Squillace v. Village of Mountain Iron

• Decision Date: 13 December 1946
• Docket Number: No. 34214.,No. 34215.,34214.,34215.
• Citation: 223 Minn. 8,26 N.W.2d 197
• Parties: SQUILLACE v. VILLAGE OF MOUNTAIN IRON (two cases).
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

26 N.W.2d 197

223 Minn. 8

SQUILLACE v. VILLAGE OF MOUNTAIN IRON (two cases).

No. 34214.

No. 34215.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

December 13, 1946.

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; Edward Freeman, Judge.

Actions by John Squillace and by John Squillace, Jr., against the Village of Mountain Iron to recover for injuries sustained by John Squillace, Jr., and for medical expenses. From judgments in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

W. O. Bissonett, of Duluth and Ben P. Constantine, of Eveleth, for appellant.

Stone, Manthey & Carey, of Virginia, for respondents.

THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice.

Actions against the village of Mountain Iron for damages arising out of an accident to John Squillace, Jr., on March 4, 1943, at about 4:00 p. m. that day. At the close of the evidence, defendant moved for directed verdicts, which motions were denied. The cases were submitted to the jury and verdicts returned in favor of John Squillace, Jr. in the sum of $20,500 for injuries, and for John Squillace, his father, in the sum of $2,500 for medical expenses. Defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts or for a new trial were denied. Judgments were entered December 7, 1945, from which defendant appeals.

For convenience, John Squillace, Jr., who was six years of age at the time of the accident, will be referred to herein as the plaintiff.

The facts, which are undisputed, are as follows: Railroad street is the main street in the village of Mountain Iron and runs in an easterly and westerly direction. On the northeast corner of its intersection with Second avenue in the village there is located a gasoline service station with a driveway extending therefrom over the sidewalk on the north side of Railroad street. The driveway commences some 86 feet east of the northeast corner of the intersection. It is 37½ feet wide, but at the time of the accident only 12 to 15 feet thereof had been cleared of snow for vehicular traffic to and from the station.

For about six weeks prior to March 4, 1943, the public sidewalk on the north side of Railroad street extending east of said driveway was clogged and obstructed with snow and ice to a height of four to six feet, making it impassable for pedestrian traffic. The snow had been piled on and south of the sidewalk by the snowplow used by the state highway department to clear Railroad street. It created a high bank of snow and ice which sloped down over the curb and extended on a slant into Railroad street for a distance of two or three feet. This bank, sloping downward into the street, had existed for at least two or three weeks prior to the date of the accident. In consequence, pedestrians desirous of traveling east on Railroad street on the north side thereof were compelled to leave the sidewalk and walk in the street over this snow-and-ice slope for some distance to the east of the driveway.

For some time prior to the date in question, it had been the custom of the school bus taking grade-school children to their homes in Mountain Iron and vicinity to stop at specified regular points at certain scheduled times along Railroad street for the purpose of discharging its passengers. One such point was the driveway of the oil station above referred to, where a number of the school children left the bus each day at about the same hour in the afternoon.

At the time of the accident, pursuant to schedule, the bus had been parked facing west immediately adjacent to the cleared portion of the driveway to discharge its passengers. The rear of the bus then extended a number of feet east of the cleared portion of the driveway. Several children, including plaintiff (then six years of age), left the bus at this point by the front right exit. Plaintiff's home was some blocks south and east of the intersection. To return there, he started to walk to the east along the right or north side of the bus. The bus driver testified that the right side of the parked bus was "right up close to the [snow] bank" on the north side of Railroad street, "approximately two feet" from it. This left only a narrow way through which the boy could pass. Since the snow-and-ice bank slanted into the street a distance of two to three feet from the north curb, the fair inference is that in passing between the bus and the snowbank plaintiff was required to walk on the slope extending into Railroad street. As he walked along this passageway after the bus had started, he slipped and fell and slid to the south under the rear wheels, which passed over his body. It is to recover for the resulting serious injuries that these actions were instituted.

The material portions of the trial court's charge with reference to negligence were as follows:

"No negligence can be charged against the Village of Mountain Iron solely because it did not plow out the sidewalk on the east end of the block where the bus stopped and where the accident occurred. * * *

"Ordinarily, however, it does have a bearing upon the question as to the care they should use in keeping the streets passable when they fail to plow out their sidewalks.

"Ordinarily, where there are sidewalks for pedestrian travel which are passable, a municipality is under a very slight duty, if any, to keep its streets in reasonably safe condition for pedestrian travel except at crosswalks; however, if the sidewalks are impassable so that pedestrians must walk in the street, a municipality is under a duty to keep its streets in the vicinity of the said sidewalks in reasonably safe condition for pedestrian travel; if from the evidence in this case you find that the sidewalks east of the entrance to the Sinclair Oil Station were obstructed so that they were not reasonably available for pedestrian travel and as a result pedestrians did travel on Railroad street, and if you find that the Village of Mountain Iron did not exercise reasonable care in keeping said street in the vicinity of the sidewalks east and west of the entrance to the Sinclair Oil Station reasonably safe for pedestrian travel, then you may find the Village of Mountain Iron negligent "* * * a municipality can be held liable if it allows its streets to get into such condition where it might well foresee that an accident might occur to persons lawfully using the streets who are themselves exercising due care for their own safety. The fact that the defendant could not anticipate or foresee that this particular accident or one like it would occur does not excuse the defendant from liability if because of the negligence of the defendant a condition was created on the street that was likely to cause an accident to someone.

"If you find that the defendant Village was negligent in allowing this ridge of sloping packed snow or ice to remain on the street in question under the existing conditions and that this was a direct or proximate cause of the accident, then the defendant is liable unless the boy, John Squillace, was also negligent and his negligence was a proximate contributing cause of the accident."

The court followed this with instructions as to the rules governing contributory negligence applicable to a boy of the age of John, as follows:

"On the question of the negligence of the boy, John Squillace, you must take into consideration his age and capacity. Young people are not held to the same degree of care for their own safety as an adult person, but a child of six years of age is required to use some care for his own safety but is only held to the degree of care that is commonly used by children of like age and capacity."

On appeal, defendant contends in substance:

(1) That the evidence fails to disclose that plaintiff actually fell or slipped on an icy ridge or slant, and hence fails to establish negligence on the part of the defendant; (2) that the evidence fails to disclose that defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in maintaining Railroad street in a reasonably safe condition for vehicular and pedestrian traffic; (3) that the evidence shows conclusively that the injuries were caused solely by the negligence of the bus driver or by the contributory negligence of plaintiff; and (4) that the court erred in instructing the jury that it was the duty of defendant to keep its streets in the vicinity of the sidewalk in reasonably safe condition for pedestrian travel.

1. We believe that the evidence, which is undisputed, reasonably sustains a finding that plaintiff slipped on the embankment slanting into Railroad street some two or three feet from the curb thereof. At the outset, the rule is well established that the view of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff must be accepted (Merritt v. Stuve, 215 Minn. 44, 9 N.W.2d 329), and that such evidence must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See, Kundiger v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 218 Minn. 273, 15 N.W.2d 487. The evidence here clearly establishes that the artificial accumulation of ice and snow created by the use of the snowplow on Railroad street caused the formation of this slope extending into Railroad street for a distance of two to three feet from its curb...