St. Clair v. Com., Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole

• Decision Date: 30 May 1985
• Citation: 493 A.2d 146,89 Pa.Cmwlth. 561
• Parties: Frank ST. CLAIR, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 146

493 A.2d 146

89 Pa.Cmwlth. 561

Frank ST. CLAIR, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Respondent.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs March 11, 1985.

Decided May 30, 1985.

Frank St. Clair, pro se.

Lester G. Nauhaus, John H. Corbett, Richard S. Levine, Pittsburgh, for petitioner.

Robert Greevy, Arthur R. Thomas, Harrisburg, for respondent.

Before CRAIG and PALLADINO, JJ., and BARBIERI, Senior Judge.

BARBIERI, Senior Judge.

Frank St. Clair (Petitioner) filed a civil action in the nature of a request for mandamus against the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) addressed to our original jurisdiction under Section 761 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761. The essence of Petitioner's contention before us is that the Board erred in denying him time credit on the maximum term of his six to thirty-year Philadelphia County sentence when it returned him to prison as a convicted parole violator on September 19, 1983. Petitioner has filed a motion for summary judgment in his favor and the Board has cross-moved for summary judgment.

Petitioner was originally sentenced in Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court in 1971 to a combined term of six to thirty years as a result of his conviction for Aggravated Robbery ¹ and Burglary. ² That sentence had an effective date of December 1, 1970 and carried an initial maximum term expiration date of December 1, 2000. He was released on parole on this sentence from the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (SCI--Graterford) on January 25, 1978. Petitioner was incarcerated again on this sentence from January 3, 1979 as a result of technical parole violations and the Board granted him re-parole effective January 25, 1980. He was arrested by Philadelphia Police on November 13, 1980 on a bench warrant and charged with Resisting Arrest. ³ The Board lodged its warrant the following day. Petitioner was also free on bail from pending charges in Montgomery County. Petitioner was convicted on the Montgomery County charges on April 29, 1981 and sentenced to a term of one to two years on June 12, 1981. On September 18, 1981, the Board continued him on parole as to his six to thirty-year Philadelphia County sentence but he remained incarcerated at SCI--Graterford to serve the minimum term of his Montgomery County sentence. He was paroled on the Montgomery County sentence effective August 26, 1982. He was arrested on October 28, 1982 by Philadelphia Police on new charges and the Board lodged its warrant the following day. On January 24, 1983, petitioner was convicted in Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court of Defiant Trespass, ⁴ Possession of an Instrument of Crime, ⁵ Burglary, Theft by Unlawful Taking ⁶ and Criminal Trespass. ⁷ On June 21, 1983, he was sentenced to a term of one and one-half to three years on the new convictions. On September 19, 1983, after conducting the required hearings, the Board ordered petitioner recommitted to prison as a convicted parole violator to serve twelve months backtime and extended his maximum term expiration date as required by Section 21.1(a) of the Parole Act ⁸ to June 18, 2004. ⁹ It is the Board's computation of this extended maximum term that petitioner challenges.

Proper Basis for Jurisdiction

Prior to addressing the merits of the summary judgment motions now before us, we must first examine the proper basis for invoking this Court's jurisdiction. While neither party has raised jurisdictional issues in their motions, this Court may always raise sua sponte the issue of its own subject matter jurisdiction. Altieri v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, --- Pa. Commonwealth Ct. ---, 495 A.2d 213 (1985); Gordon v. Pulakos, 48 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 442, 410 A.2d 899 (1980); McMahon v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 135, 400 A.2d 255 (1979).

This Court's jurisdiction is unique in that it is wholly statutory as found within Sections 761-764 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 761-764. Our original jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed to encompass civil actions or proceedings by or against the Commonwealth or any officer thereof "acting in his official capacity" or where otherwise specifically conferred by statute. Unlike jurisdictional criteria applicable to other courts of this Commonwealth, our jurisdiction is predicated upon the identities of the parties and the capacities in which they are sued. The nature of the cause of action asserted assumes importance and only becomes critical in determining jurisdiction with respect to causes asserted against an officer of the Commonwealth acting in his official capacity. General State Authority v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 24 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 82, 87-88, 354 A.2d 56, 59 (1976); Konhaus v. Lutton, 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 181, 183, 344 A.2d 763, 764 (1975).

Here, petitioner has asserted a claim in mandamus against the Board. The Board is clearly a Commonwealth agency and this Court enjoys jurisdiction in actions brought against it. Bronson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050, 101 S.Ct. 1771, 68 L.Ed.2d 247 (1981). There is also little question that actions in mandamus directed against Commonwealth agencies or officers acting in their official capacities are properly within the original jurisdiction of this Court. Jones v. McCullough, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 637, 305 A.2d 54 (1973). The issue now becomes whether petitioner's cause of action against the Board is a proper action in mandamus which is directed to our original jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 761 or whether it is in the nature of an appeal from an order of the Commonwealth agency directed to our appellate jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 763.

Mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there exists a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and the want of any other adequate and appropriate remedy. Donnell v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 61 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 517, 434 A.2d 846 (1981). Here, petitioner seeks to compel the Board to credit his six to thirty-year Philadelphia County sentence with time he spent in various programs in 1978 and 1979, and for time he spent incarcerated on the Montgomery County sentence in 1981 and 1982. He does not, however, contest the validity of the Board's action in revoking his parole and returning him to prison as a convicted parole violator. We had previously held that where a parolee contests only the computation of time credited to his original sentence by the Board, and not the validity of his recommitment, the parolee has stated a proper cause in mandamus and comes within our original jurisdiction. Green v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 56 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 408, 409 n. 1, 424 A.2d 639, 640 n. 1 (1981).

However, our Supreme Court has subsequently cast doubt upon the validity of our holding in Green when it held that a parolee's claim for time credit against his original sentence was not a proper action in mandamus but rather was an appeal from an order of a Commonwealth agency directed to our appellate jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 763. McMahon v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 504 Pa. 240, 470 A.2d 1337 (1983). To the extent that Green authorizes parolees claiming credit against their original sentences from the Board to proceed under our original jurisdiction, that holding is overruled by McMahon. Therefore, claims by parolees for time credit are properly addressed to our appellate jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 763 and that portion of our order of September 5, 1984 which grants petitioner the right to proceed under 42 Pa.C.S. § 761 is hereby vacated and we shall treat the petition for review filed by him as directed to our appellate jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 763. ¹⁰

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As we have determined that petitioner's action is properly an appeal from an order of a Commonwealth agency, we must now determine whether petitioner has exhausted his available administrative remedies with the Board. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which we have previously held to be applicable to the Board's recommitment orders, a parolee is required to exhaust all available administrative remedies before a right to judicial review of that order arises. Krantz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commonwealth Ct 38, --- n. 3, 483 A.2d 1044, 1046 n. 3 (1984); Lantzy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 82 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 626, 627 n. 2, 477 A.2d 18, 19 n. 2 (1984); see also, McMahon, 504 Pa. at 243, 470 A.2d at 1338 (Nix, J., dissenting). Therefore, a parolee's failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies acts as a bar to judicial intervention in the administrative process. See Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1028, 39 L.Ed.2d 123 (1974); FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 85 S.Ct. 1459, 14 L.Ed.2d 383 (1965).

The primary purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to ensure that claims will be heard, as a preliminary matter, by the body having expertise in the area. This is particularly important where the ultimate decision rests upon factual determinations lying within the expertise of the agency or where agency interpretations of relevant statutes or regulations are desireable. In addition, the exhaustion doctrine provides the agency with the opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to moot judicial controversies. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 92 S.Ct. 815, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972); A & B Wiper Supply, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 514 F.Supp. 1145 (E.D.Pa.1981), see also, Paterson Redevelopment Agency v. Schulman, 78 N.J. 378, 396 A.2d 573 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900, 100 S.Ct. 210, 62 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979). The...