Spratt v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 20 June 1903
• Citation: 176 Mo. 175,75 S.W. 642
• Parties: SPRATT v. LAWSON et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

75 S.W. 642

176 Mo. 175

SPRATT v. LAWSON et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

June 20, 1903.

WILLS — RIGHTS OF WIDOW — RENOUNCEMENT OF WILL — ESTOPPEL — AGREEMENT — CONSIDERATION — PARTITION.

1. A widow was not estopped from renouncing the provisions made for her in her husband's will, and electing to take under the statute, by signing at the time of the execution of the will a statement indorsed thereon reciting that she accepted the bequest in lieu of dower or other interest, and by accepting from the executors a part of such bequest, where the bequest was less than the amount given her by statute.

2. The widow had the right to renounce the provisions of the will, notwithstanding Rev. St. 1899, § 4335, which confers on a married woman the right to contract and be contracted with, because the acceptance of the will, when considered as a contract, was not supported by any consideration.

3. A widow renouncing the provisions in her husband's will, and electing to take under the statute, could maintain a suit for the partition of the estate without waiting for the expiration of five years from the date of the probate of the will.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Audrain County; E. M. Hughes, Judge.

Suit for partition by Nannie S. Spratt against Assinia Lawson and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

T. S. Carter and W. W. Fry, for appellants. Geo. Robertson, for respondent.

ROBINSON, J.

Suit by plaintiff, the widow of A. D. Spratt, deceased, against the executors of her husband's will, and the legatees named therein, to have partitioned certain lots in the village of Clark, in Randolph county, and about 490 acres of land in Audrain county, in this state. The petition sets out the fact that plaintiff is the widow of A. D. Spratt, who died May 31, 1899, childless, leaving a will by which all the land in question was deeded to his sister Assinia Lawson and to the children and grandchildren of Hall W. Spratt, a brother of deceased, and that, after said will had been duly admitted to probate, plaintiff, on the 5th day of June, 1899, filed in the office of the probate court of Audrain county her election to be endowed of one-half of all the real and personal estate of which her husband died possessed; that plaintiff was entitled to one-half of all the land sought to be partitioned, and that the defendants were entitled to the other half; and that none of the land named will be required for the purpose of paying debts, as the estate of her deceased husband also consists of a large amount of personal property, and is practically free of debt. Upon the issue joined, a decree was made in compliance with the prayer of plaintiff's petition. To the judgment entered therein, two objections are made by appellant; the first being that partition of the land in controversy cannot be made until after the lapse of five years from the date of the probate of the will of plaintiff's deceased husband, wherein said land had been devised; and, second, it is contended that plaintiff has no interest in the land sought to be partitioned. This last contention by appellant is made upon the assumption that plaintiff should be denied the right to renounce the provisions of her deceased husband's will, wherein said land in controversy was devised to others than plaintiff, and claim under the laws the undivided one-half interest therein, as was done in this suit, for the reason, as alleged, that plaintiff signed her acceptance of the will's provisions in lieu of all dower or other interests in the estate of her husband at the time said will was executed, and that after his death, with full knowledge of the provisions of the will, she had accepted $1,000 from the executors, as part of the $7,000 legacy left to her under said will in lieu of dower.

Do these facts in any way operate to abridge the right of renunciation and election in plaintiff? Certain it is that, under the facts of this case, it should not be said, as contended by appellant, that plaintiff is estopped from asserting her statutory right of renunciation and election, on the ground that her conduct at the time of the execution of the will induced the testator, in the making of the...