Spradling v. Spradling
| Decision Date | 23 February 1937 |
| Docket Number | 8440. |
| Parties | SPRADLING v. SPRADLING. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted February 2, 1937.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Prior to the enactment of Code 1931, 48-3-3, a conveyance of land by a wife to her husband, they living together, was void and vested in him no rights or interest, either legal or equitable.
2. Specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate will be decreed only where the contract itself is definite and certain in its terms.
3. In the absence of fraud or intentional wrong on the part of the person to be estopped, resulting in a detriment to one asserting estoppel, there can be no estoppel in pais.
4. When a husband improves his wife's property during her coverture, the presumption is he did so as a gift or benefit to her. In such case, there is no implied contract for the payment of their value.
5. The findings of the trial chancellor will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong or against the preponderance of the evidence.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Putnam County.
Suit by Evalena Spradling against Shirley M. Spradling. Decree for plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
C. E Copen, of Winfield, for appellant.
L. S Trotter, of Charleston, for appellee.
This is a suit in equity, brought by the appellee, Evalena Spradling against the appellant, Shirley Spradling, in the circuit court of Putnam county for the purpose primarily of having declared null and void a certain deed dated February 22 1922, of the said appellee to her husband, S. L. Spradling during his lifetime. From a final decree providing for the annulment of said deed, the appellant appeals.
On September 25, 1910, the appellee and the said S. L. Spradling were married and lived as husband and wife in a home jointly in the town of Poca, W. Va., from the time of their marriage until his death on June 1, 1933. This home was situated on a lot which the appellee had inherited before her marriage from her father.
At the time of his marriage, the decedent owned a lot immediately adjoining Mrs.
Spradling's residence property, upon which was situated a two-story store building. Adjoining this lot, in the rear, there was another small lot owned by Mrs. Spradling which she also had inherited from her father upon which an old garage was situated. In 1913 and 1914, the decedent built the dwelling house in which he and Mrs. Spradling lived until his death, and in which Mrs. Spradling continued to reside. This dwelling cost about $1,000, toward which Mrs. Spradling contributed $525. By deed made on February 22, 1922, Mrs. Spradling attempted to convey to her husband directly said rear lot (valued at $25 to $100). The decedent did not join in this deed. The deed contains no recital as to Mrs. Spradling's marital status; it recites a consideration of $10 and other valuable considerations; and was recorded in the clerk's office of Putnam county.
The old garage on the lot was remodeled into a small cottage in 1929. This cottage was rented by the decedent, who collected the rents until his death. Thereafter, the rents were collected by the appellant, Shirley Spradling, the decedent's only son (by a former marriage) and heir at law. The testimony varied as to the cost of this remodeling. However, Mrs. Spradling contributed $350 toward the expense.
During the whole course of their marriage, Mrs. Spradling and her husband lived together without any separation; no divorce had intervened to sever their marriage relationship; no children were born of this marriage. This was the virtual situation which existed between this husband and wife at the time the deed was executed, a relationship which continued until June 1, 1933, when Mr. Spradling died intestate, leaving the appellant as his only heir at law. Mrs. Spradling waived her right to qualify as administratrix of the estate and the appellant was appointed with Mrs. Spradling as surety on his bond.
After Mr. Spradling's death, an appraisement of his estate was made. In this appraisement, the two-story store building property was appraised at $550 and the lot in question was appraised at $400. The appraisement contains items of tangible personal property, listed at $297, and intangible personal property listed at $156.29. The appellant was present at the appraisement and directed it. Mrs. Spradling was not present, but, according to the appellant, she knew what was going on.
After Mr. Spradling's death and before this suit was brought, differences arose between Mrs. Spradling and her stepson. In an effort to patch up these differences, a contract was entered into between the parties on January 9, 1934, which contract deals with the disposition of the personal property belonging to the decedent's estate, and provides further that the appellant shall collect "the rents, issues and profits of all real estate left by Sam Spradling at his death, and shall continue to pay the one-third portion thereof to Evelin Spradling so long as she shall live as is her right under the law of dower." Purporting to act under this contract, the appellant continued to collect the rents derived from the dwelling house on the small lot and paid one-third thereof to Mrs. Spradling. In the fall of 1934, Mrs. Spradling caused a survey to be made of the line between the lot in question and the property upon which her dwelling house was situated. The record does not disclose when the parties learned that the deed in question was void. On one occasion, the time of which does not appear, the decedent told her that the deed was void and asked her to make a deed for the lot to the appellant.
This suit was brought on December 28, 1934. The pleadings consist of a bill of complaint; an answer containing a prayer for specific performance of the contract of January 9, 1934; and demurrers to the bill of complaint and the answer, which demurrers were overruled by the court.
On this appeal, the defendant claims that the circuit court erred in three particulars: First, in holding that the deed from Evalena Spradling to S. L. Spradling is void; second, in holding that the appellee is not estopped from denying validity of the deed; and third, in holding that the appellee is not liable for the improvements made upon the lot in question by her husband.
The appellant's first ground of error is not well taken in the view of the law which governed conveyances between wife and husband at the time the deed in question was made. At the time the deed was made the parties were married and living together. Notwithstanding this, the husband did not join in the deed. Under the statute then in effect (section 3, chapter 66, of the Barnes' Code 1923), a married woman could not convey real estate unless her husband joined in the deed. Moreover, a deed of a married woman to her husband, he not joining in the deed, was void and vested in the husband no rights or interest, either legal or equitable. Smith v. Vineyard, 58 W.Va. 98, 51 S.E. 871; Mullins v. Shrewsbury, 60 W.Va. 694, 55 S.E. 736. It follows that under the law of this state, as it existed when the deed was executed, said deed was void in every sense of the word. By its execution and delivery, Mrs. Spradling's rights in the lot in question were not altered or diminished in the least. Her title remained intact just as though the deed had not been written.
The appellant for his second ground of error says that Mrs. Spradling was estopped to deny the validity of the deed. Estopped by what, we ask? Certainly not by the deed itself which, under the statute and common law, based upon the prevailing public policy, was a mere nullity. For us to say that a party, making a void deed could be estopped by the delivery of the deed would, in fact, destroy the entire effect of the law. Such a position does not reside in sound logic. It finds no support in the decisions of this court, and it is opposed by the weight of authority in the United States. Central Land Company v. Laidley, 32 W.Va. 134, 9 S.E. 61, 3 L.R.A. 826, 25 Am.St.Rep. 797; 10 Ruling Case Law, § 56, note 9; Leftwich v. Neal, 7 W.Va. 569, 577.
The doctrine of estoppel is arbitrary in its very nature. It is invoked only in the interests of justice. Even then, it contravenes the technical, legal rights of the party estopped. For this reason, courts have been slow and careful in their application of the doctrine of estoppel. Pocahontas Light & Water Company v. Browning, 53 W.Va. 436, 442, 44 S.E. 267; Mullins v. Shrewsbury, supra.
Care should be used by us before we invoke the doctrine of estoppel, to the extent of preventing Mrs. Spradling from asserting her rights as to the lot in question.
Under the record in this case, we do not think that Mrs. Spradling was estopped by her conduct, for prior to the enactment into law of the Code of 1931, a married woman could not be estopped from asserting her title to her real estate by conduct amounting to anything less than actual fraud. Mullins v. Shrewsbury, supra; Waldron v. Harvey, 54 W.Va. 608, 46 S.E. 603, 102 Am.St.Rep. 959; Williamson et al. v. Jones et al., 43 W.Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411, 38 L.R.A. 694, 64 Am.St.Rep. 891; McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Company, 52 W.Va. 616, 643, 44 S.E. 508, 62 L.R.A. 562; Yock v. Mann, 57 W.Va. 187, 49 S.E. 1019. In this case, the appellant's answer does not assert estoppel as a defense. Its allegations are directed largely as to the contract of January 9, 1934. The necessary elements of equitable estoppel are not shown by the proof. Estoppel fundamentally rests upon deceit or fraud. It is, in its very essence, predicated upon moral turpitude and intentional wrong. There must, in the final analysis, be an attempt to mislead in the mind of the person to...
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