Springer v. State

• Decision Date: 28 July 1897
• Citation: 30 S.E. 971,102 Ga. 447
• Parties: SPRINGER v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

30 S.E. 971

102 Ga. 447

SPRINGER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 28, 1897

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Participation in the commission of the same criminal act and in the execution of a common criminal intent is necessary to render one criminal, in a legal sense, an accomplice of another; and if between two persons who may be engaged in a criminal enterprise, in the execution of which two separate offenses may be committed, there is not this concurrence of act and intent, though each may commit a crime, neither is in legal contemplation, an accomplice with the other.

2. The actual thief, relatively to the receiver of stolen goods, is an independent criminal; and, although he may commit the larceny by which he possesses himself of stolen goods, he does not and cannot participate with the receiver of such goods in the special offense committed by the latter in receiving such goods, knowing them to be stolen; and upon the uncorroborated testimony of the former the latter may be convicted.

3. The charge as to confessions, if not strictly appropriate, was not, in view of the record, cause for a new trial in the present case.

4. Under the evidence, the verdict was right, and the court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial.

Error from superior court, Fulton county; J. S. Candler, Judge.

W Springer was convicted of receiving stolen goods, and brings error. Affirmed.

Hoke Smith and H. C. Peeples, for plaintiff in error.

C. D Hill, Sol. Gen., for the State.

FISH J.

1. "An accomplice is strictly defined as one who is associated with others in the commission of a crime, all being principals." 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 389. Participation in the commission of the same criminal act, and in the execution of a common criminal intent, is therefore necessary, to render one criminal, in a legal sense, an accomplice of another. "Criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of crime, and is essential to render one an accomplice. It follows that where this element is absent, one is not an accomplice." Id. 391. Applying this rule to a case where two persons are engaged in a criminal enterprise, in the execution of which two separate offenses may be committed, it is obvious that there is not this concurrence of act and intent, unless each is guilty of, and subject to punishment for, both offenses; for, though each may commit a crime in connection with the same criminal enterprise, neither is, in legal contemplation, an accomplice of the other. "The test, in general, to determine whether a witness is or is not an accomplice, is the inquiry, could the witness himself have been indicted for the offense, either as principal or as accessory? If he could not be so indicted, he is not an accomplice." Id. 390.

2. In Minor v. State, 58 Ga. 551, the accused "was placed upon trial for the offense of simple larceny, alleged to have been committed in the stealing of a cow"; and it was held that: "When the strong and decided weight of the evidence *** is that the cow was stolen, not by the prisoner, but by others, with or without his procurement, and brought to his premises in his absence; that he there, after the larceny was complete, received the animal, and, without removing it therefrom, took part in slaughtering it, and in removing the meat, and in appropriating it to his own use and the use of some of his confederates,--his offense, under the Code, is not that of a principal felon. If he procured the larceny to be committed, he is an accessory both before and after the fact; or, if he did not procure it to be committed and yet knew the animal to be stolen, he is guilty as accessory after the fact, or of the equivalent misdemeanor of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen." See page 554. In this state, receiving stolen goods, knowing the same to have been stolen, is...