Springer v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DOES, No. 97-AA-8

Decision Date30 December 1999
Docket Number No. 97-AA-1714., No. 97-AA-557, No. 97-AA-8
Citation743 A.2d 1213
PartiesWilliam J. SPRINGER, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent Delta Installation Group and Montgomery Mutual Insurance Company, Intervenors. Michael Strickland, Petitioner, v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, Respondent. Jevic Transportation, Inc., and Lindsey Morden Claims Management, Intervenors.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Benjamin T. Boscolo, Greenbelt, MD, with whom William A. Butler, Washington, DC, and Andrew S. Kasmer, Greenbelt, MD, were on the briefs, for petitioners. Frank R. Kearney also entered an appearance for petitioner Springer.

Michael D. Dobbs, with whom Ann Wittik Bravmann, Bowie, MD, was on the brief, for intervenors in Nos. 97-AA-8 and 97-AA-557.

Forest A. Nester, Timonium, MD, for intervenors in No. 97-AA-1714.

Jo Anne Robinson, Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, filed in each case a statement in lieu of brief for respondent.

Before TERRY, STEADMAN, and REID, Associate Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

These consolidated cases, unrelated on their facts but presenting the same legal issue, arise out of on-the-job injuries suffered by petitioners William Springer and Michael Strickland while working in the District of Columbia. At the time of their respective injuries, both petitioners lived outside the District and worked for companies located outside the District. Both received and accepted compensation for their injuries, which their employers paid voluntarily under the workers' compensation laws of Maryland and New Jersey, respectively. After receiving these payments, both petitioners filed workers' compensation claims with the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services ("DOES"). Hearing examiners denied petitioners' claims under D.C.Code § 36-303(a-1) (1997), which prohibits an employee from receiving workers' compensation under the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act, D.C.Code §§ 36-301 et seq. (1997) ("WCA"), if the employee has "at any time" received compensation under the laws of any other state for the same injury. The Director of DOES affirmed the denials. On appeal, petitioners assert that the Director incorrectly construed D.C.Code § 36-303(a-1) as not including a requirement that an employer notify an injured employee of his or her rights under the WCA before the preclusive effect of the statute is triggered. They argue that their claims were improperly denied because their employers did not notify them (1) that they were being paid under the laws of jurisdictions other than the District of Columbia, (2) that they potentially had rights to compensation under the WCA, and (3) that they would lose those rights if they accepted the voluntary payments. Because we conclude that the Director's interpretation of section 36-303(a-1) is reasonable, we affirm.

I
A. Springer's Claim

At the time of his injury, petitioner Springer worked for Delta Installation Group (Delta), a Maryland company, as a modular furniture installer. On March 4, 1993, while traveling to a Delta work site with co-workers, Springer was injured when a car collided with a van in which he was a passenger. The accident occurred on Interstate Route 295 in the District of Columbia, near the Pennsylvania Avenue exit. Springer was taken to a hospital, where he was treated for his injuries and released. He returned to light-duty work the next day.

Four days after the accident, Delta filed a report of Springer's injuries with the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission ("MWCC"), as required by Maryland law. The report was forwarded to Montgomery Mutual Insurance Company, Delta's insurer, which accepted Springer's claim as compensable at the time the report was filed.

After nearly a month of light-duty work, Springer contacted Ted Linzey, a senior adjuster with Montgomery Mutual, to notify him that he could not continue working as a result of his injuries. Because Springer anticipated missing more than three days of work, Linzey instructed him that he would need to file a claim with the MWCC in order to receive workers' compensation benefits. Mr. Linzey sent Springer the requisite form, which Springer completed and returned. Linzey then filed the completed form with the MWCC on April 13, 1993.

The MWCC awarded Springer workers' compensation benefits and ordered Delta to pay Springer temporary total disability ("TTD") benefits at the rate of $280 per week, beginning on April 11, 1993. In accordance with the order, Montgomery Mutual paid Springer TTD benefits from April 11 to July 5, 1993.1 Springer received and cashed the checks for the TTD benefits. At the request of Montgomery Mutual, Dr. H.S. Palba conducted an independent medical examination of Springer in June 1993 and concluded that Springer did not have a permanent injury. Springer's treating physician, Dr. Edwin C. Fulton, disagreed. He told Springer that his injuries were permanent and that he had a five percent impairment of his body as a whole. On August 17 Linzey received a letter from Springer relating Dr. Fulton's assessment of the injury as permanent. In the letter, Springer stated, "I am at this time asking for compensation for my injury and that this be put on a permanent status." Springer delivered a copy of Dr. Fulton's report to Mr. Linzey.

On the basis of Dr. Fulton's report, Montgomery Mutual offered to pay Springer $2,355.00, i.e., $94.20 per week for twenty-five weeks, as compensation for a permanent injury. The offer was based on Maryland law, which provides for a disability rating of the whole body when an injury occurs to a non-scheduled body member, such as the neck or back. MD. CODE ANN., LABOR & EMPLOYMENT § 9-627(k) (1991). Linzey explained to Springer that he would receive only one payment based on the permanent disability, but that it would not preclude his right to other medical payments and was not final. Linzey prepared the settlement papers and sent them to Springer with instructions to deliver them to the MWCC. Springer, however, never filed the settlement papers; instead, he wrote Linzey a letter requesting that he be reinstated on TTD.

On October 28, 1993, Springer filed a claim in the District of Columbia with DOES, seeking TTD benefits from July 6, 1993, to the present and continuing. Six months later he withdrew the claim he had filed with the MWCC. Following a hearing before a hearing examiner in June 1994, another hearing examiner2 issued a compensation order on September 26, 1996, denying Springer's claim under the WCA. She concluded that, in light of D.C.Code § 36-303(a-1), Springer was barred from receiving compensation under the WCA. The examiner specifically found that Springer had suffered a compensable, work-related injury and that Delta had "made voluntary payments of temporary total disability benefits to claimant from April 11, 1993, through July 5, 1993." She also found that Springer, through Linzey, had filed a claim with the MWCC and had been awarded TTD benefits and necessary medical expenses as a result of his injury. She concluded that Springer's "receipt of disability benefits from MWCC precludes him from receiving any benefits under [the WCA]." The Director later affirmed the examiner's decision.

B. Strickland's Claim

When petitioner Strickland was injured, he was employed as a truck driver for Jevic Transportation, Inc. (Jevic), a New Jersey company. His duties included loading, transporting, delivering, and occasionally unloading freight. On August 5, 1996, Strickland delivered a load of pamphlets to an office in the District of Columbia. In the process of unloading the boxes from the truck, Strickland injured his back. The following day, at the direction of his supervisors at Jevic, Strickland drove to Concord, North Carolina, where he received treatment.

On August 8 Strickland called Kevin Long, Jevic's insurance manager, to report that he had suffered a work-related injury. Long obtained information about the injury from Strickland, explaining that it would be used to generate and file an injury report, thereby enabling Strickland to receive compensation for his injury under the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act. After the claim form was completed, Long sent it to Jevic's insurance administrator, Lindsey Morden Claims Management, which forwarded it to the New Jersey Division of Workers' Compensation.

Some time after his telephone conversation with Long, Strickland received in the mail from Jevic a check for $548.57. The check was dated August 27, 1996, and indicated that it represented temporary total disability payments from August 8 to August 15, 1996.3 The check differed from his usual paycheck both in amount (his average weekly wage was normally between $1,200 and $1,500) and in method delivered (his paycheck was usually deposited directly into his bank account); nevertheless, he cashed it. At the time he received the check, Strickland had not filed a workers' compensation claim in any jurisdiction.

Thereafter, however, Strickland filed a claim in the District of Columbia with DOES, seeking TTD compensation benefits from August 5, 1996, to the present and continuing, and payment of related medical expenses. After a hearing in April 1997, a hearing examiner denied Strickland's claim on the basis of D.C.Code § 36-303(a-1). The examiner found that although Strickland's injury had arisen out of and in the course of his employment and that his claim had been timely filed in the District of Columbia, Jevic had accepted Strickland's claim for a work-related injury on August 5, 1996, and had voluntarily paid him workers' compensation benefits under New Jersey workers' compensation laws before Strickland filed his claim here under the WCA. He concluded that because Strickland had already received benefits in accordance with New...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Fonville v. District of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 22 Agosto 2006
    ...must be sustained if the interpretation is reasonable in light of the language and purpose of the statute. Springer v. District of Columbia, 743 A.2d 1213, 1218-19 (D.C. 1999). Neither the OEA judge nor defendant has provided a reasonable explanation for the OEA's conclusion that "there was......
  • Ware v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 13 Abril 2017
    ...assume that the CRB intended to alter its test without a clear explanation that it was doing so. See Springer v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 743 A.2d 1213, 1221 (D.C. 1999) ("[W]hen an agency departs from its prior practice or rule, it must supply a reasoned analysis indica......
  • MAJERLE MGMT. v. DC RENTAL HOUSING COM'N, No. 02-AA-427.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 30 Diciembre 2004
    ...deference to such an interpretation as well as to the agency's own regulations and decisions. See, e.g., Springer v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 743 A.2d 1213, 1218 (D.C.1999); Long v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 717 A.2d 329, 331 (D.C.1998). Our deference reflects the statutory a......
  • Ward 5 Improvement Ass'n v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 21 Agosto 2014
    ...a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed.” Springer v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 743 A.2d 1213, 1221 (D.C.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 17. In its August 24, 2012, order, the BZA recognized tha......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 provisions
  • DC Register Vol 70, No 23 June 9, 2023 Pages 008199 to 008441
    • United States
    • District of Columbia Register
    • Invalid date
    ...71 FOP/PSD Labor Comm. v. DGS, 67 D.C. Reg. 7031, Slip Op. No. 1739 at 16, PERB Case No. 18-U-01 (2020). 72 See Springer v. DOES, 743 A.2d 1213, 1221 (D.C. 1999) (quoting FTC v. Crowther, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 137, 430 F.2d 510, 513 (1970)). 73 Id. (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT