Spoonick v. Backus-Brooks Company

• Decision Date: 22 May 1903
• Docket Number: 13,470 - (110)
• Citation: 94 N.W. 1079,89 Minn. 354
• Parties: JOHN SPOONICK v. BACKUS-BROOKS COMPANY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

94 N.W. 1079

89 Minn. 354

JOHN SPOONICK v. BACKUS-BROOKS COMPANY

Nos. 13,470 - (110)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

May 22, 1903

Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $10,000 for personal injuries. The case was tried before Simpson, J and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $3,000. From an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Assumption of Risk.

Held in a personal injury action, that the question of plaintiff's assumption of risk was for the jury under all the circumstances disclosed at the trial.

Insurance -- Examination of Jurors.

Where a defendant in such an action is indemnified by an accident insurance company, it is not error for the court to permit plaintiff's counsel to show the fact when impaneling the jury, and to inquire of each juror upon his voir dire if he is a stockholder, or in any manner interested, in such company. Such inquiries are proper and necessary in order to determine whether the jury can act impartially, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of a party to the litigation.

Evidence.

Certain alleged errors in the admission and exclusion of testimony considered and disposed of.

Henry C. Belden and Trafford N. Jayne, for appellant.

John W. Arctander, for respondent.

OPINION

COLLINS, J.

The plaintiff in this action -- one to recover damages for personal injuries -- had a verdict. The appeal is from an order denying the alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

A brief statement of the facts seems essential. Plaintiff was eighteen years of age, of ordinary intelligence, and had worked in the sawmill of defendant, a corporation, some months, and in various parts thereof; part of the time on the day shift and part of the time at night. At the time of the accident, which was about midnight, he was at work at a bench used for conveying lumber, by means of rollers placed at intervals along the same, from the saws to another part of the mill. This required that he do some sorting as the sawed material came along over the rollers. Near where the plaintiff stood when sorting the lumber, using a "pickaroon," which he held in his right hand, there was a gate or bumper, which moved up through an aperture in the bench, and was operated by means of a trip lever, on the treadle of which he placed his foot, pushed down, and, when this treadle reached the lowest point, sprung the arm under a catch by means of a slight motion of the foot to the left. The gate was then held in position above the bench, and caught and stopped all material as it came along. To lower the gate and permit the material to pass on to the left, the operator put his foot upon the treadle, pushed it down with a slight movement to the right to liberate it from the catch, released his foot, and thereupon the gate dropped below the bench of its own weight, and then did not interfere with the passage of lumber until again raised.

The catch, which was near the floor, appears to have been out of order for some time prior to the accident, and, instead of using it, the plaintiff and other operators substituted a strip of wood about two-and-a-half feet long, notched at each end. The notch at the lower end of this strip or stick was placed over the lever just where the treadle was attached to the arm, and that at the other end was slipped by the operator under a cast iron, which was fastened to the bench. When the strip was thus placed, the treadle was kept down and the gate up. The platform or top surface of the bench projected a short distance over its frame, and was finished on its front edge with a four-inch board. Each roller was operated by means of gearing set in the bench a few inches from its edge, the gearing being covered over so that it did not show in the top or upper surface; in other words, it was not visible except from underneath. The cogwheels of the gearing meshed at right angles close to the under surface of the platform, so that they could not be seen except by stooping and looking underneath; and under this bench no part of the gearing was covered or guarded. When the stick which served to keep the lever down was not in use, it was thrown upon the floor back of the operator, so that whenever he wanted it he turned partly or wholly around, as necessity might require, picked it up with his left hand, placed it in position, and there it necessarily remained as long as the gate was above the bench. The defendant admitted at the trial that the use of this stick resulted from the defective catch, and was with its implied consent.

On the night in question plaintiff had occasion to raise the gate. He turned around, seized the stick with his left hand, having the pickaroon in his right, and attempted to place it in position while holding the lever down with his foot. The stick slipped from his grasp, and in attempting to seize it as it fell under the bench his hand and arm were caught and badly injured in the cogwheels, and for these injuries this action was brought.

1. There was presented to the jury in this case the frequently recurring defense of assumption of risk, the plaintiff claiming that he did not know, while he was at work, that the gearing underneath the bench was not guarded and protected, as required by the provisions of G.S. 1894, § 2248. He testified positively that he did not know that this gearing was unguarded. This question being specifically submitted to the jury, they found that the plaintiff did not know, before the time of the injury, that the portion of the gearing extending below the platform was uncovered.

The rule in respect to the assumption of risk is well settled by the decisions of this court. If there was testimony in the case tending to support the verdict of the jury to the effect that plaintiff did not know that the gearing was uncovered and unguarded, the order must be affirmed, unless it appears that, in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, he ought to have known that the statute had been disregarded, and that these cogwheels were exposed, whereby he was in danger of injury if he came in contact with them. The law required of him the use of his senses in an ordinary and prudent manner but...