Spruill v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1897
• Parties: SPRUILL v. NORTHWESTERN MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

27 S.E. 39

120 N.C. 141

SPRUILL v. NORTHWESTERN MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

April 6, 1897

Appeal from superior court, Franklin county; Boykin, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Sarah F. Spruill against the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company. From a judgment in favor of defendant plaintiff appeals. No error.

The expression "died by his own hand," in a proof of death, was equivalent to "suicide."--

F. S Spruill and C. M. Cooke & Son, for appellant.

Battle & Mordecai and F. H. Busbee, for appellee.

DOUGLAS J.

This is an action by Mrs. Sarah F. Spruill against the Northwestern Life Insurance Company to recover the amount of a policy of insurance issued to her, as beneficiary, upon the life of her husband, William T. Spruill. The policy, issued on the 2d day of October, 1894, provided that if, within two years from the date thereof, "the said assured shall, whether sane or insane, die by his own hand, then this policy shall be null and void." The assured died on the 24th day of July 1895, from the effects of a "pistol shot in his own hands," as stated in the proof of loss furnished to the defendant by the plaintiff as required by the terms of the policy. The complaint, among other material allegations, alleged "that on the 24th day of July, 1895, at and in the county of Nash, the said William T. Spruill died," without stating in any manner the cause of his death. The answer of defendant company set up, as a complete defense against any recovery, the date and terms of the policy, and the date and manner of death of the assured, as above set forth. The court held that the burden of proof rested upon the defendant.

During the progress of the trial the plaintiff proposed to ask one W. T. Clark, her own witness, as to the mental condition of the assured at the time of the killing. The defendant objected, the objection was sustained, and the plaintiff excepted. There is no error in the exclusion of such testimony, as, in our view of the law, as applicable to policies like the one in suit, the mental condition of the assured at the time of the killing is entirely immaterial. It is well settled that under the old forms of life insurance policies, in which it was provided that the insurer should not be liable if the assured "committed suicide," or "died by his own hand," the policy was not vitiated when the assured was insane at the time of suicide. Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & G. 668; Insurance Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580; Bigelow v. Insurance Co., 93 U.S. 284; and a long line of decisions identical therewith in the large majority of the states. In view of these decisions, the insurance companies began to insert the words used in this policy, or words equivalent thereto. As the expressions "committed suicide," and "died by his own hand," were held synonymous, the words added thereto, "sane or insane," or "feloniously or otherwise," are regarded as equally synonymous, and intended to protect the insurer from all liability where the assured committed suicide, whether sane or insane, and regardless of the degree of insanity. After careful consideration, we are of opinion that such is the legal effect of the provisions of this policy. A policy of insurance is a contract, and should be construed, like all other contracts, in such a way as to carry out the manifest intention of the parties, unless some of its provisions, conditions, or limitations are contrary to law or to public policy. It was clearly the intention of the policy of insurance in this case to protect the insurer from all liability for any form of suicide, and we do not see how such protective conditions are in any way in violation of law, or of any settled rule of public policy. Nor is the liability of the insurer affected by the degree of insanity, the word "insane" implying every degree of unsoundness of mind. The distinction drawn by some eminent authorities in cases of self-killing by an insane person, "whether his unsoundness of mind is such as to prevent him from understanding the physical nature and consequences of his act, or only such as to prevent him, while foreseeing and premeditating its physical consequences, from understanding its moral nature and aspect," does not commend itself to our better judgment. It seems to belong rather to the domain of speculative psychology than to the practical administration of the law. The determination of that shadowy line between mental twilight and night, where the last faint rays of reason, resting for a moment on the horizon of the mind, fade away into utter darkness, is practically beyond the power of finite understanding, and, to the jury, would necessarily be a matter of mere speculation, depending more upon their sympathy than their judgment. Of course, the above rule does not include death by accident or mistake, such as the accidental discharge of a pistol in the hands of the assured, or poison, or an overdose of medicine taken by mistake. There must be, at least physically, some suicidal intent, no matter how far removed from a responsible mental operation. We believe this rule to be in accordance with the better line of decisions prevailing in the majority of courts.

In the leading and well-considered case of De Gogorza v Insurance Co., 65 N.Y. 235, the court says: "We have therefore only to consider the interpretation to be given to the language of the contract of insurance, for no question is made but that it was fully understood and agreed to by both parties. It can scarcely be doubted that an insurer of the life of a person may, by apt language, guard himself from liability for all disasters, if the exemption does not contravene public policy. He may provide that if the assured shall die of the smallpox, or any other specified disease of the body, he would not be liable; and there appears to be no reason why he may not guard himself against liability if death results from any disease of the mind. Indeed, it is said by Rapallo, J., in Van Zandt v. Insurance Co., 55 N.Y. 169, 'that no rational doubt can be entertained that a condition exempting the insurers from liability in case of the death of the assured by his own hand, whether sane or insane, would be valid if mutually agreed upon between the insurer and the insured,' and then, in substance, adds that, if nothing is said with respect to insanity, the result is that a party does not 'die by his own hand' if his death happens from the involuntary act of a madman. This view of the question is but a very concise and accurate statement of the law as announced in cases previously adjudged. *** The word 'insane,' or 'insanity,' ordinarily implies every degree of the unsoundness of mind; and in this case we assumed that the assured was in the very last degree mad or insane, so that the mere act of self-destruction was wholly involuntary." After reviewing some of the leading cases the court concludes: "We prefer to place our decision upon the ground that the words of the proviso in the policy before us, by plain rules of interpretation, exempt the insurer from liability. That this language, in view of previous decisions, was inserted for such a purpose, cannot be doubted, and that it was agreed to by both the insured and the insurer is not questioned, and that it is a provision allowed by law no one denies. We are to say from these words what the parties must have intended, and we cannot properly say that additional words having no meaning were inserted in the contract; and, if they mean anything, it is just what the words commonly import, and that is, if death ensues from any physical movement of the hand or body of the assured, proceeding from a partial or total eclipse of the mind, the insurer goes free." In Scarth v. Society, 75 Iowa, 346, 39 N.W. 658, the court says: "We think that the better rule, and the logical conclusion of all the above cases, is that the condition in the policy was intended to include self-destruction, no matter what the mental condition of the insured was at the time of the act which caused the death. Of course, the policy was never intended to include death by accident, as by taking poison by mistake, the accidental discharge of a gun or pistol held in the hands of the insured, or the like. It means all suicidal acts, whether such as are demonstrated as criminal, or such as are the offspring of insanity." This construction appears to have been subsequently followed in the supreme court of the United States, as well as New York and the majority of the leading insurance states. Bigelow v. Insurance Co., supra; Insurance Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661, 8 S.Ct. 1360; Insurance Co. v. Akens, 150 U.S. 468, 14 S.Ct. 155; Riley v. Insurance Co., 25 F. 315; Billings v. Insurance Co., 64 Vt....