Sprague v. Martin
| Decision Date | 16 June 1882 |
| Citation | 13 N.W. 34,29 Minn. 226 |
| Parties | James L. Sprague v. Francis Martin |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action under Gen. St. 1878, c. 75, § 2, to determine the defendant's adverse claim to real property in Hennepin county. The cause was submitted to the court, Young, J presiding, upon an agreed statement of facts, and judgment was ordered and entered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appeals. The case is stated in the opinion.
Samuel R. Thayer, for appellant.
Chas J. Bartleson, for respondent.
The statutory redemption must be made in strict compliance with the statute, and must have the effect given to it by the statute, viz., "an assignment to him (the redeeming creditor) of the rights acquired" under the sale, and can have no other. Tinkcom v. Lewis, 21 Minn. 132. If the law is defective it lies with the legislature to cure it, and not the courts. This system of redemptions has existed in some of the states, substantially the same as provided by our law, during most of the present century, but it is believed no case can be found where the statute has received the construction contended for by appellant. The decisions are all against appellant's theory. Van Horne v. McLaren, 8 Paige, 285; Emmet's Adm'rs v. Bradstreet, 20 Wend. 50; Ex Parte Peru Iron Co. 7 Cow. 540; Freeman on Executions, §§ 317, 321
The plaintiff was formerly the owner of lands in Hennepin county consisting of two separate tracts. He is still in the occupancy of one of such tracts; the other tract is vacant and unoccupied. In 1878 plaintiff and his wife mortgaged these lands to one Olmstead, to secure a debt. Default having been made in the conditions of payment, the mortgage was foreclosed by advertisement, the mortgagee, Olmstead, bidding off the property at foreclosure sale, and receiving the sheriff's certificate of sale. Before the expiration of the year given by law to the mortgagor to make redemption, there was paid to Olmstead, in behalf of the wife of the plaintiff, Mrs. Sprague, the sum for which the property had been sold on foreclosure, with interest from the day of sale. Thereupon Olmstead executed to Mrs. Sprague an assignment of his sheriff's certificate of sale, which assignment she placed on record. Prior to the foreclosure sale one Littler recovered a judgment against Sprague, the plaintiff, for the sum of $ 122.24, which was docketed in the district court. This judgment was assigned to defendant, and he, having complied with the requirements of the statute respecting redemptions by judgment creditors, within five days after the expiration of the year from the day of sale, paid to the sheriff the sum necessary to make redemption therefrom, and received from that officer a certificate of redemption. Through this proceeding he claims to have acquired title to the land. The defendant had previously, by virtue of the same judgment, redeemed other real property of the judgment debtor from foreclosure sale, the value of which property exceeded the amount of the judgment and the sum paid for the redemption of the same. [*]
The interest acquired by Olmstead, by the sale to him, was one which would ripen into an absolute title, vesting in him the original title of the mortgagors, unless redemption should be made from such sale. By the assignment this right of the purchaser was transferred to Mrs. Sprague, and she thenceforth held it as her assignor would have done had the assignment not been made, subject to the right of redemption by the mortgagors or their assigns within a year from the time of sale, and after that by creditors, as prescribed by statute. No redemption was made unless by Martin, the defendant, as a judgment creditor of Sprague; and if Martin did not effect a legal redemption, the title has become absolute in Mrs. Sprague. Whether he has made such redemption depends upon his right to redeem, for no question is made as to the regularity of his proceedings. That Mrs. Sprague must be deemed to have purchased the rights of Olmstead, and to hold them as assignee, cannot be a matter of doubt, although it is claimed in her behalf that the transaction should be considered as a redemption by her as a mortgagor rather than an assignment. Upon its face the transaction was an assignment, and not only is no proof offered, if that were possible, to change the apparent character of the transaction, but the parties have agreed, as a part of the statement of facts upon which the case was submitted to the court below for judgment, that Olmstead, "by an instrument in writing, regular in form, sold and assigned said certificate of sale, and all the rights and title thereby acquired to said premises, to said Angeline M. Sprague." But, assuming Mrs. Sprague to have held by assignment from the purchaser the right in respect to the property acquired by him by the sale, subject to redemption by creditors, the principal question in the case is as to whether Martin had the right to make redemption from her; whether his previous redemption of property of the judgment debtor, of value sufficient to satisfy his judgment, together with the sum paid by him to effect redemption, operated as a satisfaction of his judgment, and extinguished his right to make other redemptions.
The statute provides that if no redemption shall be made from foreclosure sale by the mortgagor, his representatives or assigns, within one year, "the senior creditor having a lien, legal or equitable, on the real estate, or some part thereof, subsequent to the mortgage, may redeem within five days after the expiration of the said twelve months; and each subsequent creditor, having such lien, within five days after the time allowed all prior lien-holders, as aforesaid, may redeem by paying the amount aforesaid, [the sum of money for which the land was sold with interest,] and all liens prior to his own held by the party from whom the redemption is made." Gen. St. 1878, c. 81, § 16. It further gives to the sale under foreclosure the effect of a conveyance to the purchaser or his assigns of all the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor in the property at the date of the mortgage, and invests redeeming creditors, as by assignment, with the rights acquired by the purchaser.
Not using the words for the purpose of accurate definition, we may say that by a mortgage of real estate the mortgaged property is pledged as security for the payment of a debt, or the performance of some other obligation. Foreclosure proceedings, in whatever manner conducted, have for their object and end the enforcement of the security; the application of the property to the satisfaction of the debt or obligation secured. Thus by a strict foreclosure the conditional title acquired by the mortgage is made absolute in the mortgagee, the property being thus applied directly to the satisfaction of the debt. So a foreclosure by entry and possession, existing under some jurisdictions, is only another mode of enforcing the security. The same is true of sales under powers or by decrees of courts. All these are remedies given by the law, or by agreement or grant, by means of which the property pledged as security is actually applied to the satisfaction of the debt secured. It has never been doubted that as to the mortgage debt such remedy, when pursued to completion, operated as payment in toto or pro tanto. Lovell v. Leland, 3 Vt. 581; Hatch v. White, 2 Gall. C.C. 152; Amory v. Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562; Green v. Cross, 45 N.H. 574; Hurd v. Coleman, 42 Me. 182; Jones on Mortgages, §§ 950, 952, 1237. So, too, a release by the mortgagor to the mortgagee of the equity of redemption, after condition broken, is tantamount to foreclosure, and operates as payment of the mortgage debt to the extent of the value of the property. Jones on Mortgages, § 951, and cases cited.
But not only has the mortgagee a right to have the mortgaged property applied in satisfaction of his debt by a foreclosure of the equity of redemption remaining in the mortgagor, but creditors of the mortgagor, having liens upon the property subsequent to the mortgage, have also the right, subject to the equities of the mortgagee, to resort to the same property for payment, and to enforce their liens upon it. These rights of both mortgagee and creditor, always recognized in chancery and subjects of equitable jurisdiction, are regulated by statute, and may ordinarily be adjusted by the acts of the parties without the intervention of the court. The equitable right of the creditor to redeem from a prior encumbrance, in order that the property may be made available to the satisfaction of his own debt, which right was formerly enforceable by a bill in chancery to redeem, may now be ordinarily legally enforced by the statutory redemption. For obvious reasons, however, the exercise of that right is postponed until the lapse of the time given to the mortgagor to redeem; for, if redemption shall be made by the mortgagor such redemption annuls the foreclosure sale,...
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