Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 1
| Decision Date | 17 May 1976 |
| Docket Number | M,No. 1,1 |
| Parties | , 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2583, 80 Lab.Cas. P 54,109 SPRINGFIELD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Petitioner-Cross-Respondent, v. SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 19, Respondent-Cross-Petitioner, Employment Relations Board, Respondent, School Districtultnomah County, and Oregon School Board Association, Intervenors-Cross-Petitioners. EUGENE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Petitioner-Cross-Respondent, v. EUGENE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4J, Respondent-Cross-Petitioner, School Districtultnomah County, and Oregon School Board Association, Intervenors-Cross-Petitioners. SOUTH LANE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Petitioner-Cross-Respondent, v. SOUTH LANE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 45J3, Respondent-Cross-Petitioner, School Districtultnomah County, and Oregon School Board Association, Intervenors-Cross-Petitioners. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Henry H. Drummonds, Eugene, argued the cause for petitioners-cross-respondents. With him on the briefs were Kulongoski, Heid, Durham & Drummonds, Eugene.
Bruce Smith, Eugene, argued the cause for respondents-cross-petitioners. On the brief were Young, Horn, Cass & Scott, Eugene, Moore, Wurtz & Logan, Springfield, Ackley & Kelsay, Cottage Grove, and Richard E. Miller and Miller, Moulton & Andrews, Eugene.
Mark C. McClanahan, Portland, argued the cause for intervenors-cross-petitioners. On the brief for School District No. 1, Multnomah County, were Miller, Anderson, Nash, Yerke & Wiener, Portland. On the brief for Oregon School Board Association were Harms & Harold, Portland.
Bruce Bischof, P.C., Lake Oswego, filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of respondents-cross-petitioners.
James B. Kenin and Willner, Bennett, Riggs & Skarstad, Portland, filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of Oregon Federation of Teachers for petitioner- cross-respondent Springfield Education Association.
No appearance for respondent Employment Relations Bd.
Before SCHWAB, C.J., and LANGTRY and THORNTON, JJ.
Three cases arising under the 1973 amendments to the Public Employe Collective Bargaining Law, Oregon Laws 1973, ch. 536, p. 1166 (ORS 243.650 to 243.782), have been consolidated for the purposes of appeal from the decisions of the Employment Relations Board (ERB): Springfield Education Association v. Springfield School District No. 19; South Lane Education Association v. South Lane School District No. 45J3; and Eugene Education Association v. Eugene School District No. 4J.
The education associations, the exclusive bargaining representatives of the teachers within the meaning of ORS 243.650(8), sought to bargain with the school boards on some 92 separate items which they contended were mandatory bargaining subjects under ORS 243.650(7). In each case the school board refused to bargain on numerous subjects presented on the ground that they were not mandatory bargaining subjects.
Each education association then filed an unfair labor practice complaint with ERB alleging that the districts refused to bargain as required by ORS 243.672(1)(e). All parties appeal 1 from ERB's decision that some of the questioned subjects were required bargaining subjects and some were not.
The following are among the subjects which ERB found to be permissive, but not mandatory, subjects for bargaining: class size, course assignments, transfer procedures, the school calendar, the selection of substitute teachers and the use of teachers' aides.
The following are among the subjects which ERB found to be mandatory subjects for bargaining: daily teaching loads, required planning periods, final responsibility for grading, and a just cause provision for teacher reprimand.
As a result of the enactment of the above law, public employers such as school districts, ORS 243.650(18), are required to bargain over matters of 'employment relations' with the bargaining representative of their employes. To refuse to do so is an unfair labor practice, ORS 243.672(1)(e). ORS 243.650(7) defines 'employment relations':
"Employment relations' includes, But is not limited to, matters concerning direct or indirect monetary benefits, hours, vacations, sick leave, grievance procedures and Other conditions of employment.' (Emphasis supplied.)
The central issue before ERB was then whether the proposed subjects for bargaining are matters of 'employment relations.'
An important preliminary issue is the scope of review by this court of decisions of ERB. As to factual determinations, our review is limited to determining whether the findings are supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence is the record, ORS 183.480(7)(d). In this regard we conclude that ERB's factual decisions are clearly supported by the record.
A more difficult question is our scope of review of questions of statutory interpretation and the actions of ERB in 'fleshing in' a vague statutory scheme.
Interpretation of an Act by the agency entrusted with its administration is generally given careful consideration by the courts. N.L.R. Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944) (); Van Ripper v. Liquor Cont. Com., 228 Or. 581, 365 P.2d 109 (1961).
The federal courts, in determining whether a particular subject is a mandatory bargaining subject under the National Labor Relations Act, have given great weight to the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board. N.L.R.B. v. International Hod Carriers, B. & C.L.U. of A., 384 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied 390 U.S. 920, 88 S.Ct. 853, 19 L.Ed.2d 980 (1968); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 85 S.Ct. 1596, 14 L.Ed.2d 640 (1965) (dictum).
The Court of Appeals of New York and the Supreme Court of Nevada have followed a similar rule of deference to the decisions of their public employe relations boards as to what constitutes a mandatory bargaining subject. West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720, 315 N.E.2d 775 (1974); Clark Co. Sch. Dist. v. Local Gov't, 90 Nev. 442, 530 P.2d 114 (1974).
In West Irondequoit the New York agency had determined that the subject of class size was not a mandatory bargaining subject under a statute requiring bargaining on all 'terms and conditions of employment.' The court of appeals determined that its scope of review was limited to a determination of whether the agency's decision was 'arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.' 358 N.Y.S.2d at 722, 315 N.E.2d at 777.
We believe the Oregon legislature intended that a similar approach would be followed under Oregon's statutory scheme. The legislature, by enacting the Public Employe Collective Bargaining Law and giving ERB the authority to administer that law evinces an intent to entrust ERB with the primary responsibility for resolving labor disputes in the public sector. Inherent in this grant of authority is the power to interpret and construe the statutory scheme which ERB was created to implement. ORS 243.650(7) being within that statutory scheme, we must affirm ERB's interpretation and 'fleshing in' of that section unless it is 'unlawful in substance or procedure.' ORS 183.480(7)(a). Cf., Van Ripper v. Liquor Cont. Com., supra; Gouge v. David et al., 185 Or. 437, 202 P.2d 489 (1949).
We now consider whether the interpretation given ORS 243.650(7) by ERB was unlawful in substance, i.e., contrary to law or arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.
The education associations argue that from the legislative history of the organic Act, Oregon Laws 1973, ch. 536, it is clear that subjects such as class size and curriculum development were intended to be mandatory bargaining subjects. The basis for their argument is the defeat of amendments to House Bill 2263, both in the House and the Senate, which would have made it clear that such subjects were not mandatory subjects for collective bargaining.
We do not agree that such an inference should be drawn from the defeat of the above amendments. First, the amendments in question contain numerous other provisions, many of which were controversial and hotly debated. Therefore, the defeat of the entire package tells us nothing regarding the legislative intent as to any one particular section thereof. Secondly, the defeat of an amendment, even one...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dortch v. A. H. Robins Co., Inc.
...to pass a particular proposal is of dubious value in interpreting the legislation which was passed. Springfield Ed. Assn v. Sch. Dist., 24 Or.App. 751, 547 P.2d 647 (1976), modified 25 Or.App. 407, 549 P.2d 1141 (1976)."To the same effect, see Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 310-11, 421 P.2d......
-
National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago
...in the schools affects teachers and is therefore arguably a 'condition of employment.' " Springfield Education Assn. v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 24 Or.App. 751, 759, 547 P.2d 647, 650 (1976). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court aptly summarized the effect of mandatory bargaining when it ......
-
Universidad Cent. de Bayamon v. N.L.R.B., 85-1074
..." NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 502-03, 99 S.Ct. at 1320; Springfield Education Association v. Springfield School District No. 19, 24 Ore.App. 751, 759, 547 P.2d 647, 650 (1976). See also Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494......
-
Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19
...questions of educational policy are not mandatory subjects for bargaining is not unlawful in substance. 2 Springfield Ed. Assn. v. Sch. Dist., 24 Or.App. 751, 759, 547 P.2d 647 (1976). Applying that principle, it affirmed the order in part. ERB had concluded that certain student teacher con......