Spurgeon v. Worley

• Decision Date: 17 February 1936
• Citation: 90 S.W.2d 948
• Parties: SPURGEON v. WORLEY, Sheriff, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

90 S.W.2d 948

SPURGEON v. WORLEY, Sheriff, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 17, 1936.

Error to Law Court, of Washington; Ben Allen, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceeding by Jordan Spurgeon against J. B. Worley, sheriff, and others. From an adverse judgment, the relator appeals.

Affirmed.

Thos. E. Mitchell, J. H. Chalkley, J. H. Winston, J. R. Simmonds, Lee Forster Miller, Jr., Robt. L. Taylor, and Wm. E. Miller, all of Johnson City, for Jordan Spurgeon.

Cantor & Cantor and McKinley Green, all of Johnson City, for defendant in error Worley and others.

COOK, Justice.

The relator, Jordan Spurgeon, sued out the writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of his restraint by the judgment of a justice of the peace. The trial judge held that the act, creating a special court for Johnson City with exclusive jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases, was invalid in so far as it deprived justices of the peace of jurisdiction and remanded the relator to custody. He appealed, and the cause is here for review upon assignments of error.

The act in question is chapter 352, Private Acts of 1935, which confers upon the city court of Johnson City original jurisdiction over all criminal cases except such as are brought to trial by indictment or presentment. Any person brought before the court charged with a misdemeanor, so the act provides, may be fined not more than $50. It further provides:

"In felony cases the Court shall act as a committing Court as now provided by law for justices of the peace. In misdemeanor cases requiring a trial by jury the court shall act as a committing court under the conditions and regulations herein provided.

"In all other misdemeanor cases the Court is empowered to hear the evidence and render judgment without a jury, and such judgment shall be final unless appealed from as herein provided.

"In misdemeanor cases in which, from their nature, there is a right of jury trial, the defendant may demand a jury at or before the hearing, and in such event the court shall hear the evidence and if there is probable cause to believe the defendant guilty shall commit such defendant to the circuit court of Washington County at Jonesboro for trial. In such cases it shall be the duty of the judge of the court before hearing such case to inquire of the defendant if he wishes to demand a trial by jury. If there is not a demand for a jury, the court shall try the case and render judgment, whether discharging the defendant, or fixing a penalty or punishment as provided by law, or committing the defendant to a jury trial in the circuit court of Washington County at Jonesboro, when, in the discretion of the court, a jury trial is required by public policy and/or in the interest of justice." Section 3.

It is insisted that the act contravenes article 1, § 8, article 11, § 8, article 6, § 1, and article 6, § 15, of the Constitution. Article 6, § 1, provides:

"The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Circuit, Chancery and other inferior courts as the Legislature shall, from time to time, ordain and establish, in the Judges thereof, and in Justices of the Peace. The Legislature may also vest such jurisdiction in Corporation Courts as may be deemed necessary. Courts to be holden by Justices of the Peace may also be established."

This provision of the Constitution, and no other, relates to the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. Article 6, § 15, merely provides for the division of the state into counties and civil districts, and that there shall be two justices of the peace from each civil district, except those including county towns to be elected by the people of each civil district with jurisdiction coextensive with the county. That provision of the Constitution does no more than recognize the office of justice of the peace as it existed at common law. The jurisdiction of justice of the peace is left to statutory regulation.

The broad power conferred by article 6, § 1, upon the Legislature to establish courts necessarily conveys power to define their jurisdiction and to transfer jurisdiction from existing courts, including the courts of justices of the peace, to the newly created court. Without such power a special court could serve no purpose. It has been common practice in the legislative history of the state to transfer jurisdiction from existing courts to special courts established to meet changed conditions produced by concentration of population and of business.

In the briefs, counsel refer to discriminatory features of the act as impairing the rights of justices of the peace, or to provisions of the act that discriminate as between justices of the peace of Johnson City and of others in the state.

While the office of justice of the peace is recognized by the Constitution, none of its provisions endow the office or its incumbents with judicial power or vested rights, and article 1, § 8, and article 11, § 8, of the Constitution impose no restraint upon the legislative authority conferred by article 6, § 1, to create courts and define their jurisdiction or to transfer jurisdiction from one court to another.

While the act is not void because discriminatory as between justices of the peace of Johnson City and those elsewhere in the state, it violates article 1, § 8, of the Constitution, which provides:

"That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."

Other constitutional provisions guarantee trial by jury upon indictment or presentment, and that right is assured in all other counties of the state. The right of trial by jury is the right as it existed upon adoption of the Constitution. Trigally v. Mayor, etc., of City of Memphis, 6 Cold. 382.

As said in Trigally v. Mayor, etc., of City of Memphis and other cases, before the Constitution divers actions between private persons and prosecutions by the state for small offenses were triable without a jury. The small offenses referred to by way of illustration in those cases were hunting and fishing on Sunday, gaming, drunkenness, and fornication, punishable by fine of from five to ten shillings, the equivalent of 62½ cents to $1.25. These are referred to in the cases to illustrate or clarify ...