Grand Lodge of Vermont F. & A. M. v. City of Burlington

• Decision Date: 18 October 1932
• Citation: 162 A. 368,104 Vt. 515
• Parties: GRAND LODGE OF VERMONT F. & A. M. v. CITY OF BURLINGTON
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

162 A. 368

104 Vt. 515

GRAND LODGE OF VERMONT F. & A. M. v. CITY OF BURLINGTON

Supreme Court of Vermont

October 18, 1932

May Term, 1932.

Limitation as to Permissible Inferences Where Case Submitted on Agreed Statement of Facts---Presumptions---Taxation---Exemptions---Statutes in Pari Materia---G. L. 684, subd. VI---G. L. 694, as Amended by Acts 1927, No. 17-Statutes, Construction of---Statutes Exempting from Taxation Inapplicable under Evidence.

1. Where case is submitted on agreed statement of facts, only necessary inferences arising therefrom can be drawn or considered.

2. On exceptions in Supreme Court, agreed statement of facts is to be considered most favorable to party who has prevailed on trial.

3. Statute providing for an exemption from taxation is to be construed strictly, although construction must be reasonable and not such as will defeat purposes of statute.

4. G L. 684, subd. VI, containing general provision for exemption from taxation of property granted, sequestered, or used for charitable purposes, and G. L. 694, as amended by Acts 1927 No. 17, providing that if society or body of persons associated for charitable purposes in whole or in part including fraternal organizations, owns real estate used exclusively for purposes of such society, body, or organization, town where such real estate is located may vote to exempt it for prescribed periods, held to be in pari materia, since both relate to exemption of property from taxation, and are to be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system.

5. In construction of statutes dealing with same subject-matter legislative intent must control.

6. Real estate of fraternal order, held not to be exempt from taxation, G. L. 684, subd. VI, containing general provision for exemption from taxation of property granted, sequestered, or used for charitable purposes, having no application, and exemption under G. L. 694, as amended by Acts 1927, No. 17, not being available, because city where real estate was located had not authorized its exemption.

ACTION OF CONTRACT to recover taxes paid under protest. Plea, general denial. Heard on an agreed statement of facts by the court at the September Term, 1931, Chittenden County, Bicknell, J., presiding. Judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment affirmed.

Charles H. Darling and Charles B. Adams for the plaintiff.

Theo. E. Hopkins for the defendant.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and GRAHAM, JJ.

OPINION

MOULTON

This is an action of contract to recover taxes paid under protest. The judgment of the trial court was for the defendant, and the plaintiff has brought the case here on exceptions.

There is an agreed statement of facts, by which the following appears: The plaintiff is composed of the three principal officers of the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the State of Vermont, who have received corporate powers in perpetuity under No. 259, Acts of 1896; and holds the title to the Masonic Temple in the city of Burlington. This building was erected in 1898, and was appraised by the assessors of the city, and set in the grand list for the year 1930. The plaintiff protested to the assessors claiming that the property was exempt, under G. L. 684, subd. VI. The protest was disallowed and an appeal was taken to the board of civil authority, but the action of the assessors was sustained. The taxes were then paid under protest. No question is made as to the regularity of the assessment except in so far as the claim of exemption is concerned, and all statutory requisites have been complied with.

The plaintiff is the governing body in this State of the secret society generally known and called "Free Masons," the members of which are distributed among subordinate lodges. The first floor of the Temple is rented for stores; a part of the second floor for offices; and the balance of the second floor and all of the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth floors are rented to other masonic bodies, with the exception of a part of the third floor which is occupied by the plaintiff as its office and library. The plaintiff also uses such part of the upper floors as it needs for its meetings.

The original conveyance of the property contained no provision concerning the uses or purposes of the grant. By a resolution, adopted by the plaintiff in 1899, it was provided in substance that, until the temple should be paid for, the net income from the rent of the building should be applied for this purpose, but that thereafter such net income should be set apart for the purpose of securing a Masonic Home and charitable uses, and "that it be used for such purposes, and such purposes, only, forever." The Temple has been paid for, and during the time here material the net income, after the payment of operating expenses, repairs, etc., has been transferred to a permanent charity fund, and disbursed for the benefit of the members of the order and for the relief of others in need of assistance. This fund is also composed of assessments on the individual members of the subordinate lodges, together with interest and donations received.

According to the agreed statement, "The teaching of Free Masonry is a study of morality based on and inculcated in the practice of moral and christian virtues, especially those of brotherly love and relief and the practice and recognition of the cardinal virtues, particularly the three, temperance, fortitude and justice, and of the christian virtues, faith, hope and charity; charity being recognized as one of the chief tenets of the order."

The plaintiff bases its claim upon that clause in G. L. 684, subd. VI, which provides that real and personal estate granted, sequestered or used for public, pious, or charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation. It is argued that the masonic body is a charitable organization, and that the temple is sequestered or used for charitable purposes.

It must be remembered that we are dealing with an agreed statement of facts, and that only necessary inferences arising therefrom can be drawn or considered. Hooper Tr. v. Kennedy, 100 Vt. 314, 317, 137 A. 194; City of Barre v. Town of Bethel, 102 Vt. 22, 25, 145 A. 410; Drew v. Bowen, 102 Vt. 124, 127, 146 A. 254. The statement is to be considered in the light most favorable to the party who has prevailed on trial. Reed v. Hendee, 100 Vt. 351, 355, 137 A. 329. Furthermore, a statute providing for an exemption from taxation is to be strictly construed ( Rixford Mfg. Co. v. Town of Highgate, 102 Vt. 1, 5, 144 A. 680; Sheldon v. Sheldon Poor House Ass'n, 100 Vt. 122, 130, 135 A. 492; Frazier v. William H. Slack & Bro. , 85 Vt. 160, 162, 81 A. 161), although, of course, the construction must be reasonable, and not such as will defeat the purposes of the statute (...