Springer v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 31 August 1882
• Citation: 11 Ill.App. 267,11 Bradw. 267
• Parties: THOMAS G. SPRINGER ET AL.v.JOSIAH P. COOPER.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

11 Ill.App. 267

11 Bradw. 267

THOMAS G. SPRINGER ET AL.

v.JOSIAH P. COOPER.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

August Term, 1882.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the County Court of Madison county; the Hon. M. G. DALE, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed September 29, 1882.

Messrs. IRWIN & SPRINGER, for appellants; that it was error to join all the parties as defendants in this suit, their interest being in severalty, cited Reynolds v. Thomas, 17 Ill. 207.

Messrs. METCALF & BRADSHAW, for appellee; that where a proposition is met by a counter-proposition or a change from the first, there is no contract until the latter is accepted, cited Carr v. Duval, 14 Pet. 77; McConnell v. Brillhart, 17 Ill. 354; Elason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 226; Davidson v. Porter, 57 Ill. 300.

It is for the jury to determine from the evidence whether there is a contract: Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Cassell, 17 Ill. 389; Sigsworth v. McIntyre, 18 Ill. 126; Taylor v. W. U. Tel. Co. 60 Ill. 421.

A verdict will not be set aside where the testimony is conflicting, even though it is against the weight of the evidence: Creote v. Willey, 83 Ill. 444; McKichan v. McBean, 45 Ill. 228; Keith v. Fink, 47 Ill. 272; Hope Ins. Co. v. Lonergan, 48 Ill. 49; McCarthy v. Mooney, 49 Ill. 247; Clifford v. Laing, 69 Ill. 401; Guerdon v. Corbitt, 87 Ill. 272; Morgan v Ryerson, 20 Ill. 343; Martin v. Ehrenfels, 24 Ill. 187; Pulliam v. Ogle, 27 Ill. 189; Chicago v. Garrison, 52 Ill. 516; Galesburg v. Higley, 61 Ill. 287; Chicago v. Jorgenson, 60 Ill. 200.

BAKER, P. J.

George J. Gillham of Memphis, Tennessee leased a tract of land situate in Madison county, Illinois, to David Morgan and Austin Jones by lease, which expired on the last day of December, 1881. On the 4th day of October, 1881, Thomas G. Springer, one of the appellants, mailed a letter to Gillham at Memphis, proposing on behalf of himself and said Jones, to rent the land for a term of years, Jones to take the north half and he the south half, all of the land that could be cultivated to be put in cultivation, and five dollars per acre to be paid, etc. This letter was answered through the mail by Gillham from Memphis, on the 8th of October, 1881, as follows: “Dear sir--Expect to be in your county early next week; should I not call or communicate further in course of two or three days, you and Jones can rely on having land on terms proposed for next year. Want all the land susceptible of cultivation put in cultivation so as to increase the acreage as much as possible. Rent, I suppose, ought to be due out of wheat crop, say September 1st. How would that time suit?” Gillham was in Edwardsville, Illinois, on the 15th, 16th and 17th days of October, 1881, but did not call on or communicate with Springer or Jones. On the morning of the 17th, he made a contract for the sale of the land to appellee, Cooper, and went back to St. Louis, and on the same day mailed to Springer a postal card notifying him of the sale to appellee. He, then, by deed dated October 19th, 1881, conveyed the land to appellee. Afterward appellee prosecuted this suit under the forcible entry and detainer act against Springer, Jones, Morgan and one George Ripper, appellants, to get possession of the land; and the case being tried, on appeal, in the County Court of Madison county, recovered a joint verdict and judgment against them for the entire tract.

The letter of Gillham was written on Saturday, the 8th day of October. It said, “I expect to be in your county early next week;” “early next week” would surely not be later than the middle of the business week, say, Wednesday, the 12th; and the letter further said, “should I not call or communicate further in course of two or three days, you and Jones can rely on having land on terms proposed for next year.” The language is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the “two or three days” indicated, meant two or three days from the date of the letter, or two or three days from the time of its reception, or two or three days from the date of his arrival “early next week” in the county. The general rule is that where ambiguous language or words of doubtful import are used, they are to be construed most strongly against the party who has chosen the expression of doubtful meaning. But, be this as it may, under any reasonable interpretation that can be given to the words of Gillham, the two or three days suggested by him had expired before he made the contract of sale with appellee and notified Springer of that fact. The letter of Gillham should be read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, so as to ascertain the real intention of the writer. The letter did not simply and fully...