Sprinkle v. West

• Decision Date: 27 March 1911
• Citation: 114 P. 430,62 Wash. 587
• Parties: SPRINKLE et al. v. WEST et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

114 P. 430

62 Wash. 587

SPRINKLE et al. v. WEST et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 27, 1911

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Klickitat County; Donald McMaster, Judge.

Action by D. S. Sprinkle and others against Pearl C. West and others. From the judgment, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

H Dustin, for appellants.

Ward H Wheeler, E. C. Ward, and N. L. Ward, for respondents.

MORRIS J.

This appeal submits a legal question of simple statement, growing out of the judgment of the court below upon an agreed statement of facts, to which it will not be necessary to refer as it would be of no additional value.

The question is, Can land acquired under the homestead laws of the United States he held liable to the satisfaction of a judgment obtained upon a note given between the making of final proof and the issuance of patent? We answer, no. While there is some conflict upon this question, the greater and the better authority is in accord with this view. Section 2296, Rev. St. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1398), provides that: 'No lands acquired under the provisions of this chapter shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuing of the patent therefor.' The theory upon which it has been held in Struby-Estabrook Mercantile Co. v. Davis, 18 Colo 93, 31 P. 495, 36 Am. St. Rep. 266, and other like cases, that the land may be subjected to debts contracted after final proof and issuance of the receiver's certificate, but before patent, is that the final certificate is as binding on the government as the patent, and, when the patent issues, it relates back to the date of the final certificate. So far as the effect upon the title alone is concerned, this is probably true, and, under such theory, mortgages executed in this interim have been sustained; it being held that the language of section 2296 does not limit a voluntary lien. This section is not one affecting title, but establishing an exemption against involuntary liens, and, inasmuch as the government grants the title, it has the right to exempt it from enforced liability until by the issuance of its patent it has parted with all its title and interest in the land. That it was the intention so to do is manifest by the language of the section, so plain as to require no interpretation, and the fact that the government has by the issuance of its certificate informed the homesteader that his proofs have been accepted and his right to title established does not interfere in any way with this further beneficial provision of the law, that, until the government has issued its patent, the final evidence of the title, it shall preserve these lands free and clear from any compulsory or involuntary lien 'in any event.'

The identical question here presented has been passed upon in California and Oregon, and the liability denied under the provision of section 2296. Miller v. Little, 47 Cal 348; Barnard v. Boller, 105 Cal. 219, 38 P. 729. In the last case it is said: 'The date of issuing the patent is made the point of time which divides the liability and nonliability of the land. It is this event or act which determines the question of liability, and not the title or the question of relation as applicable to the holder thereof which must be taken as the criterion.' In Wallowa Nat. Bank v. Riley, 29 Or. 293, 45 P. 768, 54 Am. St. Rep. 794, the court reasons that: 'It was within the power of Congress to designate any point of...