Sporza v. German Sav. Bank

• Decision Date: 07 April 1908
• Citation: 192 N.Y. 8,84 N.E. 406
• Parties: SPORZA v. GERMAN SAVINGS BANK.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

192 N.Y. 8

84 N.E. 406

SPORZA

v.GERMAN SAVINGS BANK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 7, 1908.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by Frank Sporza, committee of the estate of Ida Jetta, otherwise known as Ida Sporza, an incompetent person, against the German Savings Bank in the city of New York. From a judgment of the Appellate Division, rendered on an agreed statement of facts under Code Civ. Proc. § 1279 (119 App. Div. 172,104 N. Y. Supp. 260), in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.John E. Donnelly, Wm. J. Amend, and Alfred J. Amend, for appellant.

Joseph Weber and James E. Brande, for respondent.

HAIGHT, J.

On the 22d day of November, 1897, one Ida Jetter opened an account with the defendant, the German Savings Bank in the city of New York, and at the date of the submission there was standing to her credit upon the books of the bank $1,309.72. On the 20th of July, 1902, she was married to Frank Sporza, the plaintiff, and subsequently was duly committed to the Manhattan State Hospital at Ward's Island, under the name of Ida Jetta, as an incompetent person, in the manner provided by the state insanity law, where she ever since has been maintained and supported by the people of the state as a public charge. On the 23d of May, 1906, upon the petition of the superintendent of the hospital, upon notice duly served upon the alleged incompetent and upon her husband, and upon a hearing had, an order was entered in the Supreme Court appointing the plaintiff a committee of her estate, who duly qualified by giving the bond required by the order. Thereupon payment of the amount so remaining to her credit on deposit in defendant's bank was demanded by him, and refused upon the ground that her name was improperly spelled, and further that section 2323a of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the plaintiff was appointed a committee, was in violation of the provisions of the Constitutions of this state and of the United States. Upon application to the court an order was entered correcting the spelling of the name by stating the various names under which she had been known. This we think the court had power to do, and that no reason exists for the further withholding by the bank of the funds belonging to her, by reason of any variance in the name or names under which she was known.

The question raised, however, with reference to the constitutionality of section 2323a of the Code of Civil Procedure, requires careful consideration, and is one of much public importance, in view of the fact that it has been in force since 1895, and that several hundred appointments of committees have been made annually under it, through which not only personal estate but the title to real property has passed. The provision is as follows: ‘Where an incompetent person has been committed to a state institution in any manner provided by law, and is an inmate thereof, the petition may be presented on behalf of the state by a state officer having special jurisdiction over the institution where the incompetent person is confined, or the superintendent or acting superintendent of said institution; the petition must be in writing and verified by the affidavit of the petitioner or his attorney, to the effect that the matters therein stated are true to the best of his information or belief; it must show that the person for whose person or property, or both, a committee is asked has been legally committed to a state institution over which the petitioner has special jurisdiction, or of which he is superintendent or acting superintendent, and is at the time an inmate thereof; it must also state the institution in which he is an inmate, the date of his admission, his last known place of residence, the name and residence of the husband or wife, if any, of such person, and if there be none, the name and residence of the next of kin of such person living in this state so far as known to the petitioner; the nature, extent and income of his property, so far as the same is known to the petitioner, or can with reasonable diligence be ascertained by him. The petition may be presented to the Supreme Court at any special term thereof, held either in the judicial district in which such incompetent person last resided, or in the district in which the state institution in which he is committed is situated, or to a justice of the Supreme Court at chambers within such judicial district, or to the county court of the county in which the incompetent person resided at the time of such commitment, or of the county in which said institution is situated. Notice of the presentation of such petition shall be personally given to such person, and also to the husband or wife, if any, or if none to the next of kin named in the petition, and to the officer in charge of the institution in which such person is an inmate. Upon the presentation of such petition, and proof of the service of such notice, the court or justice may, if satisfied of the truth of the facts required to be stated in such petition, immediately appoint a committee of the person or property, or both, of such incompetent person or may require any further proof which it or he may deem necessary before making such appointment.’ One of the purposes for which this provision was enacted was to secure reimbursement in whole or in part for maintenance and support in a state institution. Code Civ. Proc. § 2336a.

It is contended that the provision of the Code alluded to is violative of the provisions of the state Constitution (article 1, § 2) which provides that the trial by a jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been used shall remain inviolate forever, and that it is also violative of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States (section 1, Amend. 14) which provides that no state shall deprive any person of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Jurisdiction is inherent in the state over unfortunate persons within its limits who are idiots, or have been deprived of the use of their mental faculties. It is its duty to protect the community from the acts of those persons who are not under the guidance of reason, and also to protect them, their persons, and property from their own disordered and insane acts. In England, whence our law respecting idiots and lunatics is derived, the custody and care of such persons and their property are part of the prerogative of the sovereign. By the ancient common law they were intrusted to curators who, being either the feudal lord or the next of kin, in case of an idiot whose disability was permanent, took his land and profits as the next in succession, subject to the obligation of supporting him during his life; but in the case of a lunatic who might recover his reason the curator was simply given the custody of the estate under the obligation of applying the profits to the support of the incompetent, retaining the excess to be returned with the estate in case of such recovery. Later on the duties of the curator were transferred to the king, whose duty was discharged by committing the custody of the person and of his estate to proper committees. This duty was afterwards transferred to the Lord Chancellor, not as a part of his equitable jurisdiction, but as the king's delegate to exercise his special jurisdiction. Fleta, 6; 2 Reeves' History of English Law, by Finlason, p. 193, c. 12, and note a; 1 Bl. Com. 303; 3 Bl. Com. 427. On our separation from Great Britain at the time of the Revolution so much of the law as formed a part of the king's prerogative which was applicable under our form of government was vested in the people of the state, and by legislative enactments was transferred to the chancellor, who should have the care of, and provide for, the safe-keeping of all idiots and lunatics, and of their real and person estates. Act concerning lunatics, passed March 20, 1801 (1 Revised Laws 1813, p. 147, c. 30). And upon the organization of the Supreme Court this jurisdiction was transferred to it.

The statutory provision for the care of the insane during the early history of our state is somewhat meager; and the practice with reference to the detention and confinement of an insane person and the appointment of a committee was somewhat uncertain, and had to be sought for in the adjudicated cases and books upon practice. It was common practice for the relatives and next of kin of persons who had become insane, if violent, to restrain them and place them in some retreat or institution for their care and medical treatment. The writ of habeas corpus was always available to inquire into the cause of such detention, and to release such persons in case they were found sane; but, if insane, their detention was sanctioned under the police power of the state on account of the necessity of protecting them and the public from their disordered minds and insane acts. The usual practice, however, was to procure a writ de lunatico inquirendo, under which an inquisition was held before a jury, and the question of the mental disorder of a person determined by a verdict. The contention is made that the verdict of the jury was not a matter of right, but that it was resorted to by the chancellor for the purpose of informing the conscience of the court.

In Matter of Wendell, a Lunatic, 1 Johns. Ch. 600, Chancellor Kent, after reviewing the statute in England of 2 and 3 Edward VI says, ‘we need not stop to discuss the construction of the statute,’ for the reason that it had not been re-enacted or adopted in this state, and then says: ‘The care and custody of idiots and lunatics, being confided to this court, the whole control of the inquisition, and the manner in which that control shall be exercised, would seem to depend entirely on the discretion of the court. The lunatic may be brought into court and inquiry made,...