Sprinkle v. Wellborn

• Decision Date: 05 December 1905
• Parties: SPRINKLE v. WELLBORN.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

52 S.E. 666

140 N.C. 163

SPRINKLE v. WELLBORN.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

December 5, 1905

Appeal from Superior Court, Wilkes County; Cooke, Judge.

Action by Nancy Elvira Sprinkle, by W. R. Sprinkle, her guardian against J. M. Wellborn and another. From an adverse judgment defendant Wellborn appeals. Affirmed.

Evidence in a suit to avoid a deed held sufficient to sustain a finding that grantee had notice that the grantor had not sufficient mental capacity to make the deed.

This action was brought by the plaintiff, Nancy Elvira Sprinkle who is represented by her guardian, W. R. Sprinkle, against the defendant J. M. Wellborn to set aside a deed made by the said Nancy Elvira Sprinkle to the defendant Wellborn on the 19th day of October, 1886, for want of mental capacity to make the same, and for fraud and undue influence in procuring the execution of the said deed. Issues were submitted to the jury which, with the answers thereto, are as follows "(1) Did Nancy E. Sprinkle at the time of executing the deed of October 19, 1886, have sufficient mental capacity to make the same? A. No. (2) If Nancy E. Sprinkle had not sufficient mental capacity at such time to make such deed, did J. M. Wellborn have notice of it? A. Yes. (3) Was any fraud or undue influence practiced on Nancy E. Sprinkle by J. M. Wellborn to induce her to make such deed? A. No. (4) What was the amount of the benefit derived by Nancy E. Sprinkle from the consideration for the deed to the river farm? A. [by consent]. $1,299 [the amount of the Salmons mortgage debt]; the value of the mountain or Miller tract of land and the value of the cattle delivered to her, and all as of date October 19, 1886. (5) What was the value of the river farm October 19, 1886? A. $4,000. (6) What has been the average annual rental value of said river farm since October 19, 1886? A. $200. (7) What was the value of the mountain or Miller tract October 19, 1886? A. $1,500. (8) What has been the average annual rental value of said mountain or Miller tract since October 19, 1886? A. $75. (9) What was the value of the cattle received by Nancy E. Sprinkle in said trade? A. $75. (10) If the said Nancy E. Sprinkle had not sufficient mental capacity to make said deed, did the defendant Greenwood have notice thereof? A. [by consent]. No. (11) Was the defendant Greenwood a purchaser for value without notice of any fraud on the part of Wellborn to procure the deed to himself, if any such was practiced? A. [[by consent]. Yes." There was no objection to the issues. It is not necessary to state the evidence. It was voluminous, but the only material portion of it will be stated in the opinion.

The defendant requested the court to give a number of instructions, all of which were given, except those numbered 3, 13, and 14, which will be noticed hereafter. The material instructions given in response to the defendant's prayers, upon the issue as to mental capacity, were as follows: "(1) The law fixes no particular standard of intelligence necessary to be possessed by parties in making a contract; and, although a person may not have sufficient intelligence to manage his affairs in a proper and prudent manner, still he may be capable of making a binding contract. (2) It is not required that a person should be able to make a disposition of his property with judgment and discretion. It is sufficient if he understands what he is about. If a person knows what he is doing and is aware of the nature of the particular transaction, such person has sufficient mental capacity to make a contract, although that person may not act wisely or discreetly, or make a good bargain. (3) If the jury find from the evidence that on the 19th of October, 1886, Nancy E. Sprinkle had sufficient mental capacity to understand what she was about and the nature and extent of the property when she executed the deed, and that she understood the nature and effect thereof, they will answer the first issue "Yes,' although they also find from the evidence that she was eccentric, and that her mind was weak and flighty, and that the trade she made was not a prudent one, and was not made in the exercise of discretion and good judgment. (4) If the jury find from the evidence that at the time the deed was executed to wit, October 19, 1886, Nancy E. Sprinkle had sufficient mental capacity to understand and appreciate that she was making a deed by which she passed the title to the river farm to the defendant Wellborn, that she was depriving herself of the ownership and control thereof, and that she was getting in exchange therefor the farm in Ashe county and the cattle mentioned in the evidence, and that the mortgage to Salmons was to be paid by the defendant, then they will answer the first issue 'Yes,' although they may also find that it was not a prudent trade, and was not made with discretion and good judgment. (5) Mere weakness of mind and susceptibility to undue or fraudulent influences, however clearly shown, will not vitiate a contract unless it was induced by fraud. Where there is a legal capacity, there cannot be an equitable incapacity, apart from fraud. If a person be of sound mind, he has the right to dispose of his property, and his will stands in place of a reason, provided the contract justified the conclusion that he exercised deliberate judgment, such as it is and has not been circumvented or imposed upon by artifice or undue influence which amounts to fraud." The following instructions, which the defendant requested the court to give the jury, were refused: "(1) Unless the mind of such person is wholly incapable of any reflection or deliberate act, so that in fact he was unaware of the nature and effect of the particular transaction, such person in the eye of the law has sufficient mental capacity to make a contract. (2) Upon all of the evidence the jury is instructed that the defendant Wellborn did not have notice of any mental incapacity of Nancy E. Sprinkle, if any such existed. (3) The jury will answer the third issue 'No."D'

The court then charged the jury generally as follows: "Those who allege insanity, idiocy, imbecility, and incapacity must prove it by the greater weight of the evidence; must overcome the legal presumption of soundness of mind. Has the plaintiff overcome this presumption of law? If so, you will answer the first issue 'No,' and thereby declare that, when she made the deed, Elvira Sprinkle did not have that mental capacity which the law requires of those who dispose of their property. The law does not require that a person be able to dispose of his or her property with judgment and discretion, or be able to get the best of a trade. It is sufficient in law if he or she understands what he or she is doing and what they are about. The law does not require a high degree of intelligence, but it does require sufficient mind to know and comprehend the character of the act and to know what one is doing. Did Elvira Sprinkle, when she made the deed to the river farm, know what she was about; know the effect of the instrument she was signing; know that she was parting with her land and getting the land in Ashe county and the cattle and the payment of the mortgage in return? If she did not fully comprehend this, you will answer the issue 'No'; otherwise, you will answer it 'Yes.' You understand, of course, that you are inquiring into the contract of Elvira Sprinkle on October 19, 1886. Was she sound, then, and of sufficient mental capacity to make the deed on that day? Where one has sufficient mental capacity at the time he signs the deed to understand the nature and extent of the property disposed of, and the force and effect of his act in signing the deed, then he is capable of executing a deed. If you find that Nancy Sprinkle, at the time she signed the deed on the 19th October, 1886, had mind and intelligence sufficient to enable her to have a reasonable judgment of the kind and value of the property embraced in the deed, and to understand the effect of her act in making the deed, you should answer the first issue 'Yes'; but, if you shall find that she did not have such mind and intelligence as stated, you will answer the first issue 'No."D' The court instructed the jury on the law applicable to the other issues, recapitulating the evidence by grouping the same as applicable to the different issues, and explained the law arising thereon. The court instructed the jury as to the difference between substantive evidence and corroborating and impeaching evidence, and then instructed them further, as follows: "The evidence of statements made in this case, by witnesses other than the parties to this suit, different from and inconsistent with the testimony given by such witnesses on this trial, was allowed only for the purpose of impeaching such witnesses, and is not to be considered as substantive evidence. Evidence of the statements of witnesses which accord with their evidence on the trial is only allowed for the purpose of corroborating such witnesses, and is not to be considered by the jury as substantive evidence."

After the verdict was returned the court found that the answer of the jury to the third issue was against the weight of the evidence, and set it aside, and that, upon the responses to the other issues, there was fraud in law. The court thereupon answered the third issue "Yes." The defendant excepted. During the trial the plaintiff introduced in evidence the record entitled "In the Matter of the Inquiry into the Mental Condition of Nancy E. Sprinkle," which was a proceeding instituted in 1893 under the statute the record showing the appointment of W. R. Sprinkle as her guardian. In the said proceeding the jury found that she was "incompetent to manage her own business." The plaintiff then introduced...