Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19
| Decision Date | 16 December 1980 |
| Docket Number | M,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 621 P.2d 547,290 Or. 217 |
| Parties | SPRINGFIELD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 19 and Employment Relations Board, Respondents, and School Districtultnomah County, and Oregon School Boards Association, Intervenors. EUGENE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. EUGENE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4J, and Employment Relations Board, Respondents, and School Districtultnomah County, and Oregon School Boards Association, Intervenors. SOUTH LANE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. SOUTH LANE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 45J3, and Employment Relations Board, Respondents, and School Districtultnomah County, and Oregon School Boards Association, Intervenors. CA 12102; SC 26542. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
[290 Or. 218-C] Jennifer Friesen and Henry H. Drummonds, Eugene, argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the petition was Kulongoski, Heid, Durham & Drummonds, Eugene. On the briefs was Henry H. Drummonds of Kulongoski, Heid, Durham & Drummonds, Eugene.
Bruce E. Smith, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent school districts. With him on the briefs were Moore, Wurtz & Logan, Springfield; Gary R. Ackley of Ackley & Kelsay, Cottage Grove; Young, Horn, Cass & Scott, Eugene; and Richard E. Miller of Hershner, Hunter, Miller, Moulton & Andrews, Eugene.
Mark C. McClanahan, Portland, argued the cause for intervenors. With him on respondent school districts' briefs were Edward C. Harms, Jr., of Harms & Harold, Springfield; and Miller, Anderson, Nash, Yerke & Wiener, Portland, attorneys for intervenors.
James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., and Al J. Laue, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, waived appearance for respondent Employment Relations Bd.
Before DENECKE, C. J., and TONGUE, HOWELL, * LENT, PETERSON and TANZER, JJ.
These three consolidated contested cases originated six years ago in unfair labor practices complaints against three school districts filed with the Employment Relations Board (ERB) by complainants, three teachers' labor organizations. The complaints charged the school districts with unfair labor practices by refusal to bargain regarding some 92 proposals, including proposals regarding teacher evaluation. There have been two ERB orders and three Court of Appeals' opinions. The latest Court of Appeals' decision upheld an ERB order which required mandatory collective bargaining regarding certain aspects of the evaluation proposals and permissive collective bargaining as to others. The ultimate issue is whether teacher evaluation is a "condition of employment" under ORS 243.650(4) and therefore subject to mandatory bargaining. 1 The threshold issue is whether the meaning of the statutory phrase "condition of employment" is to be determined by the agency or by the court. That issue has dominated the most recent appeal and we allowed review in order to consider it.
The first ERB order classified some proposals as mandatorily and others as permissively negotiable. The Court of Appeals held in its first opinion that "ERB's conclusion that matters which to a large extent involve questions of educational policy are not mandatory subjects for bargaining is not unlawful in substance. 2 Springfield Ed. Assn. v. Sch. Dist., 24 Or.App. 751, 759, 547 P.2d 647 (1976). Applying that principle, it affirmed the order in part. ERB had concluded that certain student teacher contracts were not a subject of permissive negotiation. The Court of Appeals, balancing the effect on teachers' employment and upon educational policy, concluded that the contracts were subjects for permissive bargaining and reversed that portion of the ERB order. 24 Or.App. at 760, 547 P.2d 647.
Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeals concluded, on the basis of its intervening opinion in Sutherlin Ed. Assn. v. Sch. Dist., 25 Or.App. 85, 548 P.2d 204 (1976) On remand, ERB applied the Court of Appeals' formulation to the evaluation proposals. In summary, the Board classified the evaluation proposals into three component parts: the bases and use of evaluation, the mechanics of evaluation, and the minimum fairness procedures for evaluation. It found that the first two categories, bases and mechanics, were subjects of permissive bargaining because their relation to educational policy outweighed their impact on the teacher's employment. It held that the third category, fairness procedures, was a subject of mandatory bargaining because the effect on the teacher's employment outweighed the effect on educational policy. It surveyed the proposals, phrase by phrase, and classed each within one of the three categories.
that it had erred by itself weighing the effect on employment and educational policy because that application of the statute to the facts was properly a function of ERB, not of the Court of Appeals. Springfield Ed. Assn. v. Sch. Dist., 25 Or.App. 407, 410, 549 P.2d 1141 (1976). The case was remanded to allow ERB to apply the legal test which had been formulated by the Court of Appeals.
On review, the Court of Appeals found error but upheld the order. It reasoned that under the opinion of this court in McPherson v. Employment Division, 285 Or. 541, 591 P.2d 1381 (1979), the construction of the statutory term "other conditions of employment" was within the authority of the agency, not the court. Therefore, it concluded, ERB erred in applying the Court of Appeals' construction of the statute rather than formulating and applying its own. It nevertheless upheld the order on the basis of ERB's counsel's representation that the members of the Board, had they had the benefit of the McPherson opinion and known that they could make their own interpretation, would have chosen to adopt and apply the test formulated by the Court of Appeals as their own. The Court of Appeals concluded that a remand would be pointless and upheld the order. We agree that a remand for an order amended in that respect would needlessly extend this already protracted proceeding.
We allowed the labor organizations' petition for review to determine whether the rule in McPherson had been correctly applied to this case; i. e., whether the construction of the statutory phrase "other conditions of employment" was properly an administrative or a judicial responsibility and, either way, whether the construction in this case was lawful.
Allocation between agencies and courts of responsibility for giving specific meaning to statutory terms presents a problem of long standing. As might be expected with a problem so elusive, this court has historically followed several approaches and invoked various familiar phrases. The results are fairly harmonious, but neither the phrases used nor the theories relied upon are consistent.
One prominent line of cases reviews agency action, whether by rule or order, by recognizing that the legislature gave to the agency, not to the court, authority to fill in the so-called "interstices" of the statutes they are required to administer. See, e. g., Ore. Newspaper Pub. v. Peterson, 244 Or. 116, 415 P.2d 21 (1966); U. of O. Co-Oper. v. Dept. of Rev., 273 Or. 539, 542 P.2d 900 (1975). A parallel line of cases, however, holds that it is the responsibility of the courts to construe such statutes, and the interpretation by the agency will merely be given some degree of respect. See, e. g., "great weight," City of Portland v. Duntley, 185 Or. 365, 203 P.2d 640 (1949) and Curly's Dairy v. Dept. of Agriculture, 244 Or. 15, 415 P.2d 740 (1966); "careful consideration," Gouge v. David, 185 Or. 437, 454, 202 P.2d 489 (1949). 3 Some cases hold both ways. In our oft cited case of Van Ripper v. Liquor Cont. Com., 228 Or. 581, 365 P.2d 109 (1961), we said initially that the legislature conferred authority upon the agency to "fill in the interstices in the legislation," 228 Or. at 581, 365 P.2d 109, but concluded that agency interpretation would only be "generally given careful consideration by the courts," 228 Or. at 593, 365 P.2d 109. 4
Another line of cases categorizes agency determinations as fact or law, holding that fact determinations are for agencies and law is for courts. Professor Davis has demonstrated that courts generally have inconsistently assumed interpretive responsibility as a matter of discretion and have justified the results by manipulation of the fact-law distinction. Davis, Treatise on Administrative Law, § 30.08. In Baker v. Cameron, 240 Or. 354, 401 P.2d 691 (1965), this court, recognizing Davis' criticism, resolved to sort out law and facts. We held that once the historical facts are found, the question of whether those facts come within the meaning of a statute is one of law for the court. Because the agency presumably has "some expertise," and agency determination "should be given some consideration" by the courts. 240 Or. at 359-360, 401 P.2d 691. Thus the court assigned to itself the ultimate authority to determine what constitutes "employment" as that word is used in the Unemployment Compensation Act. Later, in Kirkpatrick v. Peet, 247 Or. 204, 428 P.2d 405 (1967), we held that application of the term "employer" in the same act was a task of law for the court.
Most recently, in the context of review of rulemaking authority, we concluded in Morgan v. Stimson Lumber Company, 288 Or. 595, 607 P.2d 150 (1980), that the difference in our cases was not produced by the general phrases employed in various opinions. Rather, the results vary according to the nature and scope of the authority delegated by the statutes:
* * * In short, different holdings on the validity of agency rules, * * * do not result from different generalizations about agency rulemaking but from scrutiny of the scope of the responsibilities for substantive policy and for its administration that are assigned to the agency under the particular law at issue." 288 Or. at 602, 607 P.2d 150.
See also Jaffe,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Firefighters, Local No. 1489
...derived. It is a twofold review for substantial evidence and, in a sense, for "substantial reason," cf. Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or. 217, 228, 621 P.2d 547 (1980), and McCann v. OLCC, 27 Or.App. 487, 495, 556 P.2d 973 (1976), rev. den. 277 Or. 99 On judicial review, ......
-
Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v. Public Service Com'n
...Armored Service Corp. v. Public Service Commission, Utah, 626 P.2d 450 (1981); Springfield Education Association v. Springfield School District No. 19, 290 Or. 217, 621 P.2d 547, 551-57 (1980) (Tanzer, J.).17 Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service Commission, Utah, 636 P.2d......
-
Gearhart v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Or.
...is a unique enterprise that is governed by statute but largely left to the PUC's discretion. See Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or. 217, 230, 621 P.2d 547 (1980) (explaining that the PUC is empowered to “make delegated policy choices of a legislative nature within the broa......
-
Gearhart v. Public Utility Commission of Oregon
...allowing the utility to maintain its credit and attract capital.” Under the familiar construct of Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or. 217, 226–28, 621 P.2d 547 (1980), these are delegative terms. They set out the results that the legislature wants the PUC to achieve and the......
-
Chapter §12.6 CORE POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
...(rules could not authorize what the statute prohibits); Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19, 290 Or 217, 223-30, 621 P2d 547 (1980) (describing method of reviewing administrative rules). A petition for review of orders in other than contested cases properly belongs in t......