Spradling v. Spradling

• Decision Date: 20 November 1911
• Parties: SPRADLING v. SPRADLING
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

142 S.W. 848

101 Ark. 451

SPRADLING v. SPRADLING

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 20, 1911

Appeal from Cleburne Chancery Court; George T. Humphries Chancellor; reversed.

Decree reversed and cause remanded.

E. G Mitchell and W. N. Ivie, for appellants; Mitchell & Thompson of counsel.

1. The demurrer should have been sustained for want of jurisdiction in the chancery court to grant relief to the holder of the equitable title against the holder of the legal title who is in adverse possession. 72 Ark. 256. It should also have been sustained because the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, there being no allegation of fraud, coercion or undue influence in the procurement of the deeds. 75 Ark. 127.

2. The evidence is insufficient to establish a resulting trust, but on the contrary it is clear that Mrs. Spradling intended the conveyance as a gift to her husband. While such conveyances are scrutinized with care by the courts, it is for the purpose of ascertaining the real intention of the parties and, having ascertained it, to carry into effect, not to defeat, such intention, where the transaction is free from fraud or imposition. 75 Ark. 127-132-133; 27 Ark. 77; 40 Ark. 62; 89 Ark. 182; 20 S.W. 609; 44 S.W. 397; 146 Ill. 635.

M. E. Vinson, for appellee.

1. Appellant's contention that the demurrer should have been sustained for want of jurisdiction is not borne out by the complaint. The allegation in the complaint is that H. H. Spradling after the death of his wife, Emily, had, by right of curtesy, a life estate in the lands. There can be no adverse possession by a life tenant against the remainderman. 58 Ark. 510; 35 Ark. 84; 60 Ark. 70; 65 Ark. 90; 69 Ark. 539.

2. The evidence clearly establishes a resulting trust, in that it shows that Mrs. Emily Spradling, at the time the deeds were executed, intended to create a trust for herself and her children, if she should have any, and that in case she should die without issue her husband should be protected against her brothers in the work and improvements he should put on the place; or, as expressed by the witness to whom the deed was executed, and who reconveyed back to Spradling: "The whole thing was done to show a transfer that in case she died without issue he could not be beaten out of his work." And that H. H. Spradling recognized that he held as trustee is shown by the fact that he always referred to the land as belonging to Jan and Darcy, the children of his wife, Emily, and stated that he intended to turn the land over to them when they were old enough to manage it. Parol evidence is admissible to show a resulting trust in a deed absolute on its face, even after the death of the grantee. 45 Ark. 472 and cases cited.

In cases of voluntary conveyances without consideration, the slightest evidence will warrant the implication of a trust in favor of the grantor. Hill on Trustees, 196; Bispham's Equity, 149; 139 N.Y. 197. The fiduciary relation existing between husband and wife often creates a trust. 140 Cal. 587. The evidence does not warrant the conclusion that the transactions amounted to an absolute gift of the property to Spradling. The evidence must be clear that a married woman intended such a conveyance as a gift before it will be so construed. 73 Ga. 275; 39 N. J. Eq., 211. See also 47 Ark. 115.

FRAUENTHAL J. HART, J., dissenting.

OPINION

FRAUENTHAL, J.

This was an action in equity instituted by Jan Spradling, the plaintiff below, originally against his father, H. H. Spradling, seeking to have him declared a trustee of certain lands for his benefit, and to divest him of the title thereof and invest same in the plaintiff. The complaint in substance alleged that the land in controversy was the property of plaintiff's mother, who inherited it from her father, Calvin Kendall. Calvin Kendall died in 1866, owning about six hundred acres of land, and left surviving him five children, amongst whom was the mother of plaintiff, named Emily, who married said H. H. Spradling. In 1876 said children of Calvin Kendall by mutual agreement divided the lands left by their father between themselves. The land in controversy by said partition was allotted to plaintiff's mother, but at her solicitation the deed therefor from the other heirs was executed to her husband. Subsequently, in 1877, in order to make more effective the title to her husband to said land, the said H. H. Spradling and his wife, Emily, conveyed the same to W.A. Brice, who at once executed a deed therefor to said H. H. Spradling.

In 1886, Emily Spradling died intestate, leaving her child, the plaintiff in this action, and another child who died without issue. After her death, H. H. Spradling married a second time. It was alleged in the complaint that the land was the sole and separate property of Emily, the first wife of H. H. Spradling, and that the conveyances executed to him therefor were without consideration; that thereby a resulting trust arose in her favor, making her the equitable owner of the land, which descended to the plaintiff, her sole heir.

During the pendency of the suit, H. H. Spradling died intestate, leaving surviving him his widow, E. C. Spradling, and a number of children born of the second marriage. The action was thereupon duly revived in the names of his widow and children.

It appears that B. Massingill had, during the pendency of this suit, instituted an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by said Spradling and his second wife upon the land in controversy. This action was consolidated with the suit instituted by the plaintiff.

Upon the trial of the case, the chancellor entered a decree divesting the title to the land out of the widow and children of said H. H. Spradling by his second wife, and investing the same in the plaintiff. He also entered a decree in favor of said B. Massingill for the foreclosure of said mortgage, and decreed that, upon payment thereof, the plaintiff should be subrogated to all the rights of said Massingill against the estate of said H. H. Spradling. From this decree the widow and children of H. H. Spradling by his second wife have appealed.

The defendant filed a demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that the chancery court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Counsel for defendant urge that the court erred in overruling this demurrer. This contention is made upon the ground that the complaint also alleged that the defendant was in the possession of the land under said deed from Brice, and that the plaintiff was only asserting an equitable title thereto. It is urged that equity has no jurisdiction to grant relief to the owner of the equitable title against the holder who is in adverse possession of the land under color of title. Reliance for this contention is placed upon the case of Burke v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 72 Ark. 256. But that case is not analogous to the one at bar. In that case the plaintiff was endeavoring to establish his title to land as against third parties by having them declared trustees for his benefit, and at the same time was endeavoring to remove as a cloud from his title to the land a tax deed under which the defendant claimed title to and held the exclusive possession of the land. It was there held that, the defendant being in exclusive possession of the land under color of title, his title could only be assailed at law in an action of ejectment by one having a better title. But in the case at bar the plaintiff, by direct action, is endeavoring to have the grantee in a deed declared a trustee for his benefit. The purpose of the bill is to have a trust declared resulting from the execution of the deed under which defendant claims to hold the land, and to show that, while by said deed the defendant holds the legal title, in truth and in fact the equitable title and beneficial ownership of the land is in the plaintiff. The complaint in this case seeks the enforcement of a trust springing from the very deed under which defendant claims title to the land. The plaintiff is not endeavoring to remove a title coming from a source independent of and disconnected with himself.

Courts of equity have inherent and exclusive jurisdiction over all kinds of trusts and trustees. They have full and complete jurisdiction of trusts independently of statute, whether the same arise by express declaration and agreement, or result by implication of law. 22 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 9; McDermutt v. Strong, 4 Johns. Ch. 687; Robinson v. Robinson, 45 Ark. 481; Bland v. Talley, 50 Ark. 71, 6 S.W. 234. The court therefore did not err in overruling the demurrer to the complaint.

It appears from the testimony that the land involved in this suit was the separate property of Emily Spradling, who inherited same from her father. In effect, she conveyed the land to her husband, H. H. Spradling, In order to make the conveyance from her more effective, the land was first deeded by her to a third party, who, in pursuance of an agreement to that effect, immediately conveyed it to her husband. There was no consideration for these deeds, and the question involved herein is, was the conveyance executed for the purpose of making a gift to her husband, or did a resulting trust therein arise in her favor by reason of the fact that the consideration therefor, or in fact the land itself, came alone from her? When land is purchased in the name of one person, and the consideration is paid by another, or where the title to land, inherited by one, is placed in the name of another, it is an established rule of equity that a trust in favor of the true and beneficial owner arises which a court of chancery will...