Spraddling v. Pipkin

• Decision Date: 31 October 1851
• Citation: 15 Mo. 118
• Parties: SPRADDLING & KEETON v. PIPKIN.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

15 Mo. 118

SPRADDLING & KEETON

v.PIPKIN.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1851.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

JOHNSON, for Appellants.

1. The County Court of Jefferson county had no right to order Pipkin, the public administrator of that county, to administer on the slaves in question, and he had no right to sue for them. The slaves of John Keeton were inventoried by Wm. Keeton, the administrator, in 1827. It not being necessary to retain these slaves in Missouri to pay debts, and the heirs desiring it, and the rule for distribution being the same in Missouri and Tennessee, they were transmitted to the latter State, hired out, and their hire returned to the Probate Court, and, in fact, administered on there. Wm. Keeton made a final settlement in Missouri, on 27th of November, 1830. Missouri lost jurisdiction over the slaves in 1827, and Tennessee acquired jurisdiction. Both States could not have jurisdiction over the same property at the same time. Missouri having lost her jurisdiction, and the administration having been closed, by final settlement, her courts could never make orders that would vest the title to the slaves in any subsequent administrator. It is impossible for a court to require the same property to be administered upon twice.

2. The order of the County Court required Pipkin to take charge of the goods and chattels of John Keeton, unadministered; and under this order he sues for slaves that had been administered on, eighteen years before. He goes beyond the order and violates its very terms. He sues the representative of the first administrator, when that administrator had made final settlement of the estate in 1830. When final settlement is made, the administrator is out of court, as to all the property included in his inventories. Who would be an administrator, if, eighteen years after final settlement, the court had a right to order a new administration on the proprety included in his inventories, and have his children harassed by suits when he is dead and gone, and, perhaps, when many of the evidences of his administration may be lost or destroyed?

3. Wm. Keeton, having made a final settlement in Missouri in 1830, it is necessary to set aside that settlement as fraudulent, otherwise it operates as an effectual bar to the claims here advanced. This point is decided in a kindred case from the same county that this comes from. Keeton v. Spraddling 13 Mo. R. 323. This has not been done and cannot be done. It was never even tried.

4. The Circuit Court erred in giving the 5th instruction, at the instance of the plaintiff. That there is no evidence before the jury that the slaves have been administered upon, and the titles of John Keeton's heirs divested under the letters granted in Jefferson county. It is wrong, because it is telling the jury that there is no evidence of the fact, when, in truth, the fact is clearly established. And besides, though the fact may not be clearly established, the court has no right to tell the jury that there is no evidence of a fact if there is any evidence of it. If the opposite be the law, the court would usurp the province of the jury. See Mo. R. passim. In the first instruction given at the instance of the plaintiff, the court leaves it to the jury to find the fact whether the slaves were administered on or not. This was proper. It then turns round in the 5th instance, and tells the jury that there is no evidence that they were administered upon. In the two instructions taken together, the jury are, in effect, told to find for the plaintiff. Of course they disregarded any evidence offered by defendant.

5. If these reasons be correct, the Circuit Court should have given instructions Nos. 1 and 3, asked by defendant, and in refusing them it committed error.

6. The 1st and 4th instructions voluntarily given by the court to the jury are repugnant and irreconcilable and could not fail to mislead. It tells them, in the 1st, that if the sale is void, no circumstances of acquiescence by the heirs or the receiving of their distributive shares can make the sale binding, and yet, though the sale be void, such circumstances, if Wm. Keeton purchased for himself and held as his own, will make an adverse possession, which will complete his title after five years. To say that a title can never be valid, and in the next breath, that it will be valid in five years, is a solecism.

7. In the third instruction voluntarily given by the court, it tells the jury, “if they find that the title to the slave in controversy, never legally passed to Wm. Keeton, in his own right,” &c. Here the court commit an opposite error to the one just complained of. It does not usurp the province of the jury, but tells the jury to usurp the province of the court. It submits a question of law to the jury. Whether the title ever legally passed, is a matter for the court to decide, basing its decision upon the facts admitted or found by the jury. Ad questions facti juratores respondunt, ad questiones legis judices respondunt. Such instructions have often been condemned by this court.

8. The Circuit Court should not have rejected the bill of sale of Wm. Keeton, administrator, to Elizabeth Keeton. It could not have been regarded in the light of evidence made for the occasion. It was found among his papers by his administrator ante titem motam. It bore date, April 9th, 1832, and its execution was both admitted and proved. The fact of there being two subscribing witnesses, shows that it must have been executed at the time it bore date. The paper came from the proper custody. It was the first link in Wm. Keetons title. It is very common, when a purchase of property is made, to turn over to the last purchaser all the prior conveyances. If A., as administrator, sells lands to B., and makes a conveyance, and A. should afterwards buy all or a portion of the same land from B., and be put to sue for possession, would his deed, as administrator be rejected, when offered as the first link in his chain of title, upon the ground that the deed did not come from the proper custody? I think not. The question of “proper custody” is only important in the event that suspicion is thrown upon the genuineness of a paper; it helps to prove its authenticity. Here no suspicion surrounds the deed; it is both admitted and proved to be genuine.

9. There are several instructions given and several refused, which bear upon the validity of the sale made by Wm. Keeton in Tennessee. In the 6th point made, we showed two instructions given, which are entirely repugnant to each other. Instruction No. 19, asked by defendant, was refused, which embodied defendant's view. In this conflict, this court must say what the sale amounts to. We throw out of view the orders of any court, and say, that for payment of debts, the administrator has a right to sell slaves without the order of court, and his sale will confer a good title on the purchaser, For this purpose it has often been held valid in this State; and we say, that where property is transmitted from one jurisdiction to another, the administrator has a right to distribute it among those entitled, without the aid of a court. Story's Conflict of Laws. The record shows, that the sale was necessary for payment of debts and distribution.

10. Should this be questioned, there is no doubt that the heirs might consent that the administrator should sell slaves for the two purposes indicated, without going into courts at all, and such consent would forever estop them from disputing the sale. The record shows that all the adult heirs and Elizabeth Keeton, in her own right and as guardian of her three minor children, did consent to the sale. Numerous witnesses proved that the heirs consented to the sale, that they were present thereat and never objected to it at the time nor since. This court will hold men bound by their solemn acts, and when it appears that a sale has been made by consent, and those consenting have received their distributive shares, will not permit them to deny their consent, hold on to the money received and recover back the property again. We cordially assert that this court will hold this sale valid, particularly as it is ratified by the subsequent acts of the heirs with a concurring knowledge of all the facts in the case.

11. The court erred in instructing the jury (No. 4,) at the instance of the plaintiff, “That if they believed from the evidence, that the sale of the slaves or the receipts of the heirs, or other papers in evidence are fraudulent, the jury will disregard them.” There is not a scintilla of evidence attacking the receipts for fraud; nor is it recollected that any other papers offered in evidence were attacked for fraud. It is clearly unjust to tell a jury that if they find certain papers fraudulent they will disregard them, when no evidence has been offered to attack them for fraud. Such an instruction is calculated to create a suspicion of fraud in the minds of the jury, where the evidence furnishes no grounds for such suspicion; and they might be led to find fraud, because they believed that the judge thought fraud existed. The judge thus indirectly influences the jury to find a fact without evidence of it. Such instructions have often been condemned by this court.

12. The court should not have rejected the report of the settlement made by the last board of commissioners with William Keeton. The report should, at least, be held prima facie good. Had it been made a part of the record, as the preceding report, it would have been conclusive. It must have been the neglect of the clerk that it was not made a part of the record. It has the marks of fairness on its face; it respects only four receipts for money paid out by Wm. Keeton, and for which they say he is entitled to be credited, and one of these receipts makes up nearly the whole amount reported, the other three are insignificant. They are, moreover, dated. But the heirs have settled by this report...