Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills
| Decision Date | 05 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 01-7116. |
| Citation | 283 F.3d 404 |
| Parties | SPRINT SPECTRUM L.P. d/b/a Sprint PCS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard P. MILLS, individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Education, Charles A. Szuberla, individually and as Coordinator, Facilities Management and Information Services of the New York State Department of Education, and Carl T. Thurnau, individually and as Acting Supervisor of the New York State Department of Education, Office of Facilities Planning, Defendants, Board of Education of the Ossining Union Free School District, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
David L. Snyder, Tarrytown, New York (Frederick W. Turner, Snyder & Snyder, Tarrytown, New York, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Lawrence W. Reich, Northport, New York (Gus Mountanos, Ingerman Smith, Northport, New York, on the brief), for Appellant.
Before: MESKILL, KEARSE, and McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges.
This litigation centers on the efforts of plaintiff Sprint Spectrum L.P. ("Sprint" or "SSLP") to install a telecommunications facility, to wit, a cellular communications tower to facilitate wireless telephone communications, atop the Ossining, New York high school (the "High School"). The Board of Education of the Ossining Union Free School District ("School District" or "District"), which in 1998 entered into a lease agreement with Sprint permitting the installation of such an antenna on the High School roof, appeals from an injunction entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Barrington D. Parker, Jr., then-District Judge, requiring the District to allow Sprint to install the antenna. Although this action began as a suit by Sprint solely against officials of the New York State Department of Education ("DOE" or the "Department") to compel the issuance of New York State ("State") permits needed for construction of the antenna in accordance with the lease agreement, see Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 65 F.Supp.2d 148 (1999) ("Sprint I") (), the present injunction, entered by the district court under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994), prohibits the School District from interfering with Sprint's rights under the lease and under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. ("TCA" "Telecommunications Act" or "Act"), see Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 124 F.Supp.2d 211 (2000) ("Sprint II"). On appeal, the School District contends principally that the district court erred (a) in exercising jurisdiction over it, (b) in applying the TCA, and (c) in interpreting the lease agreement. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court could properly assume jurisdiction over the School District in this matter under the All Writs Act; but we disagree with the court's interpretation of the Act, and we conclude that there are factual issues to be resolved with respect to the meaning of the lease agreement.
Many of the facts are not in dispute and were discussed in Sprint I. Sprint is a provider of cellular telephone service in the New York-New Jersey area. In 1995, Sprint was the highest bidder at an auction, conducted by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), for a license to broadcast wireless telephone communications in an area defined by the FCC as the New York-New Jersey Major Trading Area ("MTA"), employing personal communication service technology ("PCS"). PCS uses digital, rather than analog, transmission to improve wireless communications by, inter alia, providing clearer connections and fewer dropped calls. See Sprint I, 65 F.Supp.2d at 150.
As an FCC-licensee, Sprint is obligated to provide wireless communication service to at least 33% of the population located in an area defined by the FCC as the New York-New Jersey Major Trading Area ("MTA") within five years from the date the license was granted.... The license has a term of ten years. In order to meet its obligation under the FCC license, Sprint must create a network of individual "cell sites," which are facilities consisting of a radio antenna and attached equipment which send and receive radio signals to and from customers' portable wireless communication handsets and mobile telephones. The antenna feeds low power radio signals received from mobile phones through the attached electronic equipment and into ordinary phone lines so calls can be routed anywhere in the world.
The MTA includes Ossining, New York. In September 1998, Sprint and the School District entered into a five-year lease agreement (the "Lease"), automatically renewable for four additional five-year terms at Sprint's option, permitting Sprint to locate a cell site on the roof of the High School. In exchange for this right to erect and maintain the antenna on the High School, Sprint was to pay the School District an annual rent of $30,000, escalating by at least three percent per year, and to provide, free of charge, three Sprint PCS wireless telephones to the School District. Sprint agreed to disguise the antenna as a flagpole, similar to the one already on the High School roof, in order that the Sprint facility be aesthetically and structurally unobtrusive. The Lease also allowed Sprint to make such periodic technological improvements at the cell site as it deemed necessary:
7. Improvements. SSLP may, at its expense, make such improvements on the Site as it deems necessary from time to time for the operation of the PCS system. Owner agrees to cooperate with SSLP with respect to obtaining any required zoning approvals for the Site and such improvements.
(Lease ¶ 7.)
In October 1998, Sprint and the School District agreed to incorporate into the Lease a one-page addendum (the "Addendum" or "Lease Addendum"), dealing with density of radio emissions from the proposed antenna in terms of the number of microwaves ("µw") per square centimeter. The Addendum stated that
it is hereby agreed that during the entire term of the agreement between Ossining Union Free School District and Sprint PCS, the following maximum levels for the proposed PCS antenna shall not exceed:
1. 6 feet above grade power density (µw/cm2)<0.07
2. 16 above grade power density (µw/cm2)<0.09
The foregoing operating specification applies only to the Sprint Spectrum, L.P. antenna configuration, as originally installed. The Board of Education shall have the right to test said power density at its discretion to determine the maximum power density as set forth above, using the FCC OET Bulletin 65, IEEE or NCRP approved methodology. In the event the power density should exceed the aforementioned calculations, Sprint will reimburse the district for said testing and in addition correct said power density to or below the maximums....
(Id.)
Under State regulations, because the cost of constructing the cell tower on the High School was to exceed $10,000, Sprint needed approval from DOE. The requisite application was filed in December 1998. In January 1999, DOE refused to grant the necessary permit, stating (a) that the State Constitution prohibits the School District from leasing public property to a private party if the lease primarily benefits the private party, and that the primary benefit of the Lease would accrue to the private benefit of Sprint; (b) that it was not certain that "the property... is not currently needed for school district purposes"; and (c) that the School District lacked the authority to contract with Sprint. (Letter dated January 12, 1999, from DOE to attorney for Sprint.)
Unable to resolve its conflict with DOE, Sprint commenced the present action in February 1999, naming as defendants the pertinent DOE officials. The complaint requested principally a judgment (a) declaring that DOE's refusal to grant approval for construction of the antenna violated the Telecommunications Act, and (b) ordering the defendants to issue the necessary approvals.
In Sprint I, issued on August 27, 1999, the district court ruled in favor of Sprint. First, it found that the Lease did not violate the State Constitution, noting that the State has accorded cellular telephone companies the status of public utilities, and that "Congress has expressly emphasized that providing wireless telephone services furthers an important public purpose," Sprint I, 65 F.Supp.2d at 155.
The statute creating the Federal Communications Commission directs the commission to issue wireless communications licenses,
to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communication....
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151). Thus, the court rejected DOE's contention that the Sprint-School District Lease was solely for the private benefit of Sprint, finding that "the lease is in furtherance of a public purpose." 65 F.Supp.2d at 155-56.
Second, the court rejected DOE's view that the School District lacked authority to enter into the Lease agreement:
Because [a] the portion of the roof that would house Sprint's cell site is not currently needed for school district purposes, [b] Sprint's cell site would serve a public purpose, and [c] the District determined that the leasing of such property is in the best interest of the District, defendants' argument that the school district lacked authority to enter into the lease has no merit.
Sprint I, 65 F.Supp.2d at 156-57.
Finally, the court found that DOE's invocation of its regulations to withhold approval violated the TCA in various ways. The Act...
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