, 2009, based on the divorce decree’s terms. Id. at 603 (2) (a), 800 S.E.2d 564. The Court mentioned, however, that Ex-Husband "might be held responsible for damages and repairs prior to that operative date." Id.

Generally, under the law of the case rule, "any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals as the case may be." OCGA § 9-11-60 (h). But

[a]n exception to the rule that will permit issues to be relitigated after appeal is when the evidentiary posture of the case changes. The evidentiary posture of a case changes so as to bar application of the law of the case rule when the original evidence submitted is found to be insufficient, and the deficient evidence is later supplemented. Thus, if subsequent to an appellate decision, the evidentiary posture of the case changes in the trial court, the law of the case rule does not limit or negate the effect that such change would otherwise mandate.

(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) In re Spruell , 237 Ga. App. 259, 260, 515 S.E.2d 190 (1999). After the reversal of the civil contempt remedies and remand of the case in Sponsler II , the evidentiary posture of the case changed. Significantly, in June 2018, the Rental Property was sold at a foreclosure sale and Ex-wife was no longer in possession of that property. Consequently, even if the Supreme Court previously had suggested that Ex-husband could be assessed for damages and repairs to the Rental Property accrued prior to March 1, 2009,⁵ such a remedy could no longer serve the purpose of civil contempt–that is to obtain future compliance with the divorce decree. See generally Shooter Alley , 341 Ga. App. at 627-628 (1) (a), 800 S.E.2d 588. Because future compliance was no longer at issue, as required for civil contempt, the trial court was authorized to impose unconditional criminal punishment for Ex-husband’s prior acts of contumacy. See OCGA § 15-6-8 (5) (granting superior courts the authority "[t]o punish [criminal] contempt by fines not exceeding $1,000.00, by imprisonment not exceeding 20 days, or both"); Hopkins v. Hopkins , 244 Ga. 66, 67 (1), 257 S.E.2d 900 (1979) ("Criminal contempt with unconditional imprisonment may be used to preserve the court’s authority and to punish disobedience of its orders"; compliance at the time of the hearing is not a valid defense to criminal contempt because "the trial court is punishing appellant for his past failure to obey the court’s order.").

2. Ex-husband further argues that the trial court’s imposition of criminal contempt remedies violated the presumption of vindictiveness under North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U. S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Again, no error has been shown.

As explained in Pearce , "due process of law requires that vindictiveness must play no part in the resentencing of one...