Sproul v. Town of Boothbay Harbor

• Decision Date: 24 February 2000
• Parties: Carroll J. SPROUL and James M. Sproul v. TOWN OF BOOTHBAY HARBOR et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

746 A.2d 368

2000 ME 30

Carroll J. SPROUL and James M. Sproul v. TOWN OF BOOTHBAY HARBOR et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs February 9, 2000.

Decided February 24, 2000.

Gordon E. Stein, Gallagher and Stein, Damariscotta, for plaintiffs.

Daniel J. Bernier, Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Stevens, Waterville, Thomas J. McCarthy, McCarthy, Allegretto & McCarthy, East Boston, MA, (for James and Geraldine Magnasco), Geoffrey Hole, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A., Portland, (for Town of Boothbay Harbor), for defendants.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

RUDMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Carroll J. Sproul and James M. Sproul appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Perkins, A.R.J.) denying their M.R. Civ. P. 80B appeal from the decision of the Boothbay Harbor Zoning Board of Appeals. The Board of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Boothbay Harbor Planning Board granting James and Geraldine Magnasco permission to expand a nonconforming structure pursuant to BOOTHBAY HARBOR CODE art. XIII, § 170-98(B). The Sprouls assert that, contrary to the decision of the Superior Court, they, as abutters, have standing to contest the Planning Board's decision, and that the Planning Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We agree with the Sprouls that they have standing, but find the Planning Board's decision to be neither arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable, and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I.

[¶ 2] The Magnascos desired to convert the deck on their home in Boothbay Harbor into a garage. They sought and received a permit from the Town to convert their deck into a 20' × 32' garage, but after construction was almost complete, the Town discovered that the permit was based on an erroneous calculation of the distance between the road and the garage. The garage violated the Town's road setback requirements. The Town also discovered that the garage violated the shoreland setback requirements because the garage was 63 feet from the shoreline while the shoreland setback ordinance required the garage to be 75 feet from the shoreline. The Boothbay Harbor Planning Board issued a stop work order based upon these violations.

[¶ 3] The Magnascos petitioned the Board for a permit to expand their nonconforming deck into a garage pursuant to BOOTHBAY HARBOR CODE art. XIII, § 170-98.¹ The Planning Board needed to determine whether the deck, which the Magnascos enclosed to create a garage, was originally 12' × 32' or 8' × 32'. The new garage measured 20 feet from the house, 63 feet from the water and 27 feet from the road to the edge of the garage.²

[¶ 4] The size of the original deck was important because the deck was built before the town enacted the 75 foot shoreland setback requirement, and a 12 foot deck, although encroaching upon the setback, would have been grandfathered as a nonconforming structure. The nonconforming structure ordinance only allows expansions of nonconforming structures that do not increase the structure's floor area or volume by more than thirty percent (30%). See BOOTHBAY HARBOR CODE art. XII, § 170-98. Thus, the size of the deck before the 75 foot setback was enacted would determine the permissible size of the garage.

[¶ 5] After a site visit, the Planning Board accepted the existence of the 12 foot deck and determined that the 12 foot deck encroached upon the shoreland 75 foot setback "by a 5 feet diagonal for 6 feet forming a triangle." The Planning Board concluded that the Magnascos' could build a 12' × 32' garage because the deck was originally 12 feet and granted the Magnascos' application to expand the nonconforming structure pursuant to BOOTHBAY HARBOR CODE art. XIII, § 170-98(C).³ The Board determined that the portion of the structure that encroached into the 75 foot setback was so small that it was permitted under the 30% expansion rule of the BOOTHBAY HARBOR CODE art. XIII, § 170-98(B). The decision of the Planning Board was affirmed by action of the Zoning Board of Appeals and the Sprouls then appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and this appeal followed.

II.

[¶ 6] To appeal a decision of the zoning board of appeals, pursuant to 30-A M.R.S.A. § 2691(3)(G) (1996), a party must (1) "have appeared before the board of appeals"; and (2) "be able to demonstrate a particularized injury as a result of the board's action." See Rowe v. City of South Portland, 1999 ME 81, ¶ 4, 730 A.2d 673, 674-75

(reiterating the two-prong test for standing in zoning appeals). When the party appealing is an abutter, the party need only allege "a potential for particularized injury" to satisfy the standing requirement. Pearson v. Town of Kennebunk, 590 A.2d 535, 537 (Me.1991).

[¶ 7] The threshold requirement for an abutter to have standing is minimal. Because of the abutter's proximate location, a minor adverse consequence affecting the party's property, pecuniary or personal rights is all that is required for the abutting landowner to have standing. See Rowe, ¶ 4, 730 A.2d at 674-75 (concluding that a neighbor's violation of a front yard setback requirement was sufficient injury to give the abutting landowner standing). Setback violations are a sufficient adverse consequence to give an abutter a particularized injury. See id. As abutters of property with a structure that violates setback requirements, the Sprouls have standing to appeal the decision of the Planning Board. See id. The trial court erred when it dismissed the Sprouls' appeal for lack of standing.

III.

[¶ 8] We, therefore, must turn to the merits of the Sprouls' appeal. When the Board of Appeals reviews the decision of the Planning Board in an appellate capacity, we do not review the decisions of the Board of Appeals or the Superior Court, but rather, review the Planning Board's decision directly for "error of law, abuse of discretion or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record." See Veilleux v. City of Augusta, 684 A.2d 413, 415 (Me.1996)

. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. See id. The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not make the evidence insubstantial. See id.

[¶ 9] The Planning Board based its determination of the garage's size upon three items: (1) the Magnascos' excavation contract with the builders stating the contract was for the removal of a twelve foot deck; (2) the Magnascos' insurance records stating that the deck was 12' × 32' when Magnasco bought the house; and (3) the site visit where the Planning Board personally examined the structure. These three items...