Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 00-0141,00-0141
• Citation: 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 158,34 S.W.3d 578
• Parties: (Tex. 2000) William L. Spradlin, Petitioner v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., Respondent
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 578

34 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000)

William L. Spradlin, Petitioner v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., Respondent

No. 00-0141

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Argued October 18, 2000

Decided December 7, 2000

On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas

Justice ABBOTT delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we construe recent revisions to the Texas Constitution's homestead provisions. Jim Walter Homes (JWH) contracted with William Spradlin to build a home for him and secured a lien on Spradlin's homestead. Spradlin sought invalidation of the lien, claiming that it did not comply with the procedural protections of subparts (A) through (D) of Texas Constitution Article XVI, Section 50(a)(5). In the trial court, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted JWH's motion, holding that subparts (A) through (D) did not apply to JWH's mechanic's lien for construction of new improvements. Embracing JWH's plain-language reading of the constitutional provision, the court of appeals affirmed. 9 S.W.3d 473. So do we.

In 1997, Texas voters amended Section 50 of our Constitution to allow home equity lending, subject to express procedural protections. The part of that Section at issue in this case reads:

Sec. 50. (a) The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for:

. . .

(5) work and material used in constructing new improvements thereon, if contracted for in writing, or work and material used to repair or renovate existing improvements thereon if:

(A) the work and material are contracted for in writing, with the consent of both spouses, in the case of a family homestead, given in the same manner as is required in making a sale and conveyance of the homestead;

(B) the contract for the work and material is not executed by the owner or the owner's spouse before the 12th day after the owner makes written application for any extension of credit for the work and material, unless the work and material are necessary to complete immediate repairs to conditions on the homestead property that materially affect the health or safety of the owner or person residing in the homestead and the owner of the homestead acknowledges such in writing;

(C) the contract for the work and material expressly provides that the owner may rescind the contract without penalty or charge within three days after the execution of the contract by all parties, unless the work and material are necessary to complete immediate repairs to conditions on the homestead property that materially affect the health or safety of the owner or person residing in the homestead and the owner of the homestead acknowledges such in writing; and

(D) the contract for the work and material is executed by the owner and the owner's spouse only at the office of a third-party lender making an extension of credit for the work and material, an attorney at law, or a title company.

Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5)(A)-(D) (effective Jan. 1, 1998) (emphasis added).

After this amended version of Section 50 became law, Spradlin entered into a mechanic's lien contract with JWH for the construction of a new house on his one-acre homestead. Soon thereafter, Spradlin notified JWH that he considered the lien invalid because JWH did not comply with subpart (B)'s requisite twelve-day "cooling-off period" or subpart (D)'s requirement that the contract be executed in the office of a third-party lender, an attorney, or a title company. Spradlin therefore requested that JWH release the lien. JWH responded by filing a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the lien was valid. Spradlin filed a cross-action for declaratory judgment, and both parties moved for summary judgment.

Focusing his argument on the historical strength of the Texas Constitution's homestead protections, Spradlin asserted that subparts (A) through (D) should be liberally construed to apply not only to subsection (5)'s "work and material used to repair or renovate existing improvements" on homestead property but also to "work and material used in constructing new improvements thereon." See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5). JWH argued that the 1997 amendment to Section 50, by differentiating between new and existing improvements, changed long-standing Texas constitutional law. It claimed that a plain-language reading of Section 50 shows that the four specific protections listed directly after "work and material used to repair or renovate existing improvements" apply to that phrase alone. The district court entered a declaratory judgment that JWH's lien was valid and enforceable against Spradlin. The court of appeals affirmed judgment for JWH. We likewise affirm.

The single question this case poses is: Do subparts (A) through (D) of Texas Constitution Article XVI, Section 50(a)(5) apply to both "work and material used in constructing new improvements" and "work and material used to repair or renovate existing improvements," or do they apply only to the latter?¹ In addition to asserting that Texas courts have historically construed the Texas Constitution's generous homestead provisions liberally, Spradlin argues that if the Legislature had intended subparts (A) through (D) to apply only to "work and material used to repair or renovate existing improvements," it would have confined new improvements to one subsection and drafted an entirely separate subsection for existing improvements, listing subparts (A) through (D) beneath the latter alone. Applying the doctrine of last antecedent to the plain language of the provision, JWH argues that subparts (A) through (D) refer only to the text that immediately precedes them namely, "work and material used to repair or renovate existing improvements." We agree with JWH.

Presuming that the language of the Texas Constitution is carefully selected, we construe its words as they are generally understood. City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 148 (Tex. 1995). We rely heavily on the plain language of the Constitution's literal text. Republican Party v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. 1997); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989). Consistent with these fundamental principles, we "give effect to all the words of a statute and [do] not treat any statutory language as surplusage[,] if possible." Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1987). We avoid constructions that would render any constitutional provision meaningless or nugatory. Hanson v. Jordan, 198 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. 1946).

Spradlin's reading of Section 50(a)(5) fails for the simple reason that we not only must presume that the Legislature chose its words carefully, Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at 148, but also...