Spruytte v. Govorchin

• Decision Date: 26 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 4:95-CV-208.,4:95-CV-208.
• Parties: Floyd J. SPRUYTTE, Plaintiff, v. Anthony GOVORCHIN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

961 F.Supp. 1094

Floyd J. SPRUYTTE, Plaintiff, v. Anthony GOVORCHIN, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:95-CV-208.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

March 26, 1997.

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Floyd J. Spruytte, Jr., New Haven, MI, pro se.

Christine M. Campbell, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION

HILLMAN, Senior District Judge.

This is a pro se civil rights action filed by a Michigan state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter is before the court on plaintiff's objections to the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation ("R & R") recommending that this court grant defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Having reviewed those objections, I accept the recommendation of the magistrate judge and GRANT defendants' motion.

BACKGROUND

As the magistrate judge noted, the instant case arises out of a lengthy state court action, Spruytte v. Owens, in which plaintiff sued a Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC") official to be allowed a particular word processor, the Smith Corona Model PWP-80 ("PWP-80"). Defendants in the instant case are the Assistant Attorney General representing defendant in Spruytte v. Owens (defendant Govorchin) and the Hearings Administrator for the Office of Policy and Hearings for the MDOC (defendant Stapleton).

After the MDOC refused to allow plaintiff to receive the PWP-80, plaintiff brought suit against MDOC official Owens, alleging that he had a due process property interest in receiving the word processor. The Ionia County Circuit Court dismissed the case on the basis of absolute immunity. Plaintiff appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals held that defendant was not entitled to absolute immunity. The court went on to find that plaintiff had a property interest in receiving the PWP-80. Spruytte v. Owens, 190 Mich.App. 127, 475 N.W.2d 382 (1991).

On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiff again appealed. On May 31, 1994, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that its earlier opinion constituted law of the case, and remanded for entry of an order directing defendant to permit plaintiff to possess the "subject word processor." Spruytte v. Owens, No. 155278 (Mich.App. May 31, 1994). On remand, the circuit court entered such an order.

By the time plaintiff prevailed on appeal, however, the PWP-80 was no longer being manufactured. As a result, plaintiff engaged in renewed disputes with the MDOC concerning whether he was entitled to receive a particular replacement model of word processor (Brother model 9000) as the functional equivalent of the word processor the court of appeals determined he was entitled to receive. On September 27, 1994, plaintiff had the Brother 9000 delivered to the Lakeland Correctional Facility. On October 4, 1994, a hearing officer rejected the Brother 9000 on the basis that it had neither been purchased within the requirements of the department nor constituted the court-ordered model. Plaintiff did not appeal the hearing officer's decision. Instead, plaintiff moved for an order of contempt in the Spruytte v. Owens case.

Before a contempt proceeding was held, plaintiff entered into an agreement settling his state court lawsuit. In that settlement agreement, plaintiff stipulated that the particular word processor referenced in the appellate court order and subsequent circuit court order was the PWP-80, which was no longer manufactured. The parties also stipulated that a third model (the Brother WP-1700-MDS) was comparable to the PWP-80. Finally, the parties agreed to a sum of damages and attorney fees to compensate for the harm suffered by plaintiff. Plaintiff further agreed that the settlement served as a compromise of the claims and defenses of the then-pending litigation and discharged defendant Owens from all claims known and unknown. The full text of the agreement is set forth on pages 6-7 of the magistrate judge's R & R.

On December 4, 1994, the state court action was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the settlement stipulation. Two days after entry of that order, plaintiff filed the instant action.

In his present complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants predetermined the outcome of the hearing officer's decision by ordering the hearing officer to reject the Brother 9000. He alleges that defendants' action constituted a violation of his right of access to the courts and that defendants took the action in retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment right to file a lawsuit in Spruytte v. Owens.

Defendants have moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended that defendants' motion be granted. Plaintiff has filed timely objections to that recommendation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews de novo those portions of the report and recommendation to which timely objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The court may accept, reject or modify any or all of the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations. Id.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of pointing the court to the absence of evidence in support of some essential element of the opponent's case. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). Once the moving party has made such a showing, the burden is on the nonmoving party to demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue for trial. Id.

In order to prove that a triable issue exists, the nonmoving party must do more than rely upon allegations, but must come forward with specific facts in support of his claim. Id. After reviewing the whole record, the court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "`[D]iscredited testimony is not [normally] considered a sufficient basis'" for defeating the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. at 2514 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1966, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984)). In addition, where the factual context makes a party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; Street, 886 F.2d at 1480.

On a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the determination of whether a complaint states a claim for relief is a question of law. Phoenix Engineering, Inc. v. MK-Ferguson of Oak Ridge Co., 966 F.2d 1513, 1516 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984, 113 S.Ct. 1577, 123 L.Ed.2d 146(1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, this court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232-33, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Andrews v. State of Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 806 (6th Cir. 1997). A complaint need only give fair notice of what plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Andrews, 104 F.3d at 806. A judge may not grant a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on a disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations. Id. While this standard is decidedly liberal, it requires more than a bare assertion of legal conclusions. "In practice, a ... complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993) (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendant raises numerous objections to the R & R. First, he contends that the magistrate judge erred by adopting the facts as stated by defendants, rather than considering those facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Second, plaintiff complains that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that plaintiff failed to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on his allegation that he was denied his right of access to the courts. Third, plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge's recommendation that plaintiff's demands for injunctive relief be dismissed as moot. Fourth, plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge's recommendation that defendant Govorchin be granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Fifth, plaintiff objects to the grant of summary judgment to defendants before allowing plaintiff discovery. Sixth, plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge's decision to the extent that it concludes he failed to state a claim of retaliation. Seventh, plaintiff claims that the facts alleged have stated a claim of denial of procedural due process and that he should be allowed to amend his complaint for a second time to incorporate that claim.

Because several of plaintiff's objections overlap or affect multiple issues in the R & R, I will address each objection in the specific context of plaintiff's individual claims as set forth in the R & R. I observe, however, that, with the exception of certain admissions by plaintiff himself in the underlying litigation, I have accepted plaintiff's...