Spratley v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 January 1906
• Citation: 95 S.W. 776
• Parties: SPRATLEY v. LOUISIANA & A. RY. CO.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

95 S.W. 776

SPRATLEY v. LOUISIANA & A. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

January 13, 1906.

On Rehearing, April 23, 1906.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Miller County; Joel D. Conway, Judge.

Action by G. T. Spratley against the Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

G. T. Spratley brought suit on January 2, 1903, before W. J. Smithers, a justice of the peace for Garland township, Miller county, Ark., against the defendant, the Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company, alleging a certain sum to be due him by the defendant for wages. Service of summons was attempted to be had by delivering a copy thereof to the auditor of said railway in Texarkana, Miller county, Ark. It is admitted that the domicile and principal office and place of business of the Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company is in Stamps, La Fayette county, Ark., and that no part of its railroad line lies or is situate in Miller county, Ark., and it is further admitted that its president, William Buchanan, does not live in Miller county, Ark., but lives in Bowie county, Tex. For purposes of convenience, the president's office, auditor's office, and the offices of the general passenger and freight agent and the offices of the treasurer and purchasing agent of the Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company are located in Texarkana, Miller county, Ark. On January 10, 1903, the day summons was made returnable to the justice court, the defendant appeared, answering solely for the purpose of this summons, and moved the court to quash the summons and service thereof, because the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Arkansas, and has its domicile and principal offices in Stamps, La Fayette county, Ark. And that it does not have its principal offices or place of business in Miller county, Ark., that its chief officer does not reside in said county, and that none of its road lies or is situate in said county of Miller, and that this defendant cannot be legally summoned or required to answer in a suit brought in the county of Miller. The motion was, by the justice of the peace, overruled, and the defendant answered "reserving all its rights and privileges, and reasserting that it had never been legally summoned herein and should not be required to answer, and reiterating its motion in the cause to quash the summons herein and the service thereon, and the return thereon, for the reasons set out in its previous motion therefor, and answering under protest." Judgment was rendered in the justice court against the defendant, by whom appeal was taken to the Miller county circuit court. At the June term, 1903, of the Miller county circuit court, this cause was continued by consent. At the November term, 1903, of the Miller circuit court, the defendant renewed its motion to quash the summons herein, the service thereof, and the return thereon, made in the court below for the same reasons stated in the justice court. Said motion to quash was sustained by the court, and this cause dismissed. To which order of the court sustaining said motion, the plaintiff at the time excepted, said exception was entered of record, and this appeal taken.

Frank S. Quinn, for appellant. Moore & Moore, for appellees.

WOOD, J. (after stating the facts).

First. Appellee had the cause dismissed under section 6067, Kirby's Dig., which provides that "an action, other than those mentioned in sections 6060, 6061, against a corporation created by the laws of this state may be brought in the county in which it is situated, or has its principal office or place of business, or in which its chief officer resides." For the purpose of service under this statute a corporation is situated where it "has its principal office or place of business." It can be served there, or in the county "in which its chief officer resides," but not elsewhere. The qualifying term "principal" precludes the idea of their being more than one "office or place of business" where the corporation may be served. If service is had at its office or place of business, to be valid it must be at its "principal" office or place of business, and we cannot construe this to be more than one without changing the meaning of the word "principal." The language is plain, and nothing is left for construction. The Legislature evidently had a purpose in using the adjective "principal," and it is our duty to carry out that purpose by giving it its natural meaning, and its restrictive and qualifying effect. The admission of record is that "its principal office and place of business is at Stamps." That being true, the further admission that certain officers "for purposes of convenience" have offices in Texarkana, where the business of said offices is conducted principally," must necessarily refer to other than the principal office or place of business; otherwise, the admissions would be contradictory and nonsensical. The trial court must have found...