Sprouse v. Winston
| Decision Date | 12 March 1948 |
| Docket Number | 16059. |
| Parties | SPROUSE v. WINSTON. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
M. Martin Davis and I. H. Jacobson, both of Charleston, for appellant.
E. L. Willcox and W. C. Ehrhardt both of Charleston, for respondent.
This suit in equity was instituted by the appellant against the respondent, having for its object the obtaining of a permanent injunction, restraining the respondent from proceeding with the erection of a garage alleged to be in violation of certain building restrictions covering lots composing Palmetto Gardens, a residential subdivision in or near North Charleston.
A preliminary injunction was granted upon the filing of the complaint. Thereafter the cause was referred to the master in equity for Charleston County, who after taking the testimony decided all issues in favor of the respondent. An appeal was taken to the circuit court, and that court affirmed the report of the master and dissolved the temporary injunction which had been issued on April 3, 1947. This injunction restrained the respondent from proceeding with the removal of his garage to another portion of his lot, which change of location, appellant contended, would be in violation of a restrictive covenant covering the lots of both appellant and respondent.
A map of the subdivision was made on May 6, 1941, and duly recorded in Charleston County; it specifically delineates the location, metes and bounds of each numbered lot. The restrictive covenants covering all of the lots were duly recorded June 16, 1941. The particular restriction which the appellant seeks to enforce is found in Section B, and reads as follows:
The property of the respondent, Winston, is a corner lot, and is thus described in his deed:
'Measuring and containing sixty-two and five-tenths (62.5') feet in the front line on DuRant Avenue; by the same on the back line one-hundred (100') feet in depth, be the said dimensions more or less.
'Butting and bounding to the Northeast on Lot No. 4 on said plat, to the Southeast on DuRant Avenue; to the Southwest on Holmes Avenue; and to the Northwest on Lot No. 6 on said plat.'
The appellant's property immediately adjoins the lot of the respondent on the rear, and fronts on Holmes Avenue. At the time appellant and respondent bought their adjoining lots all buildings were already constructed thereon. In fact, none of the lots in the subdivision was vacant. When the respondent purchased his lot it was occupied by a dwelling fronting on DuRant Avenue, with its Southwestern line on Holmes Avenue. His garage, which fronted on Holmes Avenue was located to the rear of his residence thirty feet from that street; twelve feet from the back line, which constituted the boundary line between the lots of the respective parties, and ten feet from the side line on the Northeastern side, which separated it from Lot No. 4 as shown on the map.
After the temporary injunction was dissolved, and although this appeal promptly followed, the respondent proceeded with the removal of his garage and erected it on the location which appellant contends violates the restrictive covenant.
When moved to the new location, the dimensions of the garage were materially increased. Ten feet were added to the front, and at least three feet to the rear, so that as it now stands, it is thirty-six and five-tenths feet in length and twelve feet in width. It is set back twenty feet from Holmes Avenue, two feet and six inches from the back line of respondent's property, which is the boundary line between him and appellant; and six feet from the inside lot line on the Northeast.
Appellant's dwelling is situated only about ten feet away from the long side of the garage. It is located twenty-five feet from Holmes Avenue, which is the front line of all dwellings on that street. The new location of the garage places it five feet beyond the front of appellant's home, and its overall length of thirty-six and five-tenths feet blocks and overruns the entire side of his house; whereas the original location of respondent's garage was approximately twenty feet from the side of appellant's home, and in length extended parallel only along the rear one-half portion of his house. It is contended that as now situated, the garage blocks the view, light and air of appellant's home on that side, and depreciates the value of the property.
The appellant protested when he ascertained that respondent contemplated changing the location of and enlarging his garage which would bring it ten feet farther toward Holmes Avenue, thus placing at least one-third of the structure outside of and beyond the designated rear one-fourth of the lot, in violation of the restrictive covenant. Respondent ignored the protest, and proceeded with the building of the garage on the new location until stopped by the temporary injunction. As already stated, as soon as the injunction was dissolved, he continued and completed the construction of the garage, which now parallels his back line and extends along the whole length of appellant's home, projecting five feet beyond appellant's building line.
While we must, of course, in construing any portion of Section B of the restrictive covenants, consider the entire provision, our attention is especially directed to the latter part of it, which reads:
In the construction given this provision by the master and by the circuit court it was held that garages and other outbuildings could be erected anywhere on the rear quarter of any lot except on a corner lot, in which instance it must be set back ten feet from the side street line, and can be placed along either of the two inside lot lines. And it was held that inasmuch as the garage at its new location was situated within the rear quarter of the respondent's corner lot at a distance greater than ten feet from the side street line (Holmes Avenue), there was no violation of the restrictive covenant.
By thus construing the above provision, the lower court held, as did the master, that respondent's corner lot possessed two inside lot lines: its back line, which constitutes the boundary between him and appellant's adjoining property and the inside lot line which marks the boundary between it and Lot No. 4 on the Northeast side. ...
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