Spurlin v. State, 26564
| Decision Date | 08 September 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 26564,26564 |
| Citation | 183 S.E.2d 765,228 Ga. 2 |
| Parties | Ralph SPURLIN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
B. L. Spruell, Weiner & Bazemore, Paul S. Weiner, Atlanta, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joel M. Feldman, Carter Goode, Bill Weller, Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
The appellant was convicted of armed robbery. He appealed to this court from the judgment of conviction and sentence, specifying 23 grounds of enumerated error. The nature of his contentions and such facts as are necessary to an understanding of the points raised will be set forth in the opinion.
1. The accused was imprisoned in the State penitentiary at Reidsville under sentence in another case. The District Attorney for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit filed with the State Board of Corrections a 'detainer' under the provisions of the Act approved April 8, 1968 (Ga.L.1968, p. 1110, et seq.) amending the Act approved February 20, 1956 (Ga.L.1956, p. 161, et seq.), as amended, requesting that the Board retain custody of the accused pending his delivery to the Sheriff of Fulton County to stand trial upon the indictment involved in this case. Pursuant to the provisions of § 33.10(a) of the aforesaid 1956 law (added by § 1 of the 1968 Act), the accused filed a written request that a final disposition be made of all indictments pending against him. Thereafter, he was not brought to trial on this indictment until more than two terms of court had passed, and he contends that the failure to try him within two terms of court after he filed his request for final disposition of the detainer resulted in his absolute discharge under the provisions of Code Chapter 27-19 relating to demand for trial. The obvious purpose of the 1956 Act as amended was to establish a procedure whereby prosecuting officers of the various courts of this State may notify the State Board of Corrections of pending indictments against prisoners held in any institution administered by such board and be assured thereby that such prisoners, upon completing their sentences, would not be released by the State Board of Corrections but would be turned over to the appropriate prosecuting authorities for trial on such pending indictments. That Act provides that the appropriate prosecuting officer may file with the State Board of Corrections a 'detainer' requesting that said board retain custody of an inmate pending his delivery to the proper authorities to stand trial upon any such pending indictment, accusation or information, and it further provides that the inmate against whom such detainer, or detainers, has been filed may file a request that a final disposition be had of all indictments, accusations or information pending against him on which detainers have been filed against him and that if he be not tried within two terms of court after the receipt by the appropriate prosecuting officers and court of his request for final disposition, 'all detainers based upon such pending indictments, accusations or informations shall be stricken and dismissed from the records of the State Board of Corrections.' This is the only relief granted to an inmate who makes such a request. The request referred to in that Act is not the equivalent of a demand for trial under the provisions of Ch. 27-19 of the Code and the failure to try the inmate at the term at which such request is made or at the next succeeding term, does not authorize his discharge and acquittal of the offense charged in the pending indictment, accusation, or information. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to discharge the appellant on the ground that he had not been tried at the first or second term after making the request.
2. The written request of the defendant, in the nature of a motion for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, that certain named individuals 'now confined to the State Prison located at Reidsville, Georgia,' are material and necessary witnesses for the defendant upon the trial of the case and should be produced to testify at said trial was properly denied where the affidavit in support thereof failed to show, other than by way of the conclusion of the movant, that the testimony of these witnesses would be material and that their attendance was necessary to the defendant's case, and where said motion was not made until the day the case was called for trial. Reid v. State, 119 Ga.App. 368(5), 166 S.E.2d 900.
3. Upon the trial of the case, the defendant was ably and well represented by the public defender. The fact that the public defender had previously, while serving as an assistant district attorney, prosecuted the defendant for another crime constitutes no basis for the grant of a new trial, and the point not having been raised in the trial court, this court will...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
McTaggart v. State
...rule regarding the character of the defendant. See Satterfield v. State, 256 Ga. 593, 598, 351 S.E.2d 625 (1987); Spurlin v. State, 228 Ga. 2, 5(4), 183 S.E.2d 765 (1971); Campbell v. State, 215 Ga.App. 14, 449 S.E.2d 366 (1994); Owen v. State, 202 Ga.App. 833, 835, 415 S.E.2d 537 (1992); C......
-
Graham v. State
...the identity of the perpetrator thereof, such evidence is admissible as an exception to this general rule. [Cits.]" Spurlin v. State, 228 Ga. 2(4), 183 S.E.2d 765 (1971). The two witnesses whose testimony is questioned related that appellants escaped from the jail in which they were confine......
-
Clyatt v. State
...the defendant ever objected to the continuances or filed a demand for trial within the meaning of Code § 27-1901. See Spurlin v. State, 228 Ga. 2(1), 183 S.E.2d 765. Furthermore, the defendant made no motion for continuance to secure the missing witness's attendance, nor was there evidence ......
-
Leutner v. State
...that it incidentally places the (appellant's) character in issue. Foster v. State, 230 Ga. 666, 198 S.E.2d 847; Spurlin v. State, 228 Ga. 2, 183 S.E.2d 765; Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 182 S.E.2d Testimony concerning the appellant having been seen with a gun at an unrelated time was not adm......