Springer Corp. v. State Corp. Commission
| Decision Date | 08 December 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 8744,8744 |
| Parties | SPRINGER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION of New Mexico and M. E. Morgan, Columbus Ferguson and Floyd Cross, Members of said Commission, Defendants-Appellants, v. WHITFIELD TANK LINES, INC., Steere Tank Lines, Inc., E. B. Law Son, Inc., and Western Oil Transportation Company, Inc., Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
OMAN, Judge, Court of Appeals.
The State Corporation Commission, hereinafter called Commission, and the intervenors have taken this appeal from a judgment of the district court. The judgment vacated and set aside an order of the Commission rejecting and permanently suspending a proposed motor freight tariff filed by plaintiff with the Commission.
Plaintiff operates as a common carrier by motor vehicle under a certificate of public convenience and necessity originally issued by the Commission on October 28, 1948, authorizing plaintiff, insofar as here material, to transport 'explosives and other dangerous articles.' It appears this is the only certificate issued by the Commission which contains this particular language. Plaintiff claims authority under the certificate to haul certain flammable liquids and gasses, which the Commissioner and intervenors contend can be legally hauled only by those holding certificates authorizing the transportation of petroleum and petroleum products.
Rule 40 of the Rules and Regulations of the New Mexico Corporation Commission, Motor Transportation Department, adopts the applicable rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, hereinafter called I.C.C., governing the transportation of 'explosives and other dangerous articles.' These rules and regulations of the I.C.C. are found in 49 C.F.R., § 72.5 (renumbered § 172.5 as of January 1, 1968). All of the flammable liquids and flammable pressed gasses contained in plaintiff's proposed tariff are included in the list of 'explosives and other dangerous articles' contained in the rules and regulations of the I.C.C., and they are also included within the category of 'other dangerous articles' in the American Trucking Association Dangerous Article Tariff No. 8 (Now 12), as adopted by the Commission. The adopted Rules and Regulations and Tariff detail the methods and precautions to be followed and observed in the loading, handling and transporting of the itemized explosives and other dangerous articles.
Plaintiff's proposed tariff purportedly relates to 'Commodity Rates on Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles in Bulk, in Tank Trucks, Between Points and Places in New Mexico.' The proposed tariff was filed with the Commission on January 20, 1967, with the intent that it should become effective on February 27, 1967.
The Commission questioned the tariff, ordered its suspension, and ordered an investigation thereof. The investigation was to be conducted, in part, into '* * * all matters and issues with respect to the lawfulness of the said schedule as proposed for use under Certificate No. N.M.S.C.C. 118--1, with specific reference to the issue of whether the commodities covered by the proposed tariff may be transported under authority held in Certificate 118--1. * * *'
A lengthy investigation in the form of a hearing was conducted by the Commission, and the parties participated therein. The findings made by the Commission which are material to this appeal are as follows:
In the action brought in district court pursuant to the provisions of § 64--27--68, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 9, pt. 2), the trial judge found and concluded that the Commission, by the adoption of Rule 40, determined and defined the meaning of the words, 'explosives and other dangerous articles,' for all purposes, including the authority of plaintiff under its certificate of public convenience and necessity to transport the questioned petroleum and petroleum products. Thereupon the trial court entered judgment vacating and setting aside the order of the Commission rejecting and permanently suspending the proposed tariff.
Thus, the principal issue to be determined on this appeal is the legal effect of the addition by the Commission of its Rule 40. We are of the opinion that the Commission, by adopting what are obviously safety rules and regulations governing the packaging, handling, loading and hauling of 'explosives and other dangerous articles,' did not thereby define and determine what articles, substances and materials plaintiff could properly transport under its authority to transport 'explosives and other dangerous articles.'
The Commission had the authority and primary responsibility of interpreting and construing the language of plaintiff's certificate. See Nelson, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 554, 78 S.Ct. 496, 2 L.Ed.2d 484 (1958); Simpson v. United States, 200 F.Supp. 372 (S.D. Iowa 1961); E. B. Law and Son, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.Supp. 846 (D.N.M.1965); Cabot Carbon Company v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 287 P.2d 675 (Okla.1955).
This interpretation and construction could properly be arrived at only after investigation by the Commission. Compare W. T. Mayfield Sons Trucking Co. v. United States, 211 F.Supp. 619 (N.D.Ga.1962); Simpson v. United States, supra; Denver Chicago Transport Company v. United States, 183 F.Supp. 785 (D.Colo.1960); Dart Transit Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 110 F.Supp. 876 (D.Minn.1953).
The ultimate interpretation and construction by the Commission constituted an adjudication as to the extent of plaintiff's authority under the certificate. This adjudication required a public hearing after notice as provided by law. See Article XI, §§ 7 and 8, Constitution of New Mexico; §§ 64--27--38 and 65, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 9, pt. 2). Compare State ex rel. State Corporation Commission v. Zinn, 72 N.M. 29, 380 P.2d 182 (1963). The Commission conducted a hearing and entered the above mentioned written order consistent with its interpretation and construction.
In conducting the public hearing for the purpose of determining the proper construction of the language of the certificate, ti was proper for the Commission to receive and consider (1) evidence as to trade usage and the understanding and meaning in the industry of certain terms (E. B. Law and Son, Inc. v. United States, supra; Black v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 167 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1948); W. T. Mayfield Sons Trucking Co. v. United States, supra; Sims Motor Transport Lines, Inc. v. United States, 183 F.Supp. 113 (N.D.Ill.1959); Arrow Trucking Co. v. United States, 181 F.Supp. 775 (N.D.Okla.1960)); (2) expert opinion testimony as to the scope and meaning of terms (Black v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra); (3) evidence as to settled administrative courses of dealing relative to the certificate (United States v. Amer. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940); Arrow Trucking Co. v. United States, supra); and (4) evidence as to source proceedings and transportation activities of the certificate holder (Black v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra; Simpson v. United States, supra; E. B. Law and Son, Inc. v. United States, supra; Malone Freight Lines Inc. v. United States, 107 F.Supp. 946 (N.D.Ala.1952)).
The Commission's interpretation and construction of plaintiff's certificate was binding on the trial court unless the Commission's findings were unsupported by substantial evidence, or the Commission acted unlawfully, arbitrarily, capriciously or in abuse of its discretion. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. New Mexico St. Corp. Comm., 79 N.M. 60, 439 P.2d 709 (1968); E. B. Law and Son, Inc. v. United States, supra. The evidence substantially supports the...
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