Spurlock v. Brown

• Decision Date: 27 February 1892
• Citation: 18 S.W. 868,91 Tenn. 241
• Parties: Spurlock v. Brown et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

18 S.W. 868

91 Tenn. 241

Spurlock v. Brown et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 27, 1892

Appeal from chancery court, Davidson county; Andrew Allison Chancellor.

Suit by Margaret M. Spurlock against C. P. Brown and others to set aside a marriage contract. Decree for complainant. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Dickinson Special Judge.

On January 4, 1884, complainant was married to S. B. Spurlock. On December 24, 1883, after the parties became engaged, a marriage contract was executed by complainant, who was then Margaret Mallon, and Spurlock, by which he conveyed to her an estate for her life in a house and lot, and she agreed as follows: "And I, the said Margaret Mallon, contract and agree with the said S. B. Spurlock, in consideration of the above conveyance, upon the consummation of said marriage, to accept the above as my portion of his property, either real personal, or mixed, moneys, choses in action, or accounts and I do hereby relinquish all my rights of dower or homestead in any real estate said Spurlock now has, or may have; and, in case said Spurlock should die before I do, I hereby relinquish all and every interest in his estate I may or would be entitled to in consequence of said marriage." Complainant had been in business, and had accumulated about $3,700, which at the time this contract was made, and at the time of her marriage, was loaned to Spurlock. Nothing was said by the contracting parties in regard to this money, nor of the effect of the marriage upon it. On March 13, 1890, about a year before his death, he executed and gave to her his note for this money, with some interest, aggregating $3,735.50, conditioned that it should not bear interest during his life. Spurlock died January 23, 1891, leaving no descendants. Respondents are his next of kin. His estate at his death was worth, net, about $100,000. If there were no marriage contract, complainant, as sole distributee, and for dower, would succeed to an estate worth about $50,000.

She filed her bill setting up these rights. In it she discloses the marriage contract, and attacks its validity as a bar to her claims. The answer specifically denies every material allegation of the bill, and controverts every proposition of law relied on by complainant. It avers that she executed the contract freely, understandingly, and for a sufficient consideration. It relies upon the contract as an equitable bar to complainant's legal rights in Spurlock's estate. At the time of the marriage complainant was about 40 years of age. She was a divorced woman, and her husband was then living. She had two children by this husband, but both are dead. Her life had been a severe struggle. She married in Ireland at 16, and soon thereafter, being deserted by her husband, went by a sailing vessel to Australia, where she supported herself for six years as a domestic servant. She returned to Ireland, and then, a reconciliation having taken place, joined her husband in Nashville. She procured a divorce from him on the ground of his cruelty. She entered in the grocery business, catering to those in lowly walks of life. She was industrious, thrifty, smart, and economical, and, in addition to supporting herself, she gradually accumulated from the business which she conducted. The record shows that she was a quiet, unobtrusive woman, and that her reputation was good.

Spurlock, at the time of the marriage, was about 63. Early misfortune had prematurely impaired his health, and caused him to withdraw from social life. He was a wholesale grocery merchant, and Mrs. Mallon was his customer. He knew her for years before her marriage, was familiar with her surroundings, and was her business adviser. It is in proof that he did not expect any children from the union. At the time the contract was made he was largely in debt, but his estate then was worth, net, fully as much as it was at his death. There is an effort to show that complainant contrived the marriage, but the proof does not sustain it. His letters, written to her two years before the marriage, plainly manifest a deep and tender interest in her, and he was a regular visitor for some months before the marriage. Her origin and antecedents were humble; but she, so far as this record shows, had achieved a competency for herself by her own efforts, and had maintained a reputable character. His antecedents and family position were good; but, constrained by a misfortune, he had banished himself from the social orbit in which he might have moved. His life was lonely, his health impaired, and he was approaching inevitable decreptitude. Leaving out all consideration of pecuniary benefits, there certainly was no advantage in his status over hers; nothing to make marriage a condescention on his part. Their marriage appears to have been happy, and the proof shows that she was a thrifty and attentive wife, who nursed him tenderly in his long and painful sickness. Complainant avers that she was induced to sign the instrument by Spurlock, who represented to her that it was meant only to save her the annoyance of going to the court-house to acknowledge deeds to his property; and that it did no cut her off, nor affect her rights as wife. This direct charge of unmitigated fraud is in strange contrast with her repeated assertions in her testimony that Spurlock was a most honorable man, who never did lie nor wrong any one.

The contract was written, at the request of Spurlock, by G. J. Stubblefield, who then was a lawyer at Nashville. He testifies that he went, at Spurlock's instance, to read and explain it to Mrs. Mallon, and that he did so, and left it with her, after Spurlock had introduced him, and retired. She denies that there was any such interview. The law would presume that she knew the contents of the paper she executed, it appearing that she was not illiterate. She admits that, on the day the contract was signed, it was in her possession about 25 minutes, while Spurlock went to get G. J. Stubblefield and Hiram Stubblefield to witness it, and that she told them, when they came, that she had read

the paper and would sign it. The paper is so plain and simple that any person of ordinary intelligence could understand that it cut off all her rights as wife in Spurlock's property. Complainant was a person of more than ordinary intelligence, and for years had successfully engaged in business. These two subscribing witnesses testify that she said, before she executed it, that she had read it and understood it. She admits that she told them that she had read it. She now says that she did not in fact read it, and that she did not know its contents. An admission, though not conclusive against the party making it, (Gardner v. Standfield's Heirs, 12 Heisk. 150; Rice v. Bank, 7 Humph. 41,) is, when made freely and without any qualification, the highest evidence, (Miller v. Denman, 8 Yerg. 237.) To overcome it, the proof must be full and unquestionable. Rice v. Bank, 7 Humph. 41. Like other parol evidence, it is subject to be weighed with other proof, and may be controlled, but it is obligatory if others, in conforming their actions to it, acquire rights with the knowledge of the person making it. Frazier v. Basset, 1 Overt. 299. This rule becomes more binding when the admission is solemn, and is made the foundation for the execution of a written contract. To corroborate complainant, two witnesses testify that she told them, on the day the contract was made, that she had signed a paper for Mr. Spurlock without reading it.

In Hayes v. Cheatham, 6 Lea, 10, the court says "The rule is that where it is attempted to be established that the statement of a witness on oath is a recent fabrication, or where it is sought to destroy the credit of a witness by proof of contradictory representations, evidence of his having given the same account of the matters, at a time when no motive existed to misrepresent the facts, ought to be received, because it naturally tends to inspire confidence in the sworn statement." This rule was approved in Glass v. Bennett, 89 Tenn. 479, 14 S.W. 1085. It is sometimes a matter of nice judgment to determine that no motive at a given time existed to misrepresent the facts. It could not be assumed in this case that no such motive existed at the time these declarations were made, for, if the testimony of G. J. Stubblefield that he had read and explained the contract to her be true, then these statements could have been made with no motive except to misrepresent facts, and lay the foundation for just such a contest as this. But this testimony does not come within the rule, and for a more conclusive reason. No effort was made to discredit her testimony as to what occurred when the contract was executed, and no corroboration on this point was needed. The attempt is on her part to show that she made conflicting statements, and to have those made after the transaction, and not as a part of the res gestae, override a solemn admission made by her before subscribing witnesses. There was no duress nor compulsion when she made this admission. To allow it to be overridden by subsequent conflicting statements would be to subvert the foundation upon which all solemn contracts rest. There is no rule under which such evidence would be competent. A number of witnesses testify to conversations had with her during her marriage, and before any question of contest was mooted, which disclose that she knew of the marriage contract, and understood its effect upon her marital rights in his estate. These witnesses are interested and prejudiced, but so is she. The weight of testimony is strongly against her; but independent of it, and of the evidence of Stubblefield that he read and explained the contract to her, we hold that her own testimony, and that of the...