Sprung v. MTR Ravensburg Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 April 2003
• Citation: 788 N.E.2d 620,99 N.Y.2d 468,758 N.Y.S.2d 271
• Parties: RONALD SPRUNG, SR., Appellant, v. MTR RAVENSBURG, INC., et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

99 N.Y.2d 468

788 N.E.2d 620

758 N.Y.S.2d 271

RONALD SPRUNG, SR., Appellant, v. MTR RAVENSBURG, INC., et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued January 15, 2003.

Decided April 3, 2003.

Bloomberg and Magguilli, Albany (Michael C. Magguilli of counsel), for appellant.

Ainsworth, Sullivan, Tracy, Knauf, Warner and Ruslander, P.C., Albany (Carolyn B. George of counsel), for MTR Ravensburg, Inc., respondent.

Law Offices of Kris T. Jackstadt, Albany (Mark P. Donohue of counsel), for VF Conner, Inc. and another, respondents.

Judges SMITH, CIPARICK, WESLEY, ROSENBLATT, GRAFFEO and READ concur.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Chief Judge KAYE.

In Gebo v Black Clawson Co. (92 NY2d 387, 392 [1998]), we explicitly left "for another day the task of defining the precise outer boundary of casual manufacturer status" that insulates certain sales from strict products liability. In a sense, that day has arrived. Because we conclude that defendant VF Conner, Inc. was not a casual manufacturer of the product at issue, and because issues of fact preclude summary judgment, we reinstate plaintiff's complaint against VF Conner and one of its owners, Gordon Bell (collectively Conner).

Plaintiff was employed as an assembler at the General Electric Turbine Assembly Plant in Schenectady, affixing metal fan blades to large steam turbine shaft rotors suspended on lathes. Most of the lathes at the plant were on the factory floor, and scaffolding would enable workers to reach the upper parts of the rotor. However, one lathe—the MTR Ravensburg lathe—was installed in a pit approximately 10 feet below the factory floor. Assemblers would reach the lower portions of the rotor on that lathe by a stairway into the pit. In order to give them a place to stand when working on the upper portions of the rotor, a retractable floor consisting of large sheet metal panels was built into the walls of the pit. These panels could be extended by two workers standing in the pit, on the bed of the lathe, and reaching overhead to pull out the telescoping panels. When extended, the panels served as the floor of the work space above the pit.

On June 24, 1997, plaintiff was assigned to the MTR Ravensburg lathe to prepare a turbine shaft rotor for drilling. While plaintiff and a coworker were in the pit attempting to pull open the retractable floor, the panels came entirely out of their wall enclosure and fell on plaintiff, causing injury.

Plaintiff commenced suit against MTR Ravensburg, the lathe manufacturer, and Conner, the retractable floor fabricator, alleging causes of action for strict products liability, negligence, failure to warn, misrepresentation and breach of warranty. Conner sought summary dismissal of the complaint on the ground that, among other things, it was only a "casual manufacturer" of the floor, and thus not subject to strict products liability. MTR Ravensburg cross-moved for summary dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it in no way caused or contributed to the collapse of the floor.

Supreme Court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that Conner was not a casual manufacturer and that the record raised triable issues of fact as to the liability of both MTR Ravensburg and Conner. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. A divided Court held that the sole cause of plaintiff's injuries was General Electric's improper installation and maintenance of the retractable floor, adding that because the floor at issue was the only one manufactured by Conner, Conner was a casual manufacturer and thus immune from claims of strict products liability and negligent design.

Because we conclude that Conner was not a casual manufacturer of the floor, and that there are disputed factual issues regarding its liability, we modify the Appellate Division order and reinstate the complaint against Conner.

We first address Conner's argument, accepted by the Appellate Division majority, that it was a casual manufacturer of the retractable floor and therefore not subject to strict liability for any possible defect in the floor.

Manufacturers of defective products may be held strictly liable for injury caused by their products—meaning that they may be liable regardless of privity, foreseeability or reasonable care (see Codling v Paglia, 32 NY2d 330, 342 [1973]; Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 98 [5th ed]). A product may be defective because of a mistake in the manufacturing process, because of defective design or because of inadequate warnings regarding use of the product (see Voss v Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 NY2d 102, 106-107 [1983]).

Strict products liability rests on several public policy considerations. In light of the increased complexity of modern products and manufacturing methods, often only the manufacturer "can fairly be said to know and to understand when an article is suitably designed and safely made for its intended purpose" (Codling, 32 NY2d at 340). Relatedly, the manufacturer alone "has the practical opportunity, as well as considerable incentive, to turn out useful, attractive, but safe products" (id. at 341).

Strict products liability, moreover, appropriately applies to sellers who engage in product sales in the ordinary course of their business because such sellers "may be said to have assumed a special responsibility to the public, which has come to expect them to stand behind their goods" (Sukljian v Ross & Son Co., 69 NY2d 89, 95 [1986]; see Restatement [Second] of Torts § 402A, Comment c). More generally, the burden of accidental injuries caused by defective products is better placed on those who produce and market them, and should be treated as a cost of business against which insurance can be obtained (see Restatement [Second] of Torts § 402A, Comment c; Codling, 32 NY2d at 341).

Those same public policy considerations are inapplicable where sales of the product are not part of the ordinary course of the seller's business. Thus, "casual" or "occasional" sales are not subject to claims of strict liability (see Gebo v Black Clawson Co., 92 NY2d 387, 393 [1998]; Stiles v Batavia Atomic Horseshoes, 81 NY2d 950, 951 [1993]; Sukljian, 69 NY2d at 95-96; see also Annotation, When is Person "Engaged in the Business" For Purposes of Doctrine of Strict Tort Liability, 99 ALR3d 671).

In Sukljian, for example, we concluded that third-party defendant's sale of a surplus 11-year-old mill on an "as-is" basis was a casual or occasional sale, not subject to a claim of strict products liability, because it was wholly incidental to the seller's regular business. The "casual or...