Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 3:93 CV 7233.,3:93 CV 7233.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia
• Parties: Robert S. SPRINGSTON, Plaintiff, v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP., et al., Defendants.

863 F. Supp. 535

Robert S. SPRINGSTON, Plaintiff, v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP., et al., Defendants.

No. 3:93 CV 7233.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.

July 5, 1994.

John Douglas Liber, Dennis R. Lansdowne, Spangenberg, Shibley, Traci, Lancione & Liber, Cleveland, OH, Ralph E. Jocke, Patricia Ann Walker, Walker & Jocke, Medina, OH, for plaintiff.

Richard S. Milligan, Philip E. Howes, Thomas R. Himmelspach, Robert B. Daane, Vogelgesang, Howes, Lindamood & Brunn, Canton, OH, for Consolidated Rail Corp.

Thomas J. Sweeney, Pietragallo, Bosick & Gordon, Pittsburgh, PA, for General Motors Corp.

David J. Hanna, Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, Akron, OH, for David J. Hanna.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DOWD, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on the motion of defendant General Motors Corporation, Electro-Motive Division ("General Motors") summary judgment, and the motion of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes both motions, and both Conrail and General Motors have filed reply briefs. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a collision between a car and a train at a railroad crossing in northwestern Ohio, south of Bowling Green. The driver of the car was plaintiff Robert Springston, who was en route from the University of Southern Illinois to Crotch Island, Maine. The collision occurred at approximately 11:30 p.m. when Conrail's train was traveling northbound on the single, main track, and Springston was traveling east on Route 281. Springston's pickup truck was struck when he drove in front of the train. Springston was rendered a quadriplegic.

Springston brings this action against Conrail, alleging, in part, that Conrail caused the collision by negligently failing to install different warning equipment on the locomotive.¹ Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the lead locomotive was not equipped with the audible warning devices or the visual warning devices necessary to warn of the trains presence, and was not painted so as to warn of the train's presence. Plaintiff also alleged that Conrail caused the collision by operating the train with a "defective" locomotive.

Springston also brings suit against General Motors, the manufacturer of the locomotive at issue, alleging again that the locomotive was defective. Springston presents his claims against General Motors pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §§ 2307.75(A) (product defective in design or formulation), 2307.77 (products defective due to non-conformance with manufacturers' representation), 1302.27 (implied warranty, merchantability; usage of trade), and 1302.28 (implied warranty; fitness for a particular purpose). Plaintiff also alleges a claim for punitive damages against General Motors.

Both Conrail and General Motors have moved for summary judgment. Although the two defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment, both defendants present the same issue: are plaintiff's claims that the locomotive should have been equipped with reflective materials and strobe, ditch and/or oscillating lights preempted by the Boiler Inspection Act ("BIA"), 45 U.S.C. § 22, et seq., or the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C. § 421, et seq.? Conrail also asks for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that the locomotive at issue was defective.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. When considering a motion for summary judgment, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." U.S. v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). See e.g., United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557, 562 (6th Cir.1985) and cases cited therein. The Court's favorable treatment of facts and inferences, however, does not relieve the nonmoving party of his responsibility "to go beyond the pleadings" to oppose an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(e). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the moving party satisfies his burden to show an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, the party in opposition "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Although the showing required of the nonmoving party by Rule 56 does not go so far as to require that all opposition evidence be in a form admissible at trial, the rule does require the nonmoving party who has the burden of proof at trial to oppose a proper summary judgment motion "by any of the kinds of evidentiary material listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. General averments or conclusional allegations of an affidavit, however, do not create specific fact disputes for summary judgment purposes. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188-89, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Furthermore, unsworn statements and affidavits composed of hearsay and nonexpert opinion evidence, "do not satisfy Rule 56(e) and must be disregarded." See Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 968-69 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am. v. Deer Creek Park, 612 F.2d 259, 264 (6th Cir.1979) and citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 n. 17, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609 n. 17, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). Nor may a party "create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for summary judgment has been made, which contradicts earlier deposition testimony." Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir.1986) (citing Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir.1984)).

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court will consider "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Nonmaterial facts will not be considered. Neither will the judge attempt to weigh the material evidence or determine its truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The judge's sole function will be to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial such that "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. (citations omitted).

Where the non-moving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof," summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (equating the standard for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a) with the summary judgment standard of Rule 56). If the evidence is "merely colorable," or is "not significantly probative," the Court may decide the legal issue and grant summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967) (per curiam) and First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1593, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). "`The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.'" Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512).

In sum, "the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

III. LAW AND DISCUSSION

A. The Preemption Doctrine

Article VI, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, declares:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuant thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the Land ...

It is from this Supremacy Clause that the doctrine of preemption is derived. It is designed to prevent the States from impinging too much on federal law and policy. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 1898, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986).

The Supreme Court has laid the path to be followed in a preemption analysis. Congress may, of course, expressly state that state law is preempted. If no such statement is made, however, preemption may be inferred because

"the scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it," because "the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the subject," or because "the object sought to be obtained by federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose."

Fidelity Fed'l Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). Where Congress intends to occupy a field, state...