Spruiell v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 31 May 1991
• Citation: 582 So.2d 508
• Parties: June R. SPRUIELL v. Edgar S. ROBINSON, as administrator of the Estate of Ommie Lou Bryant. 89-1085.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 508

582 So.2d 508

June R. SPRUIELL v. Edgar S. ROBINSON, as administrator of the Estate of Ommie Lou Bryant.

89-1085.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 31, 1991.

Donald Hugh Jones and Wayne Michael Jones, Birmingham, for appellant.

Douglas L. McWhorter of Najjar Denaburg, P.C., Birmingham, and Albert D. Lipscomb of Lipscomb & Lipscomb, Bessemer, for appellee.

ADAMS, Justice.

June R. Spruiell appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff, the estate of Ommie Bryant, in the amount of $61,828.38 plus interest, and voiding a contract for the sale of Mrs. Bryant's Queenstown Road farm. We affirm.

Mrs. Bryant died intestate on January 11, 1987, due to complications arising from cancer. Her husband, Harry Bryant, had predeceased her in 1982. There were no children from their marriage. Mrs. Bryant was survived by a brother, two sisters, and approximately 40 nieces and nephews who were children of her deceased brothers and sisters; Mrs. Spruiell was a niece of Mrs. Bryant, but her mother, Myrtle Robinson, survived Mrs. Bryant.

Mrs. Bryant's estate consisted of her personal effects, as well as the following assets: a residence in Trussville, Alabama; a farm in Trussville; and 4 accounts at the Trussville office of City Federal Savings & Loan Association. Three of these accounts were opened by Mrs. Bryant in May 1986, solely in her name. On September 5 and 9, 1986, these three accounts were converted to joint tenancy with right of survivorship in the names of Mrs. Bryant and Mrs. Spruiell. A fourth account was opened at this time in the names of Mrs. Bryant and Mrs. Spruiell as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The money deposited into these accounts apparently was contributed solely by Mrs. Bryant, and Mrs. Spruiell made no contributions to, or withdrawals from, the accounts during Mrs. Bryant's lifetime. The balance of these four accounts totalled $61,828.38 as of the date of Mrs. Bryant's death. Mrs. Spruiell closed all four accounts on January 12, 1987, withdrawing the balance of all four accounts--$61,828.38.

Edgar S. Robinson, Mrs. Bryant's brother, was appointed as the administrator of her estate on January 29, 1987. After the administration of the estate was removed from the probate court to the circuit court, Mr. Robinson filed a complaint on June 17, 1987, seeking to recover the proceeds of four City Federal accounts from Mrs. Spruiell. Robinson alleged that Mrs. Spruiell had exerted undue influence on Mrs. Bryant in order to have her name placed on the accounts and to have the accounts converted to joint tenancies with right of survivorship. The trial court, after hearing ore tenus evidence, found that: (1) a confidential relationship had existed between Mrs. Spruiell and Mrs. Bryant and Mrs. Spruiell was the "dominant spirit" in that relationship; (2) Mrs. Bryant placed Mrs. Spruiell's name on the bank accounts as a result of undue influence exerted on her by Mrs. Spruiell; and (3) Mrs. Bryant executed the contract to sell the farm on Queenstown Road in Jefferson County, Alabama, as a result of undue influence exerted on her by Mrs. Spruiell and her husband, Jerry Spruiell. The court set that contract aside and entered a judgment in favor of Mrs. Bryant's estate in the amount of $61,828.38 plus interest at 6% per year from January 12, 1987, until the date of the final judgment, and, after the date of the final judgment, at an interest rate of 12% per year.

Mrs. Spruiell raises the following issues in her appeal: (1) Whether the trial court's refusal to allow her to call a psychiatrist as an expert to testify in her behalf was so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial; (2) whether the findings of fact by the trial court, upon which the final judgment was based, are so plainly and palpably wrong as to warrant a reversal; and (3) whether the judgment is contrary to the great weight of the evidence and will be allowed to stand. We will address Mrs. Spruiell's attacks on the trial court's findings of fact before reaching the question of the expert testimony.

At the outset, we point out that the findings made by a trial court carry with them a presumption of correctness under the ore tenus rule. As this Court has held on numerous occasions, where the trial court, without a jury, hears ore tenus evidence its judgment is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only if it is found to be unsupported by the evidence or to be plainly and palpably wrong, after a consideration of all the evidence and after making all reasonable inferences from that evidence. See, e.g., Copeland v. Richardson, 551 So.2d 353 (Ala.1989); McCoy v. McCoy, 549 So.2d 53 (Ala.1989); Knox Kershaw, Inc. v. Kershaw, 552 So.2d 126 (Ala.1989); Ford v. Jackson Square, Ltd., 548 So.2d 1007 (Ala.1989); City of Birmingham v. Sansing Sales of Birmingham, Inc., 547 So.2d 464 (Ala.1989). Furthermore, this Court will not substitute its own view of the evidence for that of the trial court. Cummings v. Hill, 518 So.2d 1246 (Ala.1987); Storey v. Patterson, 437 So.2d 491 (Ala.1983).

In the present case, the trial judge heard ore tenus evidence and made his findings based on that evidence. The trial court's judgment, based on findings that a confidential relationship existed between Mrs. Bryant and Mrs. Spruiell, that Mrs. Spruiell was the dominant figure in that relationship, and that Mrs. Spruiell exerted undue influence on Mrs. Bryant in order to have the bank accounts converted into joint accounts with rights of survivorship, are presumed correct and will not be disturbed on this appeal unless they are plainly and palpably erroneous. With this presumption in mind, we address the specific issues raised by Mrs. Spruiell, who attacks the trial court's findings.

Mrs. Spruiell attacks paragraphs 2, 6, 7, and 9 of the trial court's findings as plainly and palpably wrong, and she argues that the judgment is contrary to the weight of the evidence. The trial court's final judgment contained the following findings of fact relevant to this appeal:

"2. Mrs. Bryant spent some time in a hospital in 1979 and was diagnosed as having, among other things, organic brain impairment. Tests given to Mrs. Bryant at that time showed her pro-rated verbal IQ to be 67 which is in the range of mild mental retardation. The evidence shows that it was likely that Mrs. Bryant had...