Springstun v. Springstun

Citation229 P. 14,131 Wash. 109
Decision Date06 October 1924
Docket Number18575.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
PartiesSPRINGSTUN v. SPRINGSTUN.

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Griffiths, Judge.

Suit by Lillian E. Springstun against William E. Springstun. From order for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with instructions to dismiss proceedings.

Cosgrove & Terhune, of Seattle, for appellant.

Bronson Robinson & Jones and W. L. Grill, all of Seattle, for respondent.

FULLERTON J.

The appellant, William E. Springstun, and the respondent, Lillian E. Springstun, were formerly husband and wife. There was born to them as the issue of their marriage one daughter, Wildora E. Springstun. On November 20, 1920, the superior court of King county, at the suit of Lillian E. Springstun, entered a decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony then existing between herself and her husband. Wildora E. Springstun was then a minor, and the decree, with reference to her care custody, and control, contained the following provision:

'That Lillian E. Springstun do have the care, custody and control of Wildora E. Springstun during her minority, and that the said William E. Springstun do pay to the plaintiff as alimony for the support of said Wildora E. Springstun, during her minority, the sum of $50 per month, payable on the first day or before the 10th day of each and every month during the minority of said Wildora E. Springstun.'

At the time of the entry of the decree the statute relating to the age of majority (Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10548) read as follows:

'Males shall be deemed and taken to be of full age for all purposes at the age of twenty-one years and upwards; females shall be deemed and taken to be of full age at the age of eighteen years and upwards.'

At its biennial session of 1923 (Laws 1923, p. 222), the legislature amended the statute, making it read:

'All persons shall be deemed and taken to be of full age for all purposes at the age of twenty-one years and upwards.'

The amendatory statute went into effect on June 6, 1923. Wildora E. Springstun reached the age of 18 years on October 3, 1923. The appellant, from the time of the entry of the decree to the time the daughter became of the age of 18 years, made the monthly payments required by the decree. After that time he refused to make further payments, when the present proceedings were instituted against him to compel him so to do. The hearing resulted in an order adjudging the appellant liable for the monthly payments provided for in the decree, until the daughter reaches the age of 21 years, and in appropriate provisions for enforcing the payments.

It will be seen from the dates given that at the time the decree was entered the statute fixed the age of majority, in so far as it applied to women, at the age of 18 years, and that the amendatory statute was enacted and became effective before the daughter reached the age of majority, as it was then fixed by the Legislature.

That the statute had the effect of extending the minority of the minor daughter until she reached the age of 21 years, we think there can be but little doubt. Majority or minority is a status, rather than a fixed or vested right. While under the common law both men and women were held to become sui juris on reaching the age of 21 years, the rule was arbitrary in the sense that it was one of convenience and necessity, as distinquished from a substantive rule of law. It is therefore a matter wholly subject to the legislative will. That body may fix a different date as the time when the status shall change, unless, of course, its power so to do is taken away by some provision of the fundamental law controlling its power to enact such laws. To support these propositions it is sufficient to point to the history of the law. Legislative bodies have from the earliest times exercised the power, and the courts have uniformly...

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28 cases
  • Felix v. Milliken
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • December 22, 1978
    ...result in the creation of any new rights, but merely in the termination of certain personal privileges. See Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 229 P. 14 (1934). In the true concept of the term status, therefore, the status of majority or minority by its very nature does not of itself ......
  • Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arizona
    • May 23, 1945
    ...... power to fix and change the age of majority. In re. Morrissey , 137 U.S. 157, 11 S.Ct. 57, 34 L.Ed. 644;. Springstun v. Springstun , 131 Wash. 109,. 229 P. 14, 40 A. L. R. 595; 27 Am. Jur. 748, sec. 5. . . It is. our view that the legislature had ......
  • Truax-traer Coal Co v. Comp. Com'r, s. 9248-9253.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • November 4, 1941
    ...306, 81 Am.St.Rep. 715; Marpole v. Cather's Adm'r, 78 Va. 239; Casieri's Case, 286 Mass. 50, 190 N.E. 118; Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 229 P. 14, 16, 40 A.L.R. 595. In the latter case, the court said: "A judgment is property, and is as much protected by the fundamental law agai......
  • Truax-Traer Coal Co. v. Comp. Comm'r. The New River Co., (No. 9248)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • November 4, 1941
    ...81 Am. St. Rep. 715; Marpole v. Cather's Adm'r., 78 Va. 239; Casieri's Case, 286 Mass. 50, 190 N. E. 118; Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 229 P. 14, 16, 40 A. L. R. 595. In the latter case, the court said: "A judgment is property, and is as much protected by the fundamental law aga......
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