St. Albans Hospital v. City of St. Albans

• Decision Date: 02 January 1935
• Citation: 176 A. 302,107 Vt. 59
• Parties: ST. ALBANS HOSPITAL v. CITY OF ST. ALBANS
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

176 A. 302

107 Vt. 59

ST. ALBANS HOSPITAL v. CITY OF ST. ALBANS

Supreme Court of Vermont

January 2, 1935

November Term, 1934.

Paupers---"Transient" Person---P. L. 3926---Inferences Which May Be Drawn from Agreed Statement of Facts---Construction of Agreed Statement by Supreme Court---Sufficiency of Agreed Statement To Show Transient Persons Were "Confined" to Hospital---"House"---Recovery by Hospital against City for Care of Transient as Not Dependent on Showing That They were "Poor" within Meaning of Pauper Law.

1. Word "transient," as used in P. L. 3926, relating to relief and support of "transient person" suddenly taken sick or lame or otherwise disabled and confined to any house in town, and in need of relief, means merely person away from home.

2. Only necessary inferences can be drawn from agreed statement of facts, and intendments are in favor of party prevailing below.

3. Supreme Court never reads into findings a fact not there, and always construes agreed statement against excepting party, but must construe record reasonably, and this requirement applies to every part of record, including agreed statement.

4. In ACTION OF CONTRACT under P. L. 3926 against city by hospital for expense of caring for transients, where agreed statement showed that persons relieved were "received into" hospital and there given necessary medical and surgical attention by plaintiff, and that, after notice was given to overseer, plaintiff provided them with "necessary lodging, care and maintenance," held that such facts sufficiently showed that such transient persons were "confined" to hospital, notwithstanding omission to show expressly that they were in such condition they could not safely depart therefrom.

5. Word "house," as used in P. L. 3926, relating to relief and support of transient persons suddenly taken sick or lame or otherwise disabled and "confined to any house" in town, and in need of relief, held used in broad sense and to include all sorts of structures wherein people live, a hospital being such a structure.

6. In ACTION OF CONTRACT under P. L. 3926 against city by hospital for expense of caring for transients, it was unnecessary to show that such persons were "poor" within meaning of so-called pauper law, since no question of financial ability arises under such section until suit is brought by one town against another.

ACTION OF CONTRACT under P. L. 3926 against city by hospital for expense of caring for transients. Plea, general issue. Trial by court on agreed statement of facts at the April Term 1934, Franklin County, Sherman, J., presiding. Judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case. Judgment reversed, and judgment for the plaintiff.

Judgment reversed, and judgment for the plaintiff for $ 1,379.43, with interest thereon from the date of the writ, and costs.

J W. Redmond and Horace H. Powers for the plaintiff.

Jay Chaffee, City attorney of St. Albans, for the defendant.

Present POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and SHERBURNE, JJ.

OPINION

POWERS

This is an action of contract in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for the care, treatment, and support of certain persons under and by force of P. L. 3926, which, so far as it applies here, reads as follows: "If a transient person is suddenly taken sick or lame, or is otherwise disabled and confined to any house in a town, * * * and is in need of relief, * * * the person at whose house he is, * * * shall be at the expense of relieving and supporting such person, until he represents his situation to the overseer of the poor of the town, * * * after which the overseer of the town so notified shall provide for his support; and, if the overseer neglects to provide for such support, the person so supporting him may recover therefor in an action of contract on this statute, against the town so notified. "

The facts are agreed to. It appears from the statement thereof on file, that at different times persons residing outside of the defendant city came or were brought to the plaintiff's hospital while sick, lame, and disabled, and in need of medical or surgical attention. That they were received as patients, and such attention was given them by the plaintiff. That notices were mailed to the overseer of the poor of the city setting out these and other facts, and asking such overseer to provide for their support and relief, but he failed to do so. That thereafter the plaintiff provided such persons with necessary medical and surgical treatment, lodging, care, and maintenance to the fair value of $ 1,379.43, which the defendant has failed to pay on demand. On these facts the court below gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff excepted.

At the argument, some time was taken in discussing the meaning of the word "transient." It was quite unnecessary. As used in this statute, it means, merely, a person away from home. This has been our law for more than fifty years. It is the doctrine of Town of Danville v. Sheffield, 50 Vt. 243, 247. It is, almost literally, the definition given by Judge Barrett in Goodell v. Mt. Holly, 51 Vt. 423, 426, a case which was cited without criticism in Wilbur v. Calais, 90 Vt. 335, 341, 98 A. 913, and referred to for a definition of the word in Catlin v. Town of Georgia, 103 Vt. 97, 99, 152 A. 89. And finally, in Town of Randolph v. Lyon, 106 Vt. 495, 175 A. 1, 3, this definition was approved and applied and the law of the subject restated. It seems clear that by P. L. 3926, the Legislature, with a most worthy philanthropic purpose, intended to so provide that every person transient in the foregoing sense, whether rich or poor, whether a resident or nonresident of the town wherein he became sick, lame, or disabled, should be assured of care and treatment, promptly administered.

The defendant argues that it does not appear that these persons were "confined" to the hospital, and insists that the omission to show expressly that they were in such a condition that they could not safely depart is fatal to the plaintiff's claim.

We fully agree with the defendant that only necessary inferences can be drawn from an agreed statement of facts, and that the intendments here are in favor of the defendant, the party prevailing below. We never read into findings a fact not there. Hinsman v. Marble Savings Bank, 102 Vt. 217, 223, 147 A. 270, and we always construe an agreed statement against the excepting party. Grand Lodge etc. v. Burlington, 104 Vt. 515, 517, 162 A. 368. But we are bound to construe a record reasonably. Hanley v. Poultney, 100 Vt. 172, 174, 135 A. 713, 54 A.L.R. 371; Poulin v. Graham, ...