Springall v. Fredericksburg Hospital and Clinic

• Decision Date: 30 November 1949
• Docket Number: No. 12023,12023
• Citation: 225 S.W.2d 232
• Parties: SPRINGALL et ux. v. FREDERICKSBURG HOSPITAL AND CLINIC.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 232

225 S.W.2d 232

SPRINGALL et ux. v. FREDERICKSBURG HOSPITAL AND CLINIC.

No. 12023.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

Nov. 30, 1949.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 28, 1949.

William E. Remy, San Antonio, Arthur Stehling, Fredericksburg, for appellants.

Clinton G. Brown, San Antonio, Alfred Petsch, Fredericksburg, for appellee.

NORVELL, Justice.

Subsequent to proceedings and in this Court with reference to an application for writ of mandamus, the trial court rendered judgment for appellee upon the verdict of the jury, and Mrs. Bessie Newton Springall and her husband, H. S. Springall, have appealed.

Our opinion in the mandamus proceedings contains a brief statement of the case, and it was stated that, 'We are not here called upon to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's answers to any of the special issues, such questions are properly raised in a motion for a new trial.' See Fredericksburg Hospital and Clinic v. Springall, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 692, 694.

Upon this appeal, appellants raise questions relating to the sufficiency of the evidence in law and in fact. Childre v. Casstevens, Tex.Sup., 224 S.W.2d 461. They contend that there is no evidence supporting the jury's answer to Special Issue No. 4, relating to proximate cause, and (in the alternative) that such finding is against the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence.

It is undisputed that Mrs. Springall slipped and fell upon the waxed asphalttile floor of the reception room of the Fredericksburg Hospital and Clinic. The jury found that (1) the floor was slick and slippery; (2) that appellee caused such condition; (3) that such action constituted negligence, but (4) that such negligence was not the proximate cause of Mrs. Springall's injuries. The jury absolved Mrs. Springall of contributory negligence.

In passing upon appellants' contentions we are to credit all evidence favorable to the jury finding and disregard all evidence adverse thereto. We must also indulge every legitimate inference favorable to the finding which may be drawn from the facts proved upon the trial. Henwood v. Neal, Tex.Civ.App. 198 S.W.2d 125; Mortensen v. Mortensen, Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W.2d 297.

In accordance with the rules above set out, we make the following statement of the evidence:

The witness George Sims, executive superintendent of the hospital, testified fully as to the method of treating and caring for the floor here involved. The floor was of asphalt-tile which, by reason of its composition, has a natural gloss and, like all asphalt-tile floors, it is 'slick.' The manufacturer's instructions as to keeping the floor were followed. A mixture of manufacturer's soap, about one teacup to a gallon of water and a disinfectant known as 'Pineol' was applied to the floor with a cotton mop. The floor was then mopped with clear water in order to clean it. A ten to fifteen per cent waterbase wax, described as self-drying, was then applied. Upon the day Mrs. Springall was injured, Johnson's Brown Label wax was used. The wax was a very thin solution and no polishing or buffing machine was used; it did not have to be buffed. A buffer had never been used upon the floor. The use of a polishing machine had been discontinued about a month before Mrs. Springall fell. A polishing machine would take off about ten per cent of the wax. The floor was cleaned and waxed every day except Sunday and, under normal conditions, the liquid wax would dry in about ten minutes. The drying time is affected by weather or climatic conditions. The floor had been waxed between seven and eight-thirty of the morning of June 2d, 1948, when Mrs. Springall was injured. The day was muggy and damp like and the wax may not have been entirely dry when Mrs. Springall fell.

According to appellants' witnesses, Mrs. Springall, who was 72 years of age, entered the reception room of the hospital 'in the morning toward the noon hour.' The room was rather dark to one entering from the outside. Mrs. Springall took about two steps inside and 'turned to the left, or was going to turn to the left, but her feet just went out from under her.' Marks about two feet in length, made by Mrs. Springall's shoes when she slipped, were visible on the waxed surface of the floor. Mr. Sims testified that about 2 P.M. he also observed these skid marks.

There was some testimony to the effect that other persons had slipped and fallen on the floors of the hospital. Much of this was excluded as hearsay. However, Mr. Sims testified that he had heard of two other people slipping on the reception room floor, although he did not know who they were.

In passing upon appellants' contentions, it is necessary to keep in mind the rule that the issue of proximate cause is one of fact and is generally determinable by a jury. 30 Tex.Jur. 723-725, §§ 62, 63. Further, it is the rule that although facts be undisputed, a jury question is presented if reasonable minds may draw different inferences therefrom. Commercial Standard...