Spring Brook Farm Foundation, Inc., In re, 94-332

• Decision Date: 27 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-332,94-332
• Citation: 671 A.2d 315,164 Vt. 282
• Parties: In re SPRING BROOK FARM FOUNDATION, INC.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 315

671 A.2d 315

164 Vt. 282

In re SPRING BROOK FARM FOUNDATION, INC.

No. 94-332.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Oct. 27, 1995.

On Appeal from Environmental Board; Arthur Gibb, Chair.

Stephen R. Crampton and Dennis R. Pearson of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for appellant.

John D. Hansen, Rutland, for appellee.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Mary L. Borg, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for amicus State of Vermont.

Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

JOHNSON, Justice.

Today, we conclude that the exchange element of the commercial purpose test for determining Act 250 (10 V.S.A. §§ 6001-6108) jurisdiction incorporates projects where a third person pays the provider of the facility goods or services for the benefit of another. Accordingly, we affirm the Environmental Board's decision requiring Spring Brook Farm Foundation, Inc. (Foundation), a charitable organization, to obtain an Act 250 land use permit prior to constructing a dormitory/residence hall on a 44.5-acre tract.

The Foundation is a New York not-for-profit corporation recognized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as a public charitable foundation. The Foundation was formed "to receive and administer funds for scientific, educational, and charitable purposes within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ... and in this connection to bring underprivileged children to a rural setting." The Foundation is registered to do business in Vermont for the purpose of providing inner-city children "the opportunity to visit a working farm and observe animal husbandry, crop cultivation and harvesting and, through this, to expose the children to usable, practical skills in farming and related areas." In 1992, consistent with its stated purpose, the Foundation purchased the 569.5-acre Spring Brook Farm from the Vermont Land Trust with the intent of establishing its "Farms For City Kids" program there.

Members of the Hagedorn family, the owners of Stern's Miracle-Gro Products, Inc. provided most of the initial funding for the Foundation. The president of the Foundation's Board of Directors, James Hagedorn, is also the Executive Vice-President of Stern's Miracle-Gro Products. Intending to become self-supporting, the Foundation plans to solicit charitable donations from the general public and business community. The Foundation refuses to accept any payments or funds from the students, their parents, or the schools involved in the program.

Because of restrictive covenants governing the farm property, the Foundation purchased an adjacent 44.5-acre tract on which it proposes to construct a two-story classroom/residence hall containing 5425 square feet. The proposed building is intended to house the children and their teachers in six four-person bedrooms, two single bedrooms, and numerous common areas. The building would also serve as a classroom for the program.

Once in operation, the Foundation expects to bring groups of up to twenty students, advertised in the Foundation's promotional literature as "Miracle-Gro kids," along with two teachers, to Spring Brook Farm. The students, primarily from grades four to six, will stay at the Farm for one to three weeks. During this time, they will participate in the daily life on the Farm, learning about agriculture, forestry and the environment. The program is expected to run up to nine months each year.

In June 1993, the Foundation requested an advisory opinion from the District 2/3 Environmental Commission Coordinator to determine whether the proposed classroom/residence hall would be subject to Act 250 jurisdiction. The Coordinator concluded that the project required an Act 250 permit, and the Foundation appealed to the Environmental Board. The Board also concluded that the project triggered Act 250 jurisdiction. It reasoned that the project was a development because it was a construction of improvements on a tract of land involving more than ten acres for a commercial purpose. See 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3). The Board concluded that the commercial purpose test was satisfied, within the language of Board Rules 2(L) and 2(M), because the Foundation would provide facilities to the students in exchange for contributions and donations by third parties. The Foundation appeals.

Vermont's land use law, Act 250, requires a permit prior to the commencement of any development. 10 V.S.A. § 6081(a). A development includes the construction of improvements on a tract of land involving more than ten acres for commercial or industrial purposes. Id. § 6001(3). The Board has defined "commercial purpose" as "the provision of facilities, goods or services by a person other than for a municipal or state purpose to others in exchange for payment of a purchase price, fee, contribution, donation or other object having value." Environmental Board Rule 2(L). The Board includes a commercial dwelling within the concept of a commercial or industrial purpose. Id. 2(A)(2). A "commercial dwelling" is

any building or structure or part thereof, including but not limited to ... dormitories and other places for the accommodation of people, that is intended to be used and occupied for human habitation on a temporary or intermittent basis, in exchange for payment of a fee, contribution, donation or other object having value.

Id. 2(M). These Board rules were ratified by the Legislature in 1985; therefore, they have the same force and effect as any other law passed by the Legislature. 1985, No. 52, § 5; In re Spencer, 152 Vt. 330, 336, 566 A.2d 959, 962 (1989).

On appeal, we will defer to the Board's interpretation of Act 250 and its own duly promulgated rules, unless there is a compelling indication of error. In re BHL Corp., 161 Vt. 487, 490, 641 A.2d 771, 773 (1994). Indeed, the Board's application of Act 250 to a specific project is entitled to a presumption of validity. In re Burlington Hous. Auth., 143 Vt. 80, 83, 463 A.2d 215, 217 (1983).

The central issue in this case is whether Rules 2(L) and 2(M) require a direct exchange between a provider and recipient of services. Because the rules have been ratified by the Legislature, we must follow the rules of statutory interpretation. ^* The primary goal in construing a statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and we will presume the Legislature intended the plain meaning of the statute. Bisson v. Ward, 160 Vt. 343, 348, 628 A.2d 1256, 1260 (1993). "[W]hen the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous on its face, it must be enforced according to its express terms." In re Burlington Hous. Auth., 143 Vt. at 83, 463 A.2d at 217.

The plain language of the definition of "commercial purpose" in Rule 2(L) includes the Foundation's program. The elements of the rule require: (1) the provision of facilities, goods or services, (2) by a person, (3) other than for a municipal or state purpose, (4) to others, (5) in exchange for, (6) payments of a purchase price, fee, contribution, donation or other object having value. All of these elements are satisfied. The classroom/residence hall is provided by the Foundation (not for municipal or state purposes) to underprivileged children in exchange for donations and contributions.

Similarly, the plain language of the definition of "commercial dwelling" in Rule 2(M) also includes the Foundation's program. The elements of Rule 2(M) require: (1) any building or structure or part thereof, (2) intended for human habitation, (3) on a temporary or intermittent basis, (4) in exchange for, (5) payment of a fee, contribution, donation, or other object having value. The classroom/residence hall is intended for the children and their teachers during their one-to-three-week stay in exchange for donations and contributions.

The Foundation argues that the "in exchange for" element in both definitions is not satisfied because the beneficiaries of the facility--the underprivileged children--do not provide the payment. In essence, the Foundation claims the definition implies the requirement of a direct exchange. We disagree. Nothing in the statute or the policy of Act 250 mandates a direct exchange.

The language of the definitions--specifically, the words "donation" and "contribution"--implies that the drafters did not intend to require a direct exchange. Donations and contributions convey the concept of giving; "a person cannot be required to give a donation in exchange for some consideration [because] by its very definition a gift is a voluntary transfer without consideration." In re Baptist Fellowship of Randolph, Inc., 144 Vt. 636, 639, 481 A.2d 1274, 1276 (1984). Any direct exchange requirement would impermissibly render these terms superfluous. Trombley v. Bellows Falls Union High Sch., 160 Vt. 101, 104, 624 A.2d 857, 860 (1993); Baptist Fellowship, 144 Vt. at 639, 481 A.2d at 1276.

Moreover, the plain meaning is consistent with the purpose of the statute, its subject matter, its effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law. Nash v. Warren Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 153 Vt. 108, 112, 569 A.2d 447, 450 (1989). The purpose of Act 250 is "to protect and conserve the lands and the environment of the state and to insure that these lands and environment are devoted to uses which are not detrimental to the public welfare and interests." 1969, No. 250 (Adj.Sess.), § 1. The Act requires a focus on the impact of the land use, not the nature of the institutional activity. Baptist Fellowship, 144 Vt. at 639, 481 A.2d at 1276; see In re BHL Corp., 161 Vt. at 490-91, 641 A.2d at 773 (approving Board's premise that proper starting point for determining Act 250 jurisdiction is actual use of land).

In determining whether activity constitutes a commercial purpose, as defined in Rule 2(L), it is important to consider the distinction the drafters were trying to make. Commercial development in relation to land use implies regular use by multiple parties. By using the word "exchange," the...