Spratt v. Spratt
| Decision Date | 17 March 1922 |
| Docket Number | 22,518,22,530,22,738 |
| Citation | 187 N.W. 227,151 Minn. 458 |
| Parties | ETHEL ELIZABETH SPRATT v. CHARLES N. SPRATT |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Original Opinion Filed December 9, 1921
Custody of child -- court not bound by agreement of divorced parents.
A written agreement as to the custody of a child is not binding on the court, when the best interests of the child require a different arrangement. [Reporter.]
March 17, 1922.
Divorce -- modification of decree.
1. The remarriage of a divorced man and an improvement in the health of his former wife are such changes in the circumstances and conditions of the parties as will justify a modification of the provisions of a judgment of divorce respecting the care and custody of minor children.
Right of parents to custody of children equal.
2. The father and mother are the natural guardians of the minor children, and, if not unsuitable, are equally entitled to their custody.
Decision of trial court sustained on appeal except when discretion of court is abused.
3. The disposition of the custody of children, made by a trial court in a divorce case, will not be reversed on appeal, except for an abuse of the broad discretion with which the court is invested.
Allowance for maintenance of children proper.
4. An allowance to the plaintiff in such a case to cover the expenses of caring for her children while temporarily residing with her may properly be made.
Allowance for counsel fees proper.
5. An allowance to her for counsel fees may be made in proceedings for a modification of the judgment respecting the custody of the children.
Admission of evidence not governed by technical rules.
6. Rulings on the admission of evidence in such proceedings are not subject to the tests applied in reviewing a trial of an ordinary action.
Allowance for counsel fees should be moderate.
7. The amount of an allowance to a wife for counsel fees in a divorce action is largely discretionary with the trial court. It is the established policy of this court to be conservative in the matter of such allowances.
On March 17, 1922, the following opinion was filed:
Petition on Rehearing
This is the third appearance of this case. Spratt v. Spratt, 140 Minn. 510, 166 N.W. 769, 167 N.W. 735; State ex rel. Spratt v. Spratt, 150 Minn. 5, 184 N.W. 31. It is now brought here by appeals from a judgment entered June 22, 1921, with which both parties are dissatisfied. The judgment to be reviewed amended one entered December 15, 1917, by which the parties were absolutely divorced and the custody of four of their minor children awarded to the defendant and the custody of one to the plaintiff.
On June 7, 1919, defendant remarried and the four children were thereafter under the joint care and supervision of their father and his second wife. On June 21, 1920, plaintiff procured an order requiring defendant to show cause why the custody of these children should not be awarded to her and a suitable allowance made for their support. The divorce action was tried before Judge Steele of the Hennepin county district court. He died before the application to modify the judgment was heard and it was heard by Judge Dickinson. Numerous affidavits were presented and a large amount of oral testimony introduced. On June 15, 1921, an order was filed, with a memorandum made part of it, directing that the judgment should be amended as follows: All but the eldest of the four children in defendant's custody were given to the plaintiff for three months in each year during the period of their school vacations. For the remaining nine months, plaintiff was to have them on alternate Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. The custody of the eldest child was left unchanged. It was further provided that the child whose custody had originally been awarded to plaintiff should go to the defendant during the three vacation months. Defendant was required to pay plaintiff $900 to defray the expenses of caring for the three children during the summer months, and she was directed to take them to a suitable camp or watering place. Plaintiff was allowed $500 for attorney's fees in the proceeding. In his memorandum, Judge Dickinson said:
1. Section 7123, G.S. 1913, confers power upon the district court to revise and alter its orders concerning the care and custody of minor children whose parents have been divorced and to make such new orders as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children shall require. Referring to the statute, in Arne v. Holland, 85 Minn. 401, 89 N.W. 3, it was said in substance that it contemplated a modification of the order for due cause at any time; that decrees of divorce are entered in pursuance of and are founded upon the statute, which affords a short and speedy remedy; that the ultimate question is, do the child's interests demand a modification of a former order; that the court is not limited to any particular line of inquiry or bound by strict legal rules of evidence, and its orders and directions are not subject to the tests usually applied to the trial of causes, and that the test to determine the validity of the court's order is, was there an abuse of discretion?
It is earnestly contended in defendant's behalf that the court has no power to modify a judgment in a divorce action, unless new circumstances and changed conditions are shown which render a modification just and equitable, and that plaintiff has failed to make the required showing. Crockett v. Crockett, 132 Iowa 388, 106 N.W. 944, and Scott v. Scott, 174 Iowa 740, 156 N.W. 834, support this contention, and so do a multitude of cases cited in Schouler, Mar. & Div. § 1897, and in 19 C.J. 350. With respect to provisions for alimony, this court has ruled that the power to modify the judgment may be exercised only upon clear proof of new facts showing that the changed circumstances of the parties render the proposed modification equitable. Holmes v. Holmes, 90 Minn. 466, 97 N.W. 147; Haskell v. Haskell, 116 Minn. 10, 132 N.W. 1129. Probably the same rule should be applied in passing upon applications for a modification of a provision for the custody of minor children. It is unnecessary to decide and we do not now decide that question.
The conditions are not the same as when the original judgment was entered. Defendant has remarried. By this change in his domestic relations, the supervision of the children has largely fallen to his young wife, 25 years of age at the time of the hearing. It may be true that her supervision is as competent as that of the housekeepers he employed before she took charge of his household and that the change is one for the better. Nevertheless it is but natural that, when his day's work was done, defendant, who is a busy physician, should devote some of his time and attention to his wife to the partial exclusion of the children, who, prior to his remarriage, had his undivided companionship when he was at home. She will expect him to divide his allegiance to his children henceforth, in order that she may enjoy the attentions and companionship due from a husband to his wife. She has her own circle of relatives and friends and her individual interests into which defendant will enter.
Another changed condition mentioned in the memorandum is that plaintiff is in better health and spirits now than when the decree was entered. The record shows that, when the trial of the divorce action ended, Judge Steele suggested that plaintiff go to California to regain her health, taking her youngest child with her, adding that when she returned she might be better able to manage her household affairs than she was at the time of the trial. Apparently the suggestion was not adopted. The trial had been protracted. Plaintiff had been on the witness stand for several days. The contest was a bitter one. The details of the married life of the parties had been laid bare. We shall not repeat the sorry tale. Plaintiff was nervous, excitable, broken in health and lacking in judgment and selfcontrol. This was four years ago. She has improved in health and spirits. Presumably she is now better fitted to give her children the care and companionship they should receive from their mother. Moreover, although their welfare is the determinative factor her rights as their mother should receive some consideration, if such rights can be recognized without endangering the welfare of the children. Under our law the father and mother are the natural guardians of the minor children, and, if not unsuitable, are equally entitled to their custody. Section 7442, G.S. 1913; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 136 Minn. 190, 161 N.W. 525, L.R.A. 1917D, 971. In 1917 the court might have concluded it was inadvisable to give plaintiff the custody of all the children, even for a portion of each year. In 1921 her improved state of mind and body might well lead to a different conclusion. A trial court is always in a much better position than an appellate court to decide upon the custody of children. For this reason, its judgment should not be reversed unless grave errors are discovered, Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 P. 918, L.R.A. 1915B, 154, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 941, or, as stated in Arne v. Holland, supra, unless there has been an abuse of discretion. We find nothing in the record to justify...
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