SR v. State

• Decision Date: 14 June 2018
• Docket Number: NUMBER 13-17-00072-CR
• Parties: JUAN ANTONIO NEVAREZ SR., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

JUAN ANTONIO NEVAREZ SR., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

NUMBER 13-17-00072-CR

COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

June 14, 2018

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Victoria County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Juan Antonio Nevarez Sr. appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence gained from his detention. We affirm as modified.

I. BACKGROUND

The State charged Nevarez by information with committing the offense of driving while intoxicated with a previous offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04, 49.09(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Nevarez filed a motion to suppress evidence in which he argued the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. Prior to trial, the State abandoned the language in the information alleging Nevarez had a prior conviction and as such, Nevarez was only convicted of a Class B misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. Id. § 49.04.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress at which the State stipulated that Nevarez was detained without a warrant. At the hearing, the State called Deputy Germanique Hernandez of the Victoria County Sheriff's Office, the arresting officer, to testify. She is a ten-year veteran with the Victoria County Sheriff's Office. Deputy Hernandez testified that on the evening of January 2, 2014, at approximately 10:00 in the evening, she observed Nevarez's vehicle driving very slowly in the center turn lane. She further described how she watched his vehicle waiting for him to make a turn. When she drove up next to Nevarez, with her overhead lights off, Nevarez brought his vehicle to a complete stop. Deputy Hernandez explained that she believed the vehicle was having mechanical issues or could have run out of gas, and she decided to check on the situation. Deputy Hernandez backed up her patrol vehicle and pulled behind Nevarez's vehicle, activated her lights, and exited her vehicle to approach Nevarez's vehicle. She testified that at that point, Nevarez exited his vehicle and she requested he return to his vehicle. Deputy Hernandez testified that upon approaching Nevarez, she detected signs of intoxication including glassy eyes, slurred speech, and the odor of alcohol. Additionally, the State offered and admitted the dashboard camera video from Deputy Hernandez's patrol vehicle to corroborate her testimony. Nevarez didnot present any evidence. The trial court denied his motion to suppress.

The trial court later filed the following findings of fact and conclusions of law at the State's request:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

1. That the Defendant, Juan Antonio Nevarez, Sr., ("Defendant"), was the operator of a motor vehicle in Victoria County, Texas on December 2, 2013.¹

2. The Defendant stopped his vehicle in the dark of night in the center turn lane after being observed by Deputy Hernandez to be driving at a very slow speed creating a situation that was inherently dangerous to both officer and the Defendant on public road way.

3. The Defendant's driving behavior and sudden stop in the middle of a roadway, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was in distress, having to address a disabled vehicle in the middle of a roadway.

4. The Defendant's position on the roadway presented an immediate danger to the Defendant, his passenger, and other driver's [sic] upon the roads of Victoria County, Texas.

5. The facts in the case before the court are distinguishable from Leming v. State, 454 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014), and Byram v. State, in that the defendant stopped his vehicle in the middle of a roadway, as opposed to the side of the road, placing himself, his passenger and other driver's in peril.

6. Additionally, the Defendant had committed a traffic violation by obstructing the roadway and was lawfully stopped by Deputy Hernandez.

7. Further, the Defendant's driving, stopping in the middle of a roadway, combined with the time of night, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the Defendant may have been intoxicated.

8. Upon Deputy Hernandez approaching the defendant and making contact with the defendant, smelled an odor of an alcoholic beverage, thus, it was reasonable for the Deputy to investigate the situation further.

9. Because Defendant had stopped his vehicle in the center turn lane of traffic and Deputy Hernandez smelled an odor of an alcoholic beverage, observed glassy, blood shot eyes and slurred speech it was reasonable for the Deputy to remove the defendant from his vehicle and conduct an investigation for driving while intoxicated.

10. The requisites of Miranda are not implicated by this situation because it was a temporary detention warranted by the exigency of the circumstances. The detention was brief and no longer than needed to assist the defendant vehicle with his vehicle.

This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Nevarez argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. Specifically, Nevarez argues: (1) the findings of fact and conclusions of law are not supported by the record, (2) the search was unreasonable, (3) there was no reasonable suspicion to initiate contact, and (4) the stop was not within the "community caretaking function" exception to the Fourth Amendment.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if the trial court's ruling is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We apply a bifurcated standard of review under which we give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts if supported by the record. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We give the same level of deference to the court's resolution of mixed questions of law and fact which rely upon the credibility of a witness, but review de novo pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend oncredibility determinations. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and uphold the ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When a trial court makes explicit fact findings, the appellate court determines whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports these fact findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The appellate court then reviews the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless the trial court's supported-by-the-record explicit fact findings are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. "However, in order to determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's implicit finding, the court of appeals must take all of the evidence, including the video, into account." Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The defendant in a criminal proceeding who alleges a Fourth Amendment violation bears the burden of producing "some evidence" that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A defendant meets his burden by establishing that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant. Id. The burden then shifts to the State to prove that the search or seizure was nonetheless reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id.

A traffic stop is a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes. State v. Torrez, 490 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref'd). An officer may conduct atraffic stop if it is supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The test for reasonable suspicion is an objective one that disregards the subjective intent of the officer and looks solely to whether there was an objective basis for the stop. Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). While the facts known to the officer need not rise to the level of probable cause, she "must have more than an inarticulable hunch or mere good-faith suspicion that a crime was in progress." Id. We decide whether reasonable suspicion existed by looking at the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time the detention began. Id. Whether the facts known to the officer amount to reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

B. Analysis

In his motion to suppress, Nevarez sought to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the "unlawful contact, detention and arrest of Defendant, and of any subsequent search of a 1998 Chevrolet Camaro Defendant was in . . . ." Nevarez contended that he was impermissibly detained and contacted by Deputy Hernandez without a warrant, and without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or legal process.

1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Nevarez argues that the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by the trial court are not supported by the record.

a. Paragraph 2

The trial court found that Nevarez's behavior of driving at a very slow speed and stopping his vehicle in the center turn lane was inherently dangerous. Deputy Hernandez testified during the hearing that it was not...